Beijing’s sanctions only strengthened the Philippine defence chief

At the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) held in Singapore on 31 May, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr’s remarks rested on two ideas. One, the need for like-minded states to work together to preserve a rules-based order in the maritime domain amid the constant challenge to the waters of the Indo-Pacific region. Two, which was more controversial and provocative, was the reference to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the biggest challenge facing some smaller ASEAN archipelagic member states with competing maritime claims, notably the Philippines. 

Teodoro Jr’s first point is indicative of a growing concern about a “rules-broken” order (raised at SLD 2024 by Sir John Chipman, former executive chairman of The International Institute for Strategic Studies) permeating different regions. The second point, repeatedly calling out the PRC as the “problem”, the “outlier” in the contested waterway, has once again sparked the ire of Beijing. 

Upping the ante with sanctions

The diplomatic war of words between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea (SCS) row is nothing new. It is an ongoing political rhetoric between the two sides, reflecting their growing dissatisfaction with each other’s actions in the SCS. Teodoro’s sharp reiteration of the Chinese government as the problem is particularly telling of the defence chief’s stern view of China. This stance can be explained by incidents that occurred before the SLD gathering of defence ministers. 

The Chinese foreign ministry’s immediate response, however, to not only criticise Teodoro for his “repeated erroneous remarks concerning China”, but also to impose sanctions against him by prohibiting him and his family from entering mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, and prohibiting entities in China “from engaging in any transactions, cooperation, or other activities with Teodoro ​and his spouse and child” is characteristic of China’s use of coercion time and again. Beijing uses its sheer size to punish an adversary, a pattern typical of its ‘bullying,’ and may signal yet another round of friction in Philippine-China relations. 

Tit-for-tat actions

Less than a month before the SLD, from 4 to 11 May, the Philippine Armed Forces reportedly tracked 35 Chinese ships sailing within Philippine territorial waters, particularly inside four of the most contested flashpoints: the Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal, Escoda (Sabina) Shoal, Pag-asa (Thitu) Island and the Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese vessels included 15 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships and 20 Chinese Coast Guard ships. In the previous month of April, 62 Chinese ships were spotted in the same waters. 

The expanded Chinese presence across multiple locations coincided with the 2026 Balikatan military exercises between the Philippines and the US, which ran from 20 April to 8 May. This year’s Balikatan was joined by the two countries’ closest allies, including Japan, Australia and Canada. The annual military drills are a symbol of stronger defence ties between Manila and Washington. The two allies are also working with countries that share similar goals of “protecting our (the Philippines) rights and interests under UNCLOS”, the Philippine defence chief said. 

Apart from joint military training and port visits, the Philippines and Japan are also working more closely to finalise arrangements for the sharing and protection of classified security information. “This vision is already coming to life through our ever-expanding network of allies and partners. We have conducted maritime cooperation activities with the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and India, and we are open to the participation of other countries that share our commitment to a Free and Open Indo Pacific,” Teodoro said in his speech at SLD. 

Meanwhile, for China, as part of its grey-zone tactics and in response to this showcase of the alliance’s military capabilities, sending Chinese ships during the Balikatan military drills sends a clear message — that China is here despite the presence of Philippine allies. In addition, the Philippines’ SCS task force reported the presence of a floating structure in the disputed Scarborough Shoal that appeared to be an antenna, with the Chinese foreign ministry reiterating China’s “indisputable” claim over the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao in Chinese), including adjacent waters. For its part, the Philippine foreign ministry filed a diplomatic protest over the “illegal presence” of the floating structure and demanded its removal. 

Taken together — the concentration of Chinese vessels in the four contested waterways, the timing to coincide with the Balikatan exercises, the floating structure in the Scarborough Shoal, and the evolving security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, of which the Philippines stands at the fulcrum with the defence secretary representing that shift — collectively created a political environment where a strong Philippine response became more likely.

The Philippine defence chief reportedly received the information about the floating structure on 30 May, a day before his scheduled speech at the SLD. Then, Teodoro hit back at China in his opening statement by referring to this year as the 10th anniversary of the arbitral award on the SCS, a landmark ruling that “affirmed the fundamental principle that maritime entitlements are derived not from ‘historic rights’ but from international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS”. 

In particular, Teodoro alluded to the “growing concerns over certain actors’ behaviour against these much smaller neighbours. To this day, the PRC, upon whom the 2016 arbitral award is legally binding, continues to disregard it…. Instead of honouring their obligations under UNCLOS, the PRC exhorts the Philippines to ‘return to the path of negotiations’…. In the Philippines’ experience, (therefore), negotiations are a path not to conflict resolution but a means of gaining advantage. And we will not be deceived,” said the Philippine defence chief.

In another plenary session, when asked by a Chinese delegate about the Philippines’ repeated actions that contradict the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS, Teodoro said, “The problem does not lie within ASEAN. The problem lies with the counterparty to the Code of Conduct (COC), China…. The problem lies with the outlier, and perhaps they would like a vigorous COC so they can bargain for a status quo, which is unfair and unacceptable to a lot of claimant countries.”

China playbook tactics may not be working

The Chinese foreign ministry’s immediate response was to criticise Teodoro after he “repeatedly made erroneous remarks”. Beijing condemned Teodoro for his ingratitude toward Chinese aid. It urged Manila to take action to prevent “a few clowns” from sabotaging bilateral ties through repeated political theatrics, which could seriously undermine trust. “This is a typical case of biting the hand that feeds you,” said the spokesperson of the Chinese embassy in the Philippines. The condemnation was soon followed by the sanctions against the Philippines’ defence secretary, which he merely shrugged off and asserted that he would continue his duty in the face of Beijing’s “wickedness”.

From diplomatic spat to sanctions, a playbook that China has used that spans decades as a form of punishment when either a country or, in this case, an individual pushes back against China’s interests. So far, however, China’s playbook tactic has worked in favour of the Philippine defence chief, who has been a vocal critic. It stoked Philippine nationalism, rallied the military and the Philippine foreign affairs behind him, and labelled Beijing’s imposition “an unfriendly act” that could further strain relations.

And in the eyes of the wider regional public, it showcased China’s bullying behaviour, an ill-tempered attempt to pressure the other party to cower down into submission. Also, it raised questions about China’s credibility in managing the SCS disputes peacefully with its smaller ASEAN neighbours. 

The PRC’s sanctions may have been intended to sanction and deter, but they only legitimised Teodoro’s criticisms, rallied support behind him, and further damaged China’s image among its neighbours. This outcome so far serves as a reminder that power is not measured solely by the ability to impose its will on others, especially on smaller states. Rather, it is equally measured by the ability to influence behaviour without resorting to aggression. Another round of friction between the Philippines and China may be in the offing until Beijing learns that power is relational, not a tool for coercion.

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