Why the Pacific is filling with warships: China, RIMPAC and a new military contest

Ahead of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise that kicked off on 24 June, military activity in the Western Pacific had already intensified. Naval vessels from US allies and partner countries have been converging on Hawaii for the drills, while the Chinese navy’s Liaoning carrier battle group returned to its home port of Qingdao on 22 June after completing more than 40 days of combat training in distant waters.

Interviewed academics said these developments are partly routine military exercises and training activities, but they also reflect a new round of China-US competition in military systems and capabilities east of the first island chain.

Parallel shows of force in the Pacific

The US Pacific Fleet announced that the 2026 RIMPAC exercise will run from 24 June to 31 July, featuring approximately 40 surface ships, five submarines, 140 aircraft and more than 25,000 personnel from 31 participating nations.

Meanwhile, the US-led Valiant Shield 2026 exercise also began on 22 June across Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Japan and at sea around the Mariana Islands Range Complex, ushering the Western Pacific into a period of intensive military exercises and training operations.

On 22 June, the Chinese navy announced that the Liaoning carrier strike group had conducted training in the South China Sea, the Western Pacific and other sea and air spaces. The exercises covered early warning and reconnaissance, joint shore-sea system-of-systems confrontations, tactical carrier-based aircraft operations, air supremacy and air defence operations, sea strikes, support and cover operations, and the use of live ammunition. The carrier group also carried out integrated training with an amphibious assault ship task force to enhance joint operational capabilities.

Chinese media The Paper quoted Chinese military expert Zhang Junshe as saying that on 20 April the Liaoning carrier strike group transited the Taiwan Strait en route to the South China Sea. On 19 May, the group was subsequently deployed to relevant waters in the Western Pacific for training operations. Spanning nearly two months, the cross-regional exercises marked “the longest far-sea, cross-regional training deployment since the Liaoning entered service”, demonstrating a further enhancement of the carrier group’s far-seas offensive and defensive operational capabilities.

He added that the joint training between the Liaoning carrier strike group and the amphibious assault ship task force was of significant importance. A carrier strike group can secure air and maritime supremacy on the battlefield, providing cover for amphibious assault ships and other amphibious task forces conducting landing operations. This kind of exercise can further enhance the Chinese navy’s capability to conduct multi-dimensional amphibious assaults against large islands and reefs.

Limits and reach of Beijing’s carriers

Chinese state media also reported that during the drills, Japanese aircraft and vessels repeatedly conducted close-range tracking, surveillance and provocative harassment. The Liaoning carrier group remained on high alert, continuously launching carrier-based fighter aircraft for combat sorties, flexibly adjusting its combat formations, and professionally and prudently responding to Japan’s dangerous actions. 

Lin Ying-yu, an associate professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, told Lianhe Zaobao that, looking back to the US-Philippines Balikatan exercises held in late April, the US has clearly demonstrated that it is not relying solely on its own capabilities, but is instead working with countries such as the Philippines and Japan to jointly respond to Beijing.

He said that Beijing would certainly not rule out using the Liaoning to respond to the US, but the Liaoning is, after all, “a product of the last century”. 

“It is questionable whether this response will achieve its intended effect. I think the impact is very limited,” he said.

Shen Ming-shih, a research fellow with the Division of National Security Research at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research in Taiwan, believes that the Liaoning is now capable of operating beyond the first island chain. However, owing to limitations in replenishment capability and the lack of overseas military bases, it is unlikely to sustain operations beyond the second island chain for extended periods. Once the Fujian enters service, however, the operational reach of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s aircraft carriers could be pushed even further outward.

Commenting on the strategic intent behind the Liaoning carrier group’s blue-water exercises, Shen said Beijing is unlikely to seek a direct confrontation with the US or neighbouring countries at this stage, particularly as Washington has recently stepped up military exercises with countries along the first island chain. Any high-profile confrontation initiated by Beijing in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait would only reinforce the security concerns that US-Japan-Philippines military exercises are intended to address.

Footage from one of the drills showed a DF-17 transporter erector launcher stopping by the roadside before erecting and launching a missile vertically into the sky.

Undersea warfare and electronic spy games

Notably, RIMPAC involves not only the deployment of surface warships but also submarine and anti-submarine warfare operations. Tamkang University’s Lin pointed out that this year’s exercise will offer an opportunity to observe how the US military and its allies employ submarines in joint undersea operations. If Chinese aircraft carriers become the PLA Navy’s principal force for far-seas operations in the future, one of the most effective ways of countering them would be to “strike from underwater”.

Lin also noted that as the US, Japanese and allied fleets converge on the exercise area, the activities of Chinese naval vessels and government ships are intended not only to demonstrate China’s presence, but also to collect electronic signals and operational data.

He said that the US and Japan will be keen to monitor the movements of Chinese vessels and determine whether they are transmitting electronic signals. Conversely, the Chinese Navy’s electronic surveillance ship Kaiyangxing has already passed through the Osumi Strait into the Pacific Ocean, and observers believe it may be heading towards waters associated with the RIMPAC exercise to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. “Both China and the US have their own calculations,” he said.

Shen, however, stressed that RIMPAC is, after all, a routine large-scale military exercise, and “the US will avoid portraying it as something directed specifically at China”. That said, if more advanced weaponry is introduced or the exercise scenarios become more sophisticated, its strategic significance would naturally become more pointed. 

“For example, if there are long-range naval missile live-fire drills or integrated air-sea operations aimed at large-scale warfare against a major power,” he said, then the likelihood of Beijing deploying surveillance ships or drones to the periphery of the exercise area to collect intelligence would increase.

Clash of military networks

Overall, the military situation in the Western Pacific ahead of RIMPAC has evolved beyond a simple standoff between Chinese and American aircraft carriers or individual warships. Instead, it reflects the simultaneous deployment of two competing military systems. 

The US is seeking to transform its allies and partners into an integrated air and maritime network capable of joint command and mutual support through multinational exercises, dispersed deployments and coordinated undersea operations. 

Meanwhile, China is using aircraft carrier operations in distant waters, manoeuvres across the island chains, and reconnaissance and electronic surveillance vessels to test the operational environment beyond the first island chain while gathering intelligence on the training patterns and operational methods of the US military and its allies.

In the near term, neither side wishes to see military conflict erupt. However, as the density of naval and aerial operations increases and military exercises become progressively more complex, competition in surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as the risk of encounters at sea and in the air across the Western Pacific, is likely to continue intensifying.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “环太平洋军演前夕 中美西太平洋军事对垒态势升温”.

Related: Undersea cables: The new US-China frontline | How Trump’s Iran war boosted Beijing