Will Trump’s defeat revive the old order?

In the US, the reason that the 2026 midterm elections is such a focus of global attention is that Trumpism is truly an “exception among exceptionalism” in American political history. It is often said that the US stands atop a “shining city upon a hill”, uniquely blessed by divine light, bearing special responsibilities among secular nations, and habitually enjoying exceptional status above international rules. However, since the start of Trump 2.0, his highly unconventional approach has pushed the patience of both domestic citizens and overseas allies close to its breaking point.

In particular, elites in many allied nations have been waiting for Trump to suffer a setback in the midterms, which would usher in a garbage-time second half of his presidency, accompanied by investigations and impeachments from a Democratic-controlled Congress. In that scenario, perhaps the American “deep state” would regain control, steering politics back onto the traditional track of the two-party establishment. This could even temper the counter-current of de-globalisation seen over the past decade, allowing the post-Cold War era of globalisation, democratisation and the liberal international order to make a triumphant return, clearing away the shadows of dangerous geopolitical conflicts.

China’s fifth plenum: tense atmosphere

Although two Senate seats and over 20 House seats remain to be finalised due to razor-thin margins, it is already a reality that the Trump-led Republican Party was dealt a heavy blow by a Democratic “blue wave”. 

Following the sweeping electoral defeat of the Republican Party, House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries triumphantly declared that “America is back” — echoing the familiar refrain used by Joe Biden after his 2020 victory over Donald Trump. Upon taking office, Biden swiftly rejoined the numerous multilateral institutions abandoned by his predecessor and worked to repair fractured relations with Western allies. While the phrase a “rules-based order” was conspicuously absent from the strategic lexicon of the Trump administration, it became a frequent mantra for Biden’s team. Now, with the Republican party suffering a major electoral setback, it is only natural that not just the Democrats, but Washington’s traditional allies — such as the EU, Canada and Japan — who spent the past two years sidelined, are eagerly yearning for a return to the old order.

However, does “America is back” mean that future Democrats will carry the torch of the Obama or Biden Doctrine? My own view is that history may recur in ways that rhyme, but it never repeats itself through a simple “copy and paste”. The conditions that once sustained globalisation under unipolarity and the Western rules-based order no longer exist, making a full restoration of either impossible.

On China’s side, another political event held just before the US midterms — China’s Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) — carried immense significance. It likely serves as the last substantive plenary session before next year’s 21st Party Congress, which will mark the CPC’s leadership transition. The exceptional nature of this year’s fifth plenum lies in the formal announcement of the expulsion of 24 Central Committee members and nine alternate members elected during the 20th Party Congress. Remarkably, this group includes nine senior generals and seven lieutenant generals.

Since the founding of the PRC regime, this marks the largest number of officially announced expulsions from any Central Committee session, save for the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee during the Cultural Revolution. This underscores Xi Jinping’s powerful determination to “enforce party discipline” and comprehensively deepen the party’s absolute control over all critical sectors nationwide ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027. The subsequent sixth plenum, on the eve of next year’s congress, will likely be a mere formality — held just days prior to rubber-stamp the draft of Xi’s work report and the agenda for the new Congress.

US-China interactions under pressure ahead of APEC 2026

Following closely on the heels of the fifth plenum, which consolidated Xi’s party authority, and the stinging defeat of Trump’s Republican Party, the APEC summit is set to take place in Shenzhen next week. However, there are still no further updates regarding the long-rumoured trilateral sideline meeting between the leaders of the US, Russia and China. 

Last week, a virtual meeting between Vice-Premier He Lifeng, who oversees US-China economic and trade affairs, and his American counterpart, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, carried a somewhat contentious tone. It revealed that the US feels an urgency for China to fulfill its agreements and purchase American goods, while China expressed dissatisfaction over a new wave of US sanctions against Chinese companies, which Washington justified using the Cuba issue.

Following this, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, are expected to visit China. While Hegseth accompanied Trump to China in May, Paparo’s inclusion would mark the first visit by an Indo-Pacific commander to China in a decade. Paparo previously proposed deploying vast amounts of unmanned assets to create a “hellscape” to deter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan, making it highly unlikely that his visit is intended to negotiate the war in Iran or the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 

Even in accordance with the consensus on building a “constructive strategic stable relationship” reached by Xi and Trump — where both sides agreed that their militaries should promote more institutionalised exchanges to reduce the risk of accidents — the presence of Admiral Paparo in the US delegation would mean much more than formal, polite pleasantries with the Chinese defence ministry officials. Given recent unannounced, cross-sea exercises in the Western Pacific widely perceived as aimed at strengthening the “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, Washington will undoubtedly seek clarification and assurances from Beijing regarding their underlying “intention.” Naturally, the Chinese side will in turn demand that Washington explain why US military and civilian personnel are being stationed in Taiwan in increasing quantity, frequency and duration, which Beijing maintains violates the “Three Joint Communiques”.

If Trump goes ahead with his visit to China, he will likely first attend the ASEAN summit in the Philippines, with Hegseth and Paparo potentially accompanying him. In the wake of the Republican midterm defeat, Trump has an even greater need to project strength in diplomacy and national defence — two areas of exclusive presidential prerogative. If the Trump delegation signals strong support for Manila, the atmosphere for the Trump-Xi summit is unlikely to be as peaceful as their first two meetings this year.

Moreover, there is the matter of the currently stalled, massive US-Taiwan arms sale package. Will Trump manage to delay addressing it until the new, Democratic-controlled Congress takes office next year, or will he be forced to handle it in some manner before the end of the year to prevent it from becoming a new vulnerability challenged by rivals inside and outside his party? Whether Beijing can show “understanding” toward such constraints, and how these high-risk dilemmas unfold, will heavily influence Xi Jinping’s scheduled trip to Miami at the end of this year to attend the G20 summit hosted by Trump. It is well worth watching closely to see if the overall rhythm of US-China interactions shifts toward a more tense posture during the final half of Trump’s term.

Demand for US-China cooperation persists

At present, observers should not prematurely expect Trump to become a “lame duck” president. Beyond his stubbornly resilient political character, this midterm election saw losses for both the traditional Republican establishment and the pro-Trump MAGA faction. While Trump-backed candidates such as Ken Paxton and Michael Whatley, newly nominated to replace their incumbents, suffered major defeats, heavyweight political figures like Susan Collins, who sought to distance themselves from Trump’s policies, also lost their seats. Meanwhile, a significant number of Trump loyalists secured re-election in safe Republican districts. This suggests that while the Republican Party lost substantial seats in Congress, Trump maintains considerable influence among the surviving party members.

It is currently widely believed that the war in Iran was the primary driver behind Trump’s midterm loss, followed closely by the “affordability” crisis driven by high tariffs. If Trump wishes to secure his political legacy by mitigating these two issues, he will, to a certain degree, still require China’s cooperation. Concurrently, on the eve of the CPC’s 21st Party Congress next October, Xi Jinping also needs to sustain “constructive strategic stability” in US-China relations and should continue to capitalise on this final “Trump window of opportunity”. 

Throughout this process, an element introducing even greater uncertainty than Iran, tariffs, or tech war is the succession of local and central elections in Taiwan, which could trigger a major shift in Taiwan’s political landscape. This dynamic will inevitably sway the political manoeuvring between the US establishment and Trump, as well as determine whether Xi Jinping will take more aggressive countermeasures against the increasingly close security cooperation between Taiwan and the US ahead of the CPC’s 21st Party Congress.

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