Beyond anti-corruption: Xi Jinping’s next push to tighten control over China’s officials

(Edited and refined by Candice Chan, with the assistance of AI translation.)

The Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is set to convene in Beijing for four days from 26 October. Besides the much-anticipated personnel changes within the Central Committee, the plenum will focus on “steadfastly advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance”.

When the agenda was first announced, observers initially assumed that the meeting would centre on the fight against corruption. But the concept of “full and rigorous Party self-governance” clearly encompasses much more than anti-corruption efforts.

There are growing indications that the CCP leadership is seeking to tighten oversight of officials and impose greater constraints on how they carry out their duties, possibly through more detailed performance assessment mechanisms. The decisions taken at the Fifth Plenum could therefore have far-reaching implications for the management and discipline of China’s officialdom.

Meanwhile, the relentless anti-corruption campaign of recent years shows no sign of easing and is likely to ramp up even more. Some observers have even remarked in private that the CCP’s “real fight against corruption” may just be starting.

On 21 September, the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee reviewed feedback on a draft decision document on advancing full and rigorous party self-governance. The meeting endorsed the draft for its objective assessment of the achievements and lessons of the party’s governance efforts since CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping came to power, its in-depth analysis of the challenges facing party building now and in the coming years, and its strategic plans for sustaining these efforts. The revised document will be submitted to the Fifth Plenum for deliberation.

Huang Qifan and other cases

Just two weeks before the plenum, former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan, nicknamed a “roly-poly toy” in Chinese politics, was officially placed under investigation on 13 October for “suspected serious violations of discipline and law”. Huang stepped down as Chongqing mayor a decade ago, and had long since moved away from frontline politics, frequently appearing as an economist. Chinese media outlet Caixin reported that Huang and his son, Huang Ranfei, were taken from their home by the authorities on or around the evening of 10 October, shattering the widespread belief that the elder Huang had managed to retire from politics unscathed.

A few days later, the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) published a commentary noting that “over the past week, two former centrally managed officials were announced to be under investigation or expelled from the Party”. It said this again demonstrated the unwavering determination of the CCP Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, to pursue the fight against corruption, sending a strong signal that there would be “no areas off-limits, full coverage, and zero tolerance”.

The commentary also stressed that “all Party members and officials, regardless of their rank, contributions or retirement status, have no way out and no so-called safe landing if they have engaged in corruption”.

Although Huang was not named, the reference was unmistakable. The message was politically significant: not only would retirement offer no protection from investigation, but officials who were corrupt yet competent would no longer be tolerated.

More importantly, Huang’s ability to survive successive political upheavals after moving from Shanghai to Chongqing was clearly due to more than his personal capabilities — he also had an intricate network of political and economic connections behind him. The decision to act against Huang ahead of the Fifth Plenum therefore appears aimed at the vested interests surrounding him, while serving as a stern warning to others within the political establishment.

With the anti-corruption campaign still in full swing, academics estimate that as few as 291 full and alternate members of the Central Committee may be left to attend next week’s plenum. That would be a drop of over 20% from the 376 members elected to the 20th Central Committee in 2022, comprising 205 full members and 171 alternate members.

Since last year’s Fourth Plenum, another 20 or so full and alternate members have come under investigation, died or disappeared from public view for extended periods, including former Central Military Commission vice-chairman Zhang Youxia and former Politburo member Ma Xingrui. The number of senior officials whose expulsions are formally confirmed at the Fifth Plenum could therefore reach a new high.

Yet, fighting corruption is hardly new territory for the Fifth Plenum. The real priority is to advance full and rigorous party self-governance “with higher standards and more concrete measures”.

Last week, the Qiushi website published a speech Xi delivered at the CCDI’s fifth plenary session in January this year, offering a preview of the themes likely to dominate the upcoming plenum.

Xi stressed that implementing the major decisions and directives of the CCP Central Committee was a fundamental requirement of party discipline and political rules. “We cannot just shout slogans, much less say one thing and do another. Anyone who violates these requirements must be held accountable. Those who deserve criticism must be criticised, those who need to be reassigned must be reassigned, and those who warrant disciplinary action must be disciplined. Such matters must not be played down or handled ambiguously.”

Xi went on to describe the many forms of “two-faced” behaviour among officials. Some loudly proclaim their political loyalty while quietly defying orders, doing as they please and even openly disregarding directives and prohibitions; others embrace liberalism in their thinking.

Some are political opportunists who resort to flattery and deception, shift their loyalties with the prevailing winds and stand ready to jump ship at any moment; others engage in factionalism, building their own power bases and cliques while pursuing narrow group interests under the guise of collective action.

Still others put their own interests first in their work; some are so concerned with avoiding confrontation that they fail to intervene or correct problems, allowing them to fester and spread — they claim to be preserving unity, when in reality they are simply shirking responsibility.

Xi also called for stricter enforcement of formal rules to curb the influence of unwritten ones. He warned that political fixers and fraudsters continued to thrive because informal practices had undermined the effectiveness of laws and regulations, creating a “broken window” effect in which bad practices drove out good ones.

Performative obedience

The very problems Xi highlighted reveal a deeper contradiction: despite the extraordinary concentration of power at the top, the leadership has still struggled to secure genuine loyalty from the bureaucracy, often receiving little more than “performative obedience”.

This is a longstanding problem in China’s political system. Years ago, there was already a saying that “orders from Zhongnanhai never make it beyond its walls”, reflecting the difficulty of translating central directives into action on the ground. But the problem also stems from the many challenges and competing demands that officials at different levels face in carrying out their duties.

China’s bureaucratic culture and the practical dilemmas facing its officials cannot be changed overnight. For now, the leadership has little choice but to rely on regulations and disciplinary measures to keep these problems in check.

In a lengthy article published this week by US think tank Asia Society, senior fellow Neil Thomas noted that the number of officials at various levels disciplined under party or administrative rules for “formalism” and “bureaucratism” had surged from 46,000 in 2023 to 118,000 last year. With the implementation of the decision document expected to be adopted at the Fifth Plenum, the crackdown on such practices will continue to tighten.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中共五中全会主题：强化反腐又不止反腐”.

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