China’s underground market for anti-corruption leaks

(Edited and refined by Candice Chan, with the assistance of AI translation.)

In a year of leadership reshuffles and an unrelenting anti-corruption campaign in China, self-media accounts have been uncannily “predicting” the downfall of officials by quietly posting their resumes before their purge is announced. A Chinese Communist Party (CCP) journal has now revealed that bureaucratic insiders have turned anti-corruption news into an underground business, profiting from advance leaks. Authorities are moving to crack down on the illicit trade in insider information.

An article published on 17 July by Banyuetan, a CCP journal aimed at grassroots officials, said that some Chinese self-media accounts post officials’ résumés, homophones, coded language and aliases to hint that an official is about to face investigation. Soon after an official’s résumé is posted, an official announcement of the person’s downfall often follows, with such predictions repeatedly proving accurate.

Former Vice-Minister of the CCP Central Propaganda Department Cai Fuchao was officially announced on 15 July to be under investigation, becoming the 40th centrally managed official to be brought down this year amid China’s relentless anti-corruption investigations.

Like Cai, many senior Chinese officials had already been the subject of cryptic posts circulating on social media platforms such as WeChat, Douyin and Xiaohongshu before the official announcements of their investigations. The phenomenon has become a distinctive feature of online political information leaks in China, even giving rise to the mocking term “Douyin Organisation Department”.

How it works

A review by Lianhe Zaobao (LHZB) found that self-media accounts typically post the resumes of Chinese officials in three situations: before officials are formally investigated for disciplinary or legal violations, ahead of promotions or transfers, and when rumours emerge after they unexpectedly miss important public engagements or before their deaths in office are officially announced.

The Banyuetan article said such information often comes from within the political system itself. Some public servants leak internal information for financial gain, acting as insiders, before the information is repeatedly resold through online chat groups, creating a covert industrial chain focused on profiting from anti-corruption information.

Citing investigators, the article said that since last August, a first-grade principal staff member of the Party committee at a government agency in Guiyang, Guizhou province, had joined six relatives to operate nine WeChat public accounts. The accounts published officials’ résumés to hint at forthcoming promotions or investigations, generating income by monetising online traffic.

Hard to prove intent

Wang Shengyu, a research assistant with the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, told LHZB that in China, there has always been strong public interest in political gossip. This year marks a nationwide round of local leadership reshuffles, while the CCP’s 21st Party Congress is due next year. “The conflict between the public’s growing appetite for political gossip and the increasingly restricted supply of political news inevitably creates this kind of black market.”

Investigators noted that internet users do nothing more than post officials’ résumés, but the true intent lies in what the posts imply. Because such posts neither fabricate rumours nor disclose state secrets, they fall into a legal grey area, leaving authorities without a clear legal basis to take action against those responsible.

Wang said: “If a leader doesn’t turn up for work for several days, or jumps to their death at the workplace, are people really not allowed to talk about it? That makes no sense… To some extent, such political rumours are already semi-public information.”

Calls for punishment

However, Banyuetan also noted that some self-media accounts fabricate sensational stories after officials are brought down, exaggerating corruption allegations and inventing lurid scandals. One account, for example, published a vulgar and sensational article alleging that three female municipal leaders in Guiyang engaged in sexual relationships with male lovers to secure promotions. Police in Guizhou and other parts of China later launched targeted crackdowns, resulting in the closure of the accounts involved.

According to Banyuetan, information on anti-corruption investigations and personnel appointments are “key political information of the state”, and must not be exploited for profit. The journal revealed that disciplinary inspection and supervisory authorities in Guizhou and other regions have established information-sharing and coordination mechanisms with the police to tackle such new forms of information leakage.

The article also quoted unnamed experts and grassroots officials as arguing that self-media accounts should still be punished if they are found to have leaked internal information, even where they have not fabricated rumours, in order to deter future violations.

Wang said: “Given that this is a leadership reshuffle year, CCP and government agencies will be even more cautious about political discipline and confidentiality, particularly regarding personnel vetting and evaluation. What happened in Guizhou may well be replicated across the country, and self-media accounts specialising in politically sensitive information are likely to face a broader crackdown as a result.”

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “自媒体抢先预告官员落马 中国换届年整治“内鬼”“新型泄密””.

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