South Korea’s ‘pragmatic’ China policy in a vortex of uncertainty

In September 2025, President Lee Jae-myung announced that “a new South Korea has returned to the international community”, after a period of political disarray for several months due to the former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed martial law. Typically, South Korea’s progressive governments would prioritise sovereignty vis-à-vis the US and historical justice vis-à-vis Japan while being accommodating of China’s preferences and tolerant of North Korea’s provocations. In contrast with initial expectations, for the past nine months, Seoul’s diplomacy has demonstrated a surprising degree of continuity despite the change of government.

As the world is drifting into a vortex of perilous uncertainty, optimism is a luxury for South Korea, situated at the crossroads of intense great power politics. The Lee government seems to take the Korea-US alliance and Korea-US-Japan trilateral cooperation seriously. But Washington’s whimsical monsoon of tariffs and wilful pressure for investment, as well as its view of allies as negotiable commodities, could ignite anti-American sentiments among non-conservative constituents in South Korea. Seoul-Tokyo relations also require extra doses of care and attention, as their Achilles heel — issues related to history and Dokdo (aka Liancourt Rocks) — could turn the clock back at any time.

China has tougher homework for the Lee administration. More specifically, four issues merit attention. First, during the past nine months of probing sessions, Seoul and Beijing mutually expressed goodwill as the former suspended the convention of asking Taipei to provide refuelling stops for the Black Eagles air demonstration squadron, while the latter relocated the controversial manned facility unilaterally installed in the Provisional Measures Zone in the Yellow Sea. Maximum protocol was also granted on the occasions of the V-Day ceremony in Beijing in September (for which South Korea dispatched the National Assembly Speaker), Xi Jinping’s November state visit to South Korea in 11 years, and Lee’s first presidential visit to China in January 2026 (during which he met with three Politburo Standing Committee members). 

Second, despite the exchanges of maximum protocol and goodwill, no joint statements or joint press releases came out of the two summits in just two months. Against high hopes, China’s ban on the Korean Wave since 2016 was not lifted. Nor did Beijing utter the magic phrase of “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”. For one, it may have been China’s meticulous response to South Korea’s unwavering stance on Taiwan: (1) Seoul respects Beijing’s “one China” position; (2) it opposes unilateral changes of the status quo in Taiwan; and (3) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait should be maintained. For another, perhaps, Beijing prefers to save rewards and punishments for later as, for now, it seeks to closely observe Seoul’s positioning on key issues in the face of growing Trumpian uncertainties. 

Third, dormant is the North Korean variable. As the Lee government manifests strong will to open dialogues with its northern counterpart, South Korea wishes to enlist whatever support it can garner from China. Yet two stumbling blocks are on its way. One refers to a peculiar state of Beijing-Pyongyang relations. Despite Kim Jong Un’s first visit to China in six years for the V-Day ceremony, Xi made a state visit to Seoul instead of reciprocating it. In January 2026, North Korea’s state media mentioned Xi’s New Year greetings but did not provide details. The same was true of the Chinese media’s coverage of Kim’s message to Xi. The about-face in China-North Korea relations is not yet complete. The other factor points to Kim’s wish to deal directly with Trump, as he did so confidently eight years ago. This, too, places clear limits on China’s role in facilitating inter-Korean or North Korea-US talks.

Fourth, during the past decade, South Korean views of China have consistently declined without signs of improvement. According to a recent joint survey by Seoul National University and Chosun Daily, those with favourable perceptions of China dropped from 23.1% in 2015 to 12.9% in 2025, while the figures for the US being 54.2% and 53.8%, respectively. The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Surveys are also in line with these findings. Whether the Lee administration is willing to adopt a China policy against these mainstream public opinions remains uncertain.

The world has been plunged into a vortex of profound uncertainty. In this new world disorder in the making, the long US-China competition will continue, as there cannot be two tigers in one mountain. Despite the scheduled summit meetings between Presidents Trump and Xi in April and thereafter, with maximum protocol and best optics, finding a shortcut to managing competition responsibly will not be easy. Unless Washington is willing to cede the Indo-Pacific to China as its sphere of influence, that is. Consequently, navigating through the ever-tapering channel of Sino-American confrontation is a conundrum for East Asia and for South Korea in particular.

Three challenges, among others, stand out. First, prudent positioning is required of South Korea in accommodating America’s — often outrageous — pressures for tariff and investment while, at the same time, maintaining sufficient space in the fast-changing global supply chain, particularly that of critical minerals. Second, devising an effective yet workable scheme for defence maximisation is a must. In the face of Pyongyang’s growing nuclear threats and of Washington’s dwindling support, Seoul is in desperate need of a new plan for self-strengthening as well as of alliance modernisation. Third, figuring out how to make common voices with like-minded countries — middle powers in particular — is a necessity, as they must now get used to doing it without America’s nudging.

In the increasingly feral settings of a new post-liberal system, where no norms constrain state behaviour, survival becomes the highest virtue of all. Currently, international affairs are only passing through the entrance of a long dark era without knowing where the exit could be. As South Korea is walking on a tight rope, critical tests await the Lee administration’s “pragmatic” diplomacy.

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