[Big read] China’s fifth plenum: What ongoing purges reveal about Xi Jinping’s power layout

(Edited and refined by Bai Kelei, with the assistance of AI translation.)

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo met on 21 September to set the dates for the Fifth Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee and discuss efforts to strengthen party self-governance and discipline. It reviewed feedback from consultations on a draft decision on party self-governance and agreed to submit a revised version to the plenum for discussion.

The Politburo said the draft reviewed the “achievements and experience of full and rigorous party self-governance in the new era”, analysed “the circumstances and tasks facing party building at present and in the near future, and made strategic arrangements for the sustained advancement of full and rigorous party self-governance”.

Xi’s unfinished anti-corruption drive

In other words, it has been officially confirmed that the agenda of the fifth plenum, to be held from 26 to 29 October, will include at least two items: a Politburo work report to the Central Committee and deliberation on decisions related to full and rigorous party self-governance. However, the authorities have yet to announce whether new members will be added to the Politburo or the Central Military Commission (CMC), or release a candidate list of Central Committee members and alternate members. The plenum communiqué is expected to provide details of these personnel arrangements.

The policy groundwork for the fifth plenum has been laid out over time. In February last year, CCP journal Qiushi (《求是》) published an article containing a speech by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, entitled “Improving the System of Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance” (《健全全面从严治党体系》 ). Xi proposed improving party governance through the five aspects of organisation, education, supervision, institutions and responsibility. He also said that problems in ideology, organisation and work style within the party had not been fundamentally resolved, while corruption remained a grave and complex issue.

During the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) held in January, further steps were taken to align strict self-governance with the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030). Its communiqué called for greater political oversight, stricter political and electoral discipline, and measures to prevent the promotion of officials with unresolved problems. It also called for follow-up supervision of 15th Five-Year Plan tasks involving the modern industrial system, new quality productive forces, a unified national market and hidden local government debt.

Breaking with longstanding plenum norms

On the surface, the fifth plenum’s focus on party building appears to break with the convention for Central Committee plenums that has gradually taken shape since reform and opening up.

The CCP holds its national congress once every five years to elect a new Central Committee. During each Central Committee’s term, it usually convenes seven plenary sessions.

By convention, the first plenum focuses on senior party appointments, including those in the Politburo, its standing committee, the posts of general secretary and secretariat, and the CMC. The second prepares for leadership transitions in the State Council, National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The third usually deals with reform and development issues, while the fourth generally revolves around state governance and institutional development. The fifth usually considers the formulation of the next five-year plan, the sixth tends to focus on party building and intra-party politics, and the seventh involves preparations for the next party congress.

Under the current Central Committee, the scheduling of plenary sessions began to shift markedly from its third plenum. After the 20th Party Congress was held in October 2022, the third plenum that should have been held in the second half of 2023 did not take place until July 2024. Subsequent plenums were also pushed back as a whole. The fourth plenum, held last October, approved recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, breaking with the norm to settle an issue normally dealt with only at the fifth plenum.

The fifth plenum’s handling of party building this year can therefore also be seen as a continuation of the new scheduling to handle an issue more commonly discussed at the sixth.

Cutting away rot before next congress

Kou Chien-wen, a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University (NCCU)’s Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, told Lianhe Zaobao that the plenum would be directly linked to personnel arrangements for the 21st Party Congress.

Kou noted that the CCP has undergone a large-scale purge over the past two years. Unlike the period when Xi first came to power, many of those targeted now were promoted during the leader’s own tenure. Continuing the purge about a year before the party congress serves to sort out the cadre ranks. He said, “After removing what needs to be cleared out, personnel replacements are then made.”

Kou also believes that high-pressure purges can reduce intra-Party competition before the 21st Party Congress. “On the one hand, it is about rectification and purges, like cutting away the rot. On the other, it can also be seen as consolidating Xi’s political position,” he said.

At a September seminar organised by the NCCU Institute of International Relations (IIR), Huang Hsin-hao, a professor in the Department of Civic Education and Leadership at National Taiwan Normal University, described anti-corruption efforts under Xi as “institution-building within a mobilisation system”. Anti-corruption was first elevated into a central political task, before gradually being transformed into routine governance through intra-Party regulations, state supervision and case procedures.

Drawing on online information released by the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission, Huang reviewed corruption cases involving centrally managed cadres between 2012 and the end of June this year. Centrally managed cadres refer to officials overseen by the CCP Central Organisation Department, most of whom are vice-ministerial level or above, although a small number are department-level officials. 

