Building lifelines: North Korea’s China-Russia tightrope

(Edited and refined by Bai Kelei, with the assistance of AI translation.)

Rumours of North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un’s death have resurfaced.

On 19 October, claims that Kim had suffered a brain haemorrhage and died after being rushed to Beijing for emergency treatment went viral on social media outside China. The following day, the Korean Central News Agency released photographs of Kim visiting a clothing and footwear exhibition the day before, in an apparent rebuttal of the rumours. South Korean officials said they had no reliable information that Kim had died.

This is not the first time Kim has been falsely reported dead. Such rumours have surfaced at least six times: in 2014, twice in 2020, in 2021, in 2025 and now. A social media ecosystem with few checks, North Korea’s highly insulated political system and concentrated power, and the enormous implications of its supreme leader’s health for East Asia have all provided fertile ground for such unverified rumours. The BBC even published an article exploring why rumours of his death keep resurfacing.

Although these rumours deliberately involved China, they caused barely a ripple on Chinese social media. In sharp contrast to the online clamour, the geopolitical landscape is quietly shifting. Two road bridges linking North Korea with Russia and China have opened in succession, reflecting Pyongyang’s subtle yet complex interactions with its two neighbours.

Border bridges signal shifting alliances

The road bridge over the Tumen River between North Korea and Russia opened on 7 September. About five weeks later, on 15 October, the New Yalu River Bridge linking China’s Dandong with North Korea’s Sinuiju entered service. One in the north-east and the other in the north-west, the bridges point to two directions in North Korea’s foreign relations. They demonstrate Kim’s political skill in using modest leverage to influence the China-North Korea-Russia triangle, expanding his strategic room for manoeuvre between the two major powers and exploiting their differing needs to maximise his gains.

The sharply contrasting fortunes of the two bridges reveal profound differences in the nature of China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea relations. Plans for the road bridge between Russia and North Korea were agreed during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024, and construction began in April last year. By contrast, the main structure of the New Yalu River Bridge, a four-lane, dual-carriageway cable-stayed bridge, was completed as early as 2014. But delays in building connecting roads and border checkpoint facilities on the North Korean side left it idle for about 12 years before it opened.

The rapid progress of the Russia-North Korea road bridge was underpinned by a sharp warming of bilateral ties. Outside observers believe the Russia-Ukraine war has increased North Korea’s strategic and military value to Russia. Besides supplying military material, North Korea has, according to Ukrainian and South Korean estimates, sent more than 10,000 troops to support Russian forces in the war against Ukraine. Russia reciprocates by supplying Pyongyang with energy and food, alongside potential cooperation in military technology. The bridge’s opening establishes a direct overland logistics route, paving the way for future trade and travel between both countries.

Avoiding total dependence on China

China accounts for more than 90% of North Korea’s foreign trade, and Beijing has long provided Pyongyang with indispensable industrial supplies and economic support. The opening of the New Yalu River Bridge will help expand border trade and consolidate Beijing’s economic influence. It also reflects Beijing’s desire to strengthen ties with North Korea as Russia-North Korea exchanges intensify. Yet the bridge’s 12 years of disuse also starkly illustrate the fluctuations in China-North Korea relations and their mutual wariness. Although North Korea cannot do without China’s economic lifeline, it also wants to prevent its economic dependence from translating into political subordination.

The strategic significance of the two bridges lies not only in increasing transport capacity, but also in giving North Korea more options for engaging with the outside world. China provides economic support that is difficult to replace, while Russia offers the military and security cooperation Pyongyang is eager to secure. Together, these two routes form twin lifelines for North Korea’s survival and development.

Tightrope between major powers

As the leader of the smallest player in this power triangle, Kim has recognised China’s strategic interest in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and preventing a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. He has also seized on Russia’s urgent need for military support as it remains embroiled in the war with Ukraine. By deepening cooperation with Russia, Pyongyang not only gains leverage but also avoids becoming wholly dependent on a single major power.

Meanwhile, the New Yalu River Bridge also shows that Russia is not an economic replacement for China. North Korea can diversify its dependency through Moscow, but it cannot escape its economic reliance on China. The opening of the Russia-North Korea road bridge shows that Kim continues to increase his diplomatic options to avoid having China as his sole support.

Despite their similar positions on some international issues, China, Russia and North Korea have not formed an alliance. China prioritises border stability and risk management. It does not want the West to group it into a “China-Russia-North Korea axis” and maintains a calibrated distance from the military alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow. Russia is focused on its wartime needs, while North Korea places regime survival and nuclear deterrence at the heart of its priorities.

With China and Russia providing a dual layer of economic and security “protection”, a more confident Kim would have considerable leverage should he meet with US President Donald Trump. With these two major backers, Pyongyang is likely to have very little appetite for concessions on the nuclear issue. If Washington insists on complete denuclearisation as a precondition for talks, any renewed engagement may struggle to produce a substantive breakthrough. Asked on 19 October whether he would meet Kim during his November trip to Asia for the APEC summit in Shenzhen, Trump was guarded, saying he was “unsure whether anyone has proposed a meeting”. This suggests considerable uncertainty over whether the two would make contact before the end of the year.

Recurring rumours of Kim’s death underscore the outside world’s close attention to North Korea’s highly centralised regime. The successive openings of the two new bridges reflect Kim’s survival strategy as he manoeuvres between major powers. Pyongyang’s shrewdness lies in making it difficult for either China or Russia to abandon it. Its vulnerability lies in its dependence on China’s economic support and the question mark of how long Russia’s wartime needs will last.

Moscow needs Pyongyang’s wartime support, while Pyongyang needs security cooperation with it. Beijing does not want to lose North Korea, while Pyongyang does not want to be wholly constrained by it. The two cross-border bridges neatly illustrate the delicate balance between mutual need and wariness as countries large and small navigate geopolitical tightropes.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “金正恩屡“被传死”与两座新桥”.

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