What the rise of post-70s provincial officials reveals about CCP succession

(Edited and refined by Bai Kelei, with the assistance of AI translation.)

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds the fifth plenary session of its 20th Central Committee, frequent local leadership changes are bringing more officials in the post-70s generation into top provincial government posts. However, provincial party secretaries are still predominantly from the post-60s generation. With the CCP’s 21st National Congress approaching, whether these younger officials advance further will offer important clues to the composition of its next generation of leaders and senior personnel arrangements.

By 2027, officials born between 1970 and 1979 will be aged 48 to 57, with some already having accumulated experience in provincial leadership or central government departments. Their promotion trajectories will reflect the make-up of the CCP’s next leadership cohort.

Last Saturday (24 October), the six provinces of Hebei, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Yunnan and Qinghai appointed new secretaries of their provincial governments’ party groups. Among them, Guo Ningning born in 1970, Xie Weijiang born in 1973, and Zhuge Yujie born in 1971, took up the posts in Fujian, Hunan and Qinghai respectively. They are expected to become governors thereafter.

Technocrats gain ground in provincial leadership

The three have distinctive career backgrounds. Guo spent many years in finance, serving as head of Bank of China’s Hong Kong and Singapore branches and as a vice-president of the Agricultural Bank of China. Since she was transferred to Fujian in 2018, she has served as vice-governor, Fuzhou party secretary and deputy provincial party secretary. If formally elected, she will become China’s first female governor born in the 1970s.

Xie began his career at centrally administered state-owned enterprises in the energy and power sectors and after moving to Hunan, he served as vice-governor, Yueyang party secretary and deputy provincial party secretary. He is considered an example of an official with corporate experience.

Zhuge began his career at a state-owned port enterprise in Shanghai. After many years in the city, he was transferred to Hubei as deputy provincial party secretary in 2023. His move to lead Qinghai marks his promotion to full ministerial rank after nine years at vice-ministerial rank.

The ranks of post-70s provincial government heads continue to grow with the trio’s addition. Beijing mayor Yin Yong, a former central bank deputy governor, was born in 1969, placing him close in age to this cohort. Shanghai mayor Zhu Zhongming, born in 1972, previously served as vice-minister of finance, while Shanxi governor Lu Dongliang was born in 1973. Zhejiang governor Liu Jie, Jiangsu governor Liu Xiaotao and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region chairman Wei Tao were all born in 1970.

This round of personnel changes also highlights the difference in age profiles between government and party leaderships. Newly appointed Hunan party secretary Wang Zhijun was born in 1965, while Yunnan party secretary Mo Gaoyi was born in 1964. Even the relatively young Hubei party secretary Guan Zhi’ou, born in December 1969, belongs to the tail end of the post-60s generation. While post-70s officials are gradually becoming more numerous in top provincial government posts, provincial party secretaries remain predominantly from the post-60s generation.

Generational progression within the central leadership hierarchy is equally clear. When the 20th Central Committee was elected, it had no full members in the post-70s generation. That changed only at the fourth plenary session last October, when Wei Tao was elevated from alternate to full membership. Meanwhile, post-70s generation alternate members include Guo Ningning, Zhuge Yujie and Lu Dongliang. Whether they, along with Zhu Zhongming and others, secure full membership at the 21st Party Congress will be an indicator to watch.

Changing profiles of local leaders

At central ministries and agencies, the appointment of post-70s officials to full ministerial rank is also gathering pace. Zhang Chengzhong and Cheng Fubo, both born in 1970, have successively taken charge of departments. Zhang became party secretary of the Ministry of Emergency Management in March this year and minister in April. Cheng took over as party secretary of the State Council’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission in June and as its chairman in July. A Dong, also born in 1970, is currently first secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee.

This round of personnel changes also reflects a trend towards older promotion ages among China’s local officials. A previously published article by Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, entitled “A Study of the Characteristics and Experience of Prefecture-level Party and Government Officials Across Different Periods” (《不同时期地市党政干部特征与经历研究》), found that between 2003 and 2012, the average ages at which prefecture-level city party secretaries and mayors took office were 49.94 and 47.67 respectively. Between 2013 and August 2020, these rose to 52.27 and 50.29.

As a generation that grew up and completed its higher education after China’s reform and opening up, these officials also have a different educational grounding from their predecessors, who were sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Li Cheng, director of the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong, studied 108 post-70s officials who held vice-provincial or vice-ministerial rank. He found that 53.7% had doctorates while 34.3% had majored in engineering as undergraduates and 25% in economics, finance or accounting. Some had also studied overseas. Among 86 officials serving as vice-governors or provincial party standing committee members, 53.5% had risen primarily through industrial enterprises or financial institutions, reflecting the corporate and financial experience that characterises some officials’ careers.

Among the closely watched provincial government heads, Yin Yong holds a doctorate in systems engineering and Guo Ningning a doctorate in economics. Xie Weijiang has a master’s degree in thermal engineering and previously worked in energy and power companies, while Lu Dongliang spent many years in the Aluminum Corporation of China group.

Loyalty and execution over factional ties

Professional competence, however, is not the only criterion for promotion. The Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Officials, revised by the CCP in 2019, explicitly prioritised political standards. They list political loyalty, resolve, responsibility, capability and self-discipline among the criteria for assessing officials.

Hung Yao-nan, director of the Centre for Cross-Strait Relations at Taiwan’s Tamkang University, told Lianhe Zaobao (LHZB) that the first opportunity to assess the promotion trajectories of post-70s officials would be the list of alternate members elevated to full Central Committee membership, to be released after the fifth plenary session closes this Thursday. Following the elevations at the fourth plenary session, Lu Dongliang is now first in the order of precedence among alternate members, he said. Whether Lu gains full membership at the fifth plenary session would be “the most immediate and concrete signal”.

Zhu Zhongming, Liu Xiaotao and Xie Weijiang, as well as post-60s generation Mo Gaoyi are not Central Committee members. Hung said that if they were elected directly as full members at the 21st Party Congress, bypassing alternate membership, it would mean that the practice of “appointment to office before formal recognition of status” has been institutionalised.

Hung said the proportion of post-70s officials on the 21st Central Committee would reveal more about the pace of generational change than whether particular individuals were leading the field. Most of this cohort are technocrats or come from centrally administered state-owned enterprises or the finance industry, while the Communist Youth League career pipeline has all but disappeared. This reflects a shift in senior personnel appointment from political credentials towards “professional expertise and experience that can be kept under control”, favouring “people who can get things done but have no independent political networks”.

Looking ahead to the 21st Party Congress, Hung expects a “succession cohort” to become discernible, but not necessarily a clear “successor”. Being identified too early is itself a political risk, putting the likelihood of an explicit succession arrangement at only about 15%. “The real function of the 21st Party Congress is to build the base for the 22nd Party Congress in 2032. By then, the post-70s cohort will be aged between 59 and 63, just the right age to enter the top leadership,” he explained.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “地方人事调整频密 中共 “70后”升迁牵动二十一大布局”.

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