He found a higher frequency of cases since the 20th Party Congress. The proportion of department-level officials implicated rose from around 7% during the 18th Party Congress period to nearly 20%; retired and departed officials accounted for more than 40%; and most cases took about five to six months from the announcement of an investigation to disciplinary action, with processing times becoming more consistent.

Guo Xuezhi, a political science professor at Guilford College in the US, shared his findings on the institutionalisation of anti-corruption efforts through changes to the disciplinary inspection system at a September seminar held by Academia Sinica’s Institute of Political Science.

He said Xi had promoted full coverage of inspection and oversight after taking office, bringing all party and government bodies under disciplinary inspection. Authority over the appointment and removal of local disciplinary inspection officials was also further centralised. Through measures such as assigning officials to posts outside their home areas, the CCP sought to sever possible patronage and personal networks between local party secretaries and disciplinary inspection commission secretaries. Guo’s research found that 97% of local party secretaries and disciplinary inspection commission secretaries had no career connections, enabling disciplinary bodies to oversee local power effectively.

Guo divided Xi’s anti-corruption drive into three stages, with the second marking a shift from high-pressure anti-corruption efforts towards institutionalisation. According to his research, 156 of the 221, around 71%, of the anti-corruption regulations promulgated since the founding of the People’s Republic of China were issued during Xi’s tenure.

He noted that increasingly extensive rules are being used to supervise officials, a shift from making them “dare not be corrupt” towards ensuring they “cannot be corrupt” under institutional constraints. The third stage of Xi’s drive seeks to achieve a state in which officials “do not want to be corrupt” through ideological and political education, as well as moral discipline.

NCCU’s Kou opined that the new document to be adopted by the fifth plenum may go beyond an anti-corruption approach centred on arrests. Taking into account Xi’s earlier article on “Improving the System of Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance”, this year’s Fifth Plenary Session of the CCDI and official statements ahead of the fifth plenum, he felt that stronger oversight of the top leadership, institutionalised ideological education and routine supervision could be in the pipeline. Kou said, “It will not be simply about catching people, institutional adjustments and restructuring will also be made.”

Unseen casualties in ongoing military sweep

The purge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s senior ranks, ongoing for more than two years, is one of the main personnel matters at the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee. The fourth plenum in 2025 saw the expulsion from the CCP of nine senior military officials, including He Weidong and Miao Hua, and added Zhang Shengmin as a CMC vice-chairman. This year, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were expelled from both the CCP and the military, but their punishments are pending endorsement by the Central Committee plenum.

Official statements issued in the Zhang and Liu cases were particularly severe. They were accused of being “alienated from the party”, “forming cliques and factions” and being “disloyal and dishonest towards the party”. The authorities also said their political and economic problems were intertwined.

The turmoil in military personnel matters may extend further. Besides those formally punished, military Central Committee members Zhang Lin, Li Qiaoming, Zhong Shaojun and Ju Qiansheng have been removed or had their National People’s Congress delegate qualifications terminated. Several other senior generals have also been absent from public view for extended periods, although this alone does not confirm that they have fallen from power.

Ma Cheng-kun, a professor at the National Defence University’s Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies in Taiwan, said at the September seminar organised by NCCU IIR that the PLA’s weaponry and tangible combat capabilities have grown rapidly in recent years. However, the senior-level purge across its operational command, political work, logistics and equipment systems branches involves many generals. This may undermine its leadership authority, organisational discipline and political loyalty, weakening its “intangible combat capability”.

Chieh Chung, an adjunct assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, said that Xi had established rules for the military’s day-to-day operations following military reforms. As such, senior leadership vacancies may have limited impact on routine work and exercise planning. However, the PLA currently lacks the capacity to handle contingencies.

Chieh explained that following the military reforms, theatre commands carrying out major military operations must rely on coordination and support from units directly under the CMC, including those responsible for information support, military aerospace and joint logistics. But many such units are currently led by deputies or even lower-ranking personnel. “Almost every unit has a gap in succession,” he said. Should a Taiwan Strait crisis occur or a major operation requiring cross-unit coordination be needed, command efficiency might be affected.

Chieh also believes the continuing purge could have a chilling effect, making “political correctness” the overriding concern in the military and discouraging generals from offering alternative views to the top leadership. The CMC could consequently become more insulated. He added, “The point is that no one dares to put forward different opinions,” potentially affecting the quality of its decision-making during sudden external crises.

