COP31: China pushes back on green protectionism while deepening its Pacific ties

As the international community converges on Antalya, Turkey, for the 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP31) from 9 to 20 November, the global climate regime finds itself at a profound geoeconomic crossroads. Operating under an innovative co-hosting model where Turkey hosts and Australia steers the official negotiation process, COP31 is ostensibly tasked with accelerating global electrification, driving zero-waste initiatives, slashing methane emissions and keeping the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target within reach.

Yet beneath the technical negotiations over emission reductions lies a fierce contest over industrial policy, trade protectionism and global governance architecture. For Beijing, COP31 is not merely an environmental summit; it is a critical diplomatic arena to project its status as a “responsible big power” (负责任大国), advance its newly minted Global Governance Initiative (GGI), and push back against mounting Western trade barriers on clean technologies. 

China’s defensive-offensive strategy

The official agenda of COP31, heavily influenced by Australia’s presidency priorities, emphasises practical implementation, clean energy transitions, zero-waste targets and regional climate resilience. However, China arrives in Antalya with a distinctly defensive-offensive posture. Beijing has signalled its explicit intent to use COP31 to push back against the proliferation of Western clean energy tariffs. 

Facing aggressive anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties, as well as the operational rollout of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes carbon costs on carbon-intensive imports, Chinese policymakers view these trade measures not as legitimate environmental safeguards, but as disguised protectionism designed to blunt China’s commanding lead in green manufacturing.

Analytically, the UNFCCC negotiating framework is poorly suited for resolving bilateral or plurilateral trade disputes, which fundamentally fall under the jurisdiction of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Consequently, Beijing is unlikely to secure formal rollbacks of Western tariffs directly through COP text agreements. Nevertheless, COP31 serves as an invaluable political megaphone. By aligning with other developing nations and major emerging economies, China can leverage multilateral platforms to delegitimise unilateral trade restrictions, framing green protectionism as a direct threat to global climate mitigation speed and affordability.

The energy security imperative

Last year, China updated its 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), committing to an absolute emissions reduction of 7-10% from peak levels by 2035 and expanding non-fossil energy to over 30% of its total energy mix. This climate pledge, however, was profoundly reframed by the Middle East conflict and the near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Because over half of China’s crude oil imports originate from the volatile Persian Gulf, geopolitical chokepoints transformed China’s climate pledges from mere environmental aspirations into urgent imperatives for national security, economic resilience, and rapid electrification.

This strategic pivot towards becoming an “electro-state” has supercharged China’s green industrial policy. Dominating 80% to 90% of global manufacturing capacity in solar modules, wind turbines, and electric vehicle (EV) batteries, China has successfully driven down global renewable equipment costs. However, this hyper-expansion has triggered severe domestic overcapacity, price undercutting, and intense international pushback. Western economies argue that heavily subsidised Chinese clean tech threatens domestic industrial survival, prompting defensive trade walls.

At COP31, Beijing finds itself caught in a structural tension: while it demands open global markets for its renewable exports, it simultaneously criticises the EU’s CBAM as “unfair” and “discriminatory”. In response, China is accelerating the expansion of its national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a carbon market that requires companies to hold or purchase emissions allowances based on their carbon output, effectively putting a price on pollution and incentivising industries to cut emissions. The scheme is slated to cover all major high-emission industrial sectors, including steel, cement, aluminium and petrochemicals, by 2027. By tightening its domestic carbon market and gradually raising carbon prices, Beijing aims to inoculate its export industries against foreign carbon levies while retaining carbon revenues domestically.

The blue maritime economy and the GGI

Beyond trade defence, China’s COP31 strategy places heavy emphasis on the blue maritime economy and normative global governance reform. Under President Xi Jinping’s vision, Beijing has increasingly articulated concepts like the “Community of Marine Destiny” alongside the GGI, unveiled in late 2025. The GGI — complemented by the Global Security, Development, and Civilisation Initiatives — serves as Beijing’s conceptual vehicle to champion “true multilateralism” and challenge Western-dominated international norms.

