Is China still Trump’s number one target?

Despite being the US’s biggest strategic competitor, China was not President Donald Trump’s primary target at the start of his second term. Instead, he first imposed tariffs on neighbouring countries and allies, announcing plans for a 25% tariff on goods imported from Canada and Mexico.

Initially set to take effect on 1 February, Trump paused these tariffs after Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reiterated commitments — some previously made — to enhance border security with the US. Additionally, Trump voiced dissatisfaction with the trade deficit with the European Union (EU) and hinted at taking trade measures against allies like Japan.

Although Trump on 22 January announced his intention to impose a 10% tariff on goods imported from China — which he carried out on 1 February — there is a clear difference in magnitude compared to the 25% tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods, or the “60% tariffs” that he had previously threatened.

Taking these along with Trump’s claim that China and the US can solve all of the world’s problems together and his plan to visit China within the first 100 days of his presidency, one cannot help but wonder if China is still Trump’s number one target. Does Trump in fact hope to join hands with China?

The answer is obvious: China is still Trump’s and the US’s biggest competitor. The reason Trump did not target China from the start could be due to differences within his team, or that he may wish to develop a more mature, systematic, and effective China strategy first. This relates to Trump’s experience during his first term.

Trump initiated a trade war against China in March 2018. By 2019, tariffs had been imposed on the vast majority of Chinese goods. However, this direct confrontation was ineffective: it not only failed to significantly reduce the US’s trade deficit but also disrupted global supply chains, increased costs for American consumers, resulted in the loss of export markets for farmers and sparked discontent among its allies. To Trump, Europe not only failed to help the US counter China but instead became a force that China used to constrain the US.

Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why the US is pressuring Canada, Mexico and the EU. Focusing on US neighbours and allies actually serves a larger strategic goal of re-establishing a US-centric global supply chain and trade system, and even the global order itself.

Through measures such as tariff threats, Trump is attempting to achieve numerous goals: one, consolidate America’s dominant position in trade rules; two, encourage allies to reduce their economic ties with China; and three, ensure that these countries are more closely aligned with the US’s stance in future China-US competition.

Moreover, from another perspective, altering relationships with neighbouring countries and allies is also easier to do. Be it Mexico, Canada or European allies, they all rely on the US to a certain extent. Thus, rather than “firing shots” at China right from the start, it is better to address the issues within its own alliances first — stabilising the internal before fighting external forces.

Here, “internal” not only refers to reaching a consensus within the US, but also among its allies. By restructuring its alliance system, the US can position itself more advantageously in future strategic competition with China. Trump does not want the US’s European allies to become a force that China can leverage again as he advances his plans targeting China.

Similarly, Trump’s eagerness to end the Russia-Ukraine war also reflects this strategic intent. By facilitating a peace agreement, the US is not only able to redirect more strategic resources to Asia but also seize the opportunity to weaken Russia’s reliance on China, or encourage Russia to remain neutral in China-US competition, thereby changing the balance of power on a geopolitical level.

However, there is no guarantee of success for these policies, which are also not without risks. For example, apart from tariffs, Trump seems to have no better measures against Russia. On 22 January, he threatened to sanction and impose new tariffs on Russia if Russian President Vladimir Putin did not end the war in Ukraine.

However, according to the statistics from the US Census Bureau, Russia’s exports to the US only amounted to US$2.9 billion in 2024, far lower than the US$29.6 billion in 2021 prior to the war. Thus, the effectiveness of tariff threats as a deterrent against Putin is highly questionable.

Similarly, Trump’s hardline policies against its allies and neighbouring countries could cause rifts in the US’s relationships with its allies in the short term, including accelerating Europe’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” — as championed by France during Trump’s first term — or prompting retaliatory tariffs on US goods.

However, European strategic autonomy is not necessarily entirely detrimental to the US. In fact, it could benefit the US’s global strategic layout. When Europe becomes more autonomous in the military and security aspects, especially in dealing with the Russian threat independently, the US can redirect more strategic resources to Asia and concentrate its efforts on dealing with the China threat. In the long term, this seemingly contradictory development may in fact be more aligned with long-term American strategic interests, especially given that Europe is unlikely to completely break away from the US.

Thus, by pressuring his allies, Trump might be able to establish a new transatlantic order with a clearer hierarchy, regardless of the final outcome. At the same time, by quickly resolving the conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the US can reallocate more strategic resources to Asia. This will afford Trump more resources and energy to push his plans targeting China forward.

Perhaps because of the experiences during his first presidency, Trump is now more deeply aware that the effectiveness of unilateral actions is limited in today’s highly interconnected global economy, and that it is difficult for the US to fully advance its plans to contain China alone.

However, from Trump’s perspective, a containment strategy based on uniting and coordinating with allies is also unreliable and unlikely to be effective. Just as he demands full loyalty from his government officials to himself, he is more eager to build an alliance system that obeys him and the US so that his ideas can be better implemented. 

Reshaping such an alliance system will take time, as will the establishment of a mature, systematic and effective China strategy framework. This may therefore be the reason why Trump did not “fire shots” at China right from the start. As for his so-called goal to visit China within the first 100 days of his presidency, it could well be the deadline for him to finally implement his China policy.

In other words, Trump is now aiming to formulate and finalise his China policy, while also restructuring the alliance system during this period. Then, during his visit to China, he will reassess China-US relations, understand China’s policies, positions and bottom lines, and make the final decision on his China policy. 

Thus, Trump’s approach, which seems to target allies right from the beginning, could in fact be a way of seeking a more mature China strategy. In dealing with the China challenge, Trump hopes to build a more systematic and comprehensive strategy, instead of engaging in straightforward and direct confrontation like he did during his first term.

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