Is China giving up on denuclearising North Korea?

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited North Korea for the first time in seven years, but unlike his 2019 trip when he repeatedly mentioned denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and US-North Korea dialogue, the talks in Pyongyang on 8 June and the joint public statements made no reference at all to denuclearisation, instead focusing on strategic cooperation and the safeguarding of sovereignty, security and development interests.

Analysts felt that this suggests China-North Korea ties have entered a new phase centred on strategic cooperation, and that Beijing is adopting a more pragmatic approach to the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea.

Xi arrived in Pyongyang at noon on 8 June, and met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the afternoon. By early evening, Chinese state media had already released detailed reports of the visit.

No mention of denuclearisation

South Korean media outlets, following the closing of the China-North Korea summit, quickly identified the “disappearance of the denuclearisation issue” as the main talking point. By contrast, seven years ago, Xi had proactively praised North Korea’s efforts towards denuclearisation and voiced support for resolving the issue through dialogue; both sides had repeatedly referred to denuclearisation and US-North Korea talks.

This time, however, the focus for both has clearly shifted to strategic coordination and joint responses to changes in the international environment. Xi said China and North Korea should strengthen strategic communication and cooperation, firmly safeguard their respective sovereignty, security and development interests, and jointly maintain regional peace and development.

Notably, in an article signed by Xi that was published in North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun ahead of the visit, phrases such as “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” and “US-North Korea dialogue” — which used to appear frequently — were absent.

South Korean broadcaster SBS commented that by stressing the protection of North Korea’s security interests while sidestepping the issue of denuclearisation, Beijing is to a certain extent signalling tacit acceptance of the reality of Pyongyang’s nuclear status. Against the backdrop of deepening North Korea-Russia ties and China’s relatively diminished leverage over Pyongyang, Beijing now appears more focused on shoring up strategic cooperation with North Korea than on playing the lead coordinator in peninsula affairs.

Other topics of focus

However, Wang Dong, a tenured professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies and executive director of its Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, argued that Xinhua’s omission of the phrase “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” did not necessarily signal a change in China’s official position.

He said China’s longstanding four principles on the Korean peninsula issue remain consistent and unchanged: pursuing the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula, resolving issues through dialogue and consultation and advancing the political settlement process.

He noted that the root causes of the peninsula issue are the lingering legacy of the Cold War and the lack of mutual trust among the parties involved. Given the current circumstances, unilateral pressure or military deterrence would only aggravate tensions. China is now placing greater emphasis on strengthening political mutual trust through high-level exchanges and upholding regional peace and stability, which are the prerequisites and foundations for resolving the Korean peninsula issue.

South Korea’s TV Chosun noted that the wording closely resembles a remark made by the late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il during his final visit to China in 2011, when he spoke of “pass[ing] on the baton of friendship from generation to generation”.

Shin Beom-chul, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, argued that Xi’s decision to revisit this episode can be interpreted as China’s tacit acknowledgement of North Korea’s succession planning, given the increasingly frequent public appearances of Kim Ju Ae and growing speculation that she is being groomed as a successor.

Reinforcing its nuclear-armed status

In recent years, North Korea has continued to institutionalise its status as a nuclear-armed state. Since declaring its possession of nuclear weapons in 2005 and conducting its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has steadily strengthened its nuclear capabilities. Following the collapse of the North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in 2019, North Korea has returned to reinforcing its nuclear-armed status.

In particular, since 2022, North Korea has enacted the Act on Nuclear Forces Policy and, in this year’s constitutional revision, incorporated command authority over its nuclear forces into the constitution, further entrenching its status as a nuclear-armed state.

Meanwhile, the continued weakening of the global nuclear arms control regime and the deepening strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea have created more favourable conditions for Pyongyang to consolidate its nuclear-