China’s illusion of influence in the Middle East

Since the unrest erupted in Iran late last year, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened military action against the country. Despite ongoing nuclear negotiations between the two nations, reports of an imminent US attack on Iran have been widespread. Given that the US has deployed a large number of military forces near Iran, US-Iran relations are highly likely to undergo significant changes this year, whether through negotiations or military action. The international community widely believes that such changes will be detrimental to China.

In fact, prior to the outbreak of the Gaza war on 7 October 2023, comments about China-US competition in the Middle East or China challenging the US position in the region frequently appeared in international discourse. Such topics were particularly highlighted after the US withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 and China’s mediation of Saudi Arabia-Iran relations in March 2023.

However, such viewpoints are increasingly losing traction. Over the past two-plus years of war and intense turmoil in the Middle East, China has engaged in very few high-impact interactions with the region. Meanwhile, although many Middle Eastern countries resent Washington’s biased policy toward Israel — and even Israel itself is sometimes dissatisfied with US Middle East policy — almost no country would disagree that the US is the nation most likely to gradually stabilise the currently highly volatile Middle East.

Due to the distinct roles played by China and the US, Middle Eastern countries hold different expectations of these two global powers. Even when discussions about Sino-US competition in the Middle East were at their peak, I did not view China as a challenger to the US.

For a long time, the US and China have operated on separate tracks in the region. China’s cooperation with the Middle East focuses primarily on economic and trade relations, while US engagement centres on security and high-technology collaboration. Moreover, judging by the performance of the second Trump administration, the US appears to have learned from China’s approach to engaging with Arab nations — that is, by showing respect and offering praise in diplomatic interactions.

The Middle East and the global landscape are undergoing significant transformations. It can be said with certainty that there exists both space and motivation for China and the Middle East to expand their cooperation.

After decades of war and turmoil, a growing number of Middle Eastern countries are placing greater emphasis on economic and social development. Having achieved remarkable successes following its reform and opening up, China has become a development model for many nations in the region. Breakthroughs in high-technology sectors such as artificial intelligence have further enhanced China’s appeal to Middle Eastern countries. With advantages in traditional industries coupled with the rise of emerging fields, China has become an ideal partner for numerous nations in the Middle East.

Trade and investment statistics between China and Middle Eastern countries also reveal substantial potential for cooperation. In 2024, the total import-export volume with Middle Eastern countries accounted for only about 8% of China’s total foreign trade, while China’s direct investment flows to the region represented merely 1.2% of its outbound investment. Characterised by generally underdeveloped industrial systems, inadequate infrastructure, and significant technological gaps, the Middle East remains one of the world’s regions most in need of external investment and trade partnerships.

However, it must be acknowledged that there is still a long way to go to turn the potential for China-Middle East cooperation into reality. For example, the free trade agreement negotiations between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which were launched in 2004, have yet to reach a consensus. 

During his visit to the Middle East in December 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the GCC Secretary-General and stated frankly: “The China-GCC FTA negotiations have been ongoing for over 20 years. The conditions are basically mature, and it is time to make a decisive move at this critical moment.” Nevertheless, despite years of efforts, substantial progress has not been made in settling the oil and gas trade between China and Arab countries in RMB.

In recent years, China-Arab relations have been regarded by China as a highlight of its Middle East diplomacy. However, as demonstrated by the China-GCC free trade agreement negotiations, numerous obstacles remain in Sino-Arab cooperation. For instance, some Arab states, including GCC member countries, practice diversified diplomacy by striving to maintain balanced relations among world powers. Particularly in security and military domains, they continue to rely heavily on the US, which compels them to consider American positions and reactions when engaging with China.

Moreover, in its engagements with Arab nations, China’s need for their political support is evident. As demonstrated during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Jordan last December, the joint press releases issued after talks with each country’s foreign minister included expressions of support for the “one China” principle and for China’s hosting of the second China-Arab States Summit. 

To some extent, this gives these countries leverage to negotiate with China. It is noteworthy that in the joint press release following talks between the foreign ministers of China and the UAE, China once again expressed its support for the UAE’s efforts to peacefully resolve the “Three Islands” issue through bilateral negotiations.

Over the past three years, China has publicly expressed its stance on the “Three Islands” issue at least three times during its engagements with Arab countries, which has triggered strong dissatisfaction from Iran. These three islands in the Persian Gulf of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa are regarded by Iran as an inseparable part of its territory. 

Arab countries constitute the vast majority of Middle Eastern nations, yet in terms of power and influence, three non-Arab states — Turkey, Israel and Iran — are undeniably core regional powers. Due to China’s initial response to the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas and other Gaza-based armed groups, as well as China’s repeated statements on the Palestinian issue in recent years, Israel’s negative perception of China has intensified. How to strike a diplomatic balance between Arab and non-Arab countries has become an urgent issue for China’s Middle East policy.

Today, despite facing numerous challenges, President Trump’s Gaza peace plan is advancing step by step. His administration is also compelling Iran to shift its stance toward the US, and is likely to succeed. These advancements and changes are more beneficial to the US. It is certain that, at some point in the future, Iran will lodge more direct complaints or even protests to China regarding the “Three Islands” in the Persian Gulf.

Despite some challenges China faces in the Middle East, as mentioned earlier, there is objectively room for cooperation between China and the region. China does indeed have its own advantages. However, China must take note that Middle Eastern countries, which are in urgent need of national development, are increasingly emphasising pragmatism and the feasibility of cooperative documents in their engagements with other nations. While ceremonial and principle-based diplomacy will always have its place, without a foundation of practical cooperation, the former can hardly yield positive significance. This is also an aspect China needs to prioritise in its diplomatic approach to the Middle East.

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