Trump in Beijing: Why China may miss Trump after 2029
Even as US-China rivalry deepens, Beijing may look back on Trump’s transactional unpredictability as a rare stabiliser in an increasingly ideological and uncertain post-Trump world, argues Lianhe Zaobao associate China news editor Sim Tze Wei.
After nine years, Donald Trump is back in Beijing as US president.
In that time, China has transformed, becoming more confident, at least in its external narrative and posture. Trump has also evolved, shifting from a “disruptor” of China-US relations to a more cautious “risk manager”. The direct ideological confrontation between China and the US has cooled, with pragmatic interests and manageable strategic competition increasingly taking centre stage.
What remains unchanged, however, is that once Trump leaves Beijing, the US and China could easily turn on each other with the flick of a switch.
Relations changed at the flick of a switch
What remains unchanged, however, is that once Trump leaves Beijing, the US and China could easily turn on each other with the flick of a switch. After he leaves office in 2029, the “transactional stability” Trump has maintained may evaporate, and relations could slide back into ideology-driven structural rivalry.
Looking back to 2017, trade and economic ties — the erstwhile “ballast” of China-US relations — were upended under Trump 1.0.
From 8 to 10 November 2017, Trump made his first visit to China as president. As the first foreign leader to be received following the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress, his visit carried a special political and diplomatic significance.
Then, Chinese ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai described the visit as a “state visit-plus” in scale. Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife accompanied Trump on a tour of the Palace Museum, and had afternoon tea at the Baoyun Building. The two heads of state also shared an intimate dinner at the Jianfu Palace within the Forbidden City. This was reportedly a rare instance since 1949 of a foreign head of state receiving such a high-level reception inside the palace; some overseas media even described it as “imperial-style” hospitality.
During Trump’s visit, Chinese and US companies signed 34 cooperation agreements worth US$253.5 billion, yielding substantial results.
Yet shortly after Trump returned to the US, China-US relations took a sharp downturn, and trade tensions escalated rapidly. In early 2018, the US imposed tariffs on solar panels and washing machines, prompting China to launch anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into US sorghum, triggering multiple rounds of tit-for-tat trade battles between both sides. By May 2019, the US added Huawei to its Entity List, and the trade and tech wars erupted side by side.
China and the US are already trapped in a long-term vortex of strategic rivalry, where attacks and counterattacks of varying intensity have become routine, making a complete rupture unnecessary.
High cost of ruptured relations
In January 2020, China and the US signed the Phase One trade deal. Beijing pledged to increase purchases of US agricultural products, energy and other goods by at least US$200 billion over 2017 levels in 2020 and 2021, in exchange for the US pausing certain tariff hikes.
However, the global outbreak of Covid-19 prevented China from fully implementing the agreement, and with Trump’s defeat in 2020 and his departure from office in 2021, the deal ultimately fizzled.
Might a similar scenario repeat itself for Trump 2.0? High-level receptions, massive orders and a thaw in relations — only for China and the US to be at odds again within months?
If a visit to the US by China’s leader happens in the second half of the year, or if the leaders of China and the US both attend multilateral meetings hosted by the other side — first the G20, followed by APEC — then warmer personal ties between the two leaders would greatly reduce the likelihood of a further deterioration in bilateral relations.
However, the absence of dramatic confrontations does not mean the absence of contradictions or tensions. A more likely scenario is that China and the US are already trapped in a long-term vortex of strategic rivalry, where attacks and counterattacks of varying intensity have become routine, making a complete rupture unnecessary.
For example, on the eve of Trump’s visit to China, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions against 12 individuals and entities linked to Iran, accusing them of violating US sanctions by helping Iran transport oil to China. Meanwhile, China introduced new regulations targeting supply chain security and extraterritorial jurisdiction, strengthening its tools against sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction. The expansion of this “countermeasure toolbox” has also made the deterrence balance in China-US relations increasingly complex.
The growing number of Chinese countermeasures has also somewhat raised the cost of conflict between the two sides, making a complete breakdown in relations more difficult and thereby sustaining a fragile yet relatively stable balance.
After China’s “rare-earths card” proved highly effective, it appears increasingly confident in retaliating against the US. The growing number of Chinese countermeasures has also somewhat raised the cost of conflict between the two sides, making a complete breakdown in relations more difficult and thereby sustaining a fragile yet relatively stable balance.
This is like the logic of deterrence between nuclear powers: when both sides possess the capacity to inflict enormous damage, the cost becomes so devastating that the likelihood of full-scale conflict actually declines.
What happens post-Trump?
But the bigger problem is that this fragile equilibrium cannot last indefinitely, because Trump is not a president for life. Once he leaves office in 2029, a more critical question will emerge: will China-US relations lose this “transactional stabiliser” and revert to a more ideologically driven dynamic rivalry?
After the next US president takes office, will executive orders once again be used to overturn Trump’s second-term policies, much as both former US President Joe Biden and Trump relied heavily on executive orders to reverse each other’s agendas upon entering office? Within hours of being sworn in, Biden signed 15 executive orders overturning some of Trump 1.0’s policies; Trump, upon returning to office, also signed executive orders revoking nearly 80 Biden-era policies.
At that point, will China come to miss Trump — the transactional US president who cared little for ideological crusades, played by none of the conventional rules, yet remained willing to negotiate over almost everything?
For this reason, most mainland Chinese scholars believe Beijing will not place excessive expectations on any possible shift in Trump’s verbal framing of the Taiwan issue, because a future US president could easily overturn Trump’s policies after taking office, let alone loosely worded verbal statements.
Indeed, no one can say with certainty what the world or China-US relations will look like in the post-Trump era. Especially as artificial intelligence (AI) becomes rapidly embedded in everyday life across the globe — and may even emerge as a core pillar of national economic operations and military systems — the trend towards securitisation is likely to intensify further. This could make international cooperation on AI governance increasingly difficult, while competition becomes more readily infused with ideological overtones and bloc-based dynamics.
At that point, will China come to miss Trump — the transactional US president who cared little for ideological crusades, played by none of the conventional rules, yet remained willing to negotiate over almost everything?
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中国会不会“怀念特朗普”？”.
![[Video] Lim Siong Guan: Can Singapore survive?](https://cassette.sphdigital.com.sg/image/thinkchina/e168c5c1a28b42fe72448478a1c7c9f4e4d41500b920c3141fa5f40677706b27)