The Pacific Pre-COP: Australian ambitions and ground realities

To understand the geopolitical undertones of COP31 regarding developing regions, one must examine the recent diplomatic manoeuvres in the South Pacific. In October 2026, Fiji hosted the official Pre-COP31 preparatory meetings, followed by a Leaders’ event in Tuvalu, in close partnership with Australia. For Canberra, orchestrating a successful Pacific-centred pre-COP was viewed as a strategic opportunity to consolidate its diplomatic and security influence vis-à-vis China’s growing footprint in the “Blue Pacific Continent” by championing regional climate survival, 1.5°C alignment, and the newly established Pacific Resilience Facility.

However, international news reports and analytical assessments, such as evaluations by the Pacific Security College, noted that the Pre-COP experienced a somewhat lacklustre reception, marred by headlines of a “pre-COP flop” driven by the absence of top leaders from the world’s largest industrial emitters.

My field research trip to Fiji and the Solomon Islands this year tells how Pacific Island Countries (PICs) navigate this great-power competition. Interviews with central bank officials, employer federations, academic leaders, and embassy staff revealed that development challenges in the Pacific are overwhelmingly structural — driven by geographic fragmentation, high freight and energy costs, brain drain, and climate vulnerability — rather than ideological.

In countries like the Solomon Islands, external partnerships are evaluated through a pragmatic, demand-driven lens. Beijing’s visible infrastructure contributions — including national stadiums, modern hospital buildings, arterial roadways, and national broadband communication networks — alongside continuous deployment of medical teams performing groundbreaking surgeries, have established a tangible, highly appreciated footprint. Local stakeholders widely reject simplistic narratives of “debt-trap diplomacy”, emphasising sovereign debt prudence and preference for concessional financing. Similarly, in Fiji, China is perceived as a normalised, functional economic and commercial participant operating alongside Australia and New Zealand rather than a disruptive geopolitical threat.

Cleantech cooperation vs climate finance wariness

Given these pragmatic realities, what more can China do to deepen cooperation with Pacific countries, and where might tensions arise? On the cooperation front, there is fertile ground for deepening ties in decentralised cleantech and climate resilience. Pacific economies grapple with exorbitant diesel-based power generation and fragile island grids. China’s advanced, cost-competitive solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and mini-grid technologies offer practical solutions for outer-island electrification and energy sovereignty. Furthermore, expanding cooperation in sustainable fisheries management, marine biodiversity preservation, and blue carbon ecosystems aligns directly with China’s “Community of Marine Destiny” narrative and PIC priorities.

However, challenges and underlying wariness persist, particularly regarding climate finance and debt transparency. While Pacific leaders continually demand scaled-up, accessible adaptation finance — highlighted by regional advocates like Papua New Guinea’s special envoy Ruel Yamuna — both traditional Western donors and emerging partners like China face scrutiny over the speed and conditionality of disbursement. Pacific financial authorities are acutely sensitive to macroeconomic stability; while Chinese concessional loans have funded vital infrastructure, PIC governments remain cautious about over-committing to commercial lending structures that could exacerbate fiscal vulnerabilities amid repeated cyclone and flood disasters.

COP31 in Antalya stands as a microcosm of 21st century climate-related geoeconomics and geopolitics, where environmental multilateralism collides with industrial competition and trade protectionism. While China is unlikely to achieve its objective of dismantling Western cleantech tariffs through climate change negotiations, the summit provides an essential platform for China to champion South-South solidarity, denounce green protectionism, and showcase its clean energy transition. 

At the same time, Beijing’s pragmatic, livelihood-oriented engagement in the Pacific — grounded in infrastructure delivery and cleantech utility — demonstrates that its expanding global influence is sustained by tangible economic complementarities. As energy security and climate action converge, China’s ability to navigate trade friction while delivering credible climate implementation will ultimately determine its success in reshaping the global governance architecture.

The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the NUS NOL Fellowship for field research.

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