NCCU’s Kou described military personnel arrangements as being “at their most chaotic”. With many veteran generals having fallen from power, some institutions at the full theatre-command level are being run by relatively junior lieutenant generals, disrupting the established order of promotion by rank and seniority.

As for whether all the CMC vacancies will be filled at the fifth plenum, Chieh believes this may have to wait until next year’s 21st Party Congress. He noted that Zhang Shuguang, secretary of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission, who was promoted to full general in July, is among the potential candidates to be added to the CMC at this plenum. However, filling other senior military vacancies may take longer.

Kou, however, noted that the CMC has in the past added vice-chairmen or members ahead of a party congress. If additions are made at the fifth plenum, “it may indicate that the CMC membership for the 21st Party Congress is taking shape”.

Reading signals from bypassed central cadres

Besides deliberating the document on full and rigorous party self-governance, the fifth plenum may also deal with the Central Committee’s growing list of vacancies. Following the large-scale disciplinary action and elevation of Central Committee members at last year’s fourth plenum, several more members of the 20th Central Committee in the party and state systems have been investigated or punished, while others have remained out of the public eye for long periods. How many cases the fifth plenum will have to address has become another focus in assessing personnel reshuffles ahead of the 21st Party Congress.

At last year’s fourth plenum, 11 alternate Central Committee members, including Yu Huiwen, Ma Hancheng and Wang Jian, were elevated to full membership. The plenum also confirmed the expulsion from the party of 14 Central Committee members and alternate members, including He Weidong and Miao Hua.

The purge has not stopped. Besides military Central Committee members such as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, Central Committee members in the party and state systems, including Lan Tianli, Wang Lixia, Yi Huiman, Ma Xingrui, Sun Shaocheng, Yi Lianhong, Wang Xiangxi and Hu Henghua, have successively been formally investigated or disciplined. Among them, Zhang and Ma were both former Politburo members, indicating that this latest personnel upheaval has reached the upper echelons.

The status of some others remains unclear. For instance, Liu Jianchao, former head of the CCP Central Committee’s International Department, has been absent from public view for a prolonged period, and his post has been taken over by Liu Haixing. Jin Zhuanglong has also made no public appearances since stepping down as Minister of Industry and Information Technology. The whereabouts of Lei Fanpei, who was removed as executive deputy director of the Central Office for Military-Civil Fusion Development, have similarly drawn attention.

NCCU’s Kou estimated that after accounting for Central Committee members who have “disappeared” and whose actual circumstances remain unclear, around 18 to 30 replacements may be needed. He stressed that some have simply disappeared from public view, and it remains unclear whether they are in trouble. However, he said that “replacing a dozen or so members is probably unavoidable”.

This makes the eventual list of disciplinary actions and replacements announced at the fifth plenum noteworthy.

Under the CCP Constitution, Central Committee vacancies are filled sequentially by alternate members according to the number of votes they received. However, the past two plenums have shown that the process is not entirely based on the original ranking.

At the third plenum in 2024 and the fourth plenum last year, there were instances of higher-ranked alternate Central Committee members being bypassed. At the fourth plenum, higher-ranked members, including Ding Xingnong, Wang Jiayi, Fang Hongwei and Shi Yugang, were not promoted. Fang was subsequently formally expelled from the party.

Kou believes that beyond observing who is elevated at this plenum, it will be more revealing to see which alternate members are passed over. If those with higher rankings are bypassed again, “it may be that they have run into trouble too”.

At the fourth plenum, Lu Hong was the last alternate member to be promoted. Based purely on this, those who could be promoted in sequence include Lu Dongliang, Fu Wenhua, Cong Liang, Bao Gang, Xing Shanping, Ji Lin, Qu Yingpu and Lu Jun.

As for the criteria of selecting cadres ahead of the 21st Party Congress, Kou said bluntly that “political loyalty is a must”. He added that while professional competence is important, “it is second to political loyalty”. Given that exchanges between central and local government, across provinces and between departments, are now fairly common, he felt that a more important indicator is whether an official has experience leading an important province or city.

In conclusion, party and government personnel issues at the fifth plenum go beyond how many Central Committee vacancies are filled. With just a year to go before the 21st Party Congress, the official messaging on long-absent members, highly ranked alternate members who are again bypassed, and personnel transfers between local and central government could all offer fresh clues to the make-up of the next Politburo and an even longer-term leadership pipeline.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中国特稿：五中全会聚焦全面从严治党 二十一大前再掀整肃浪潮”.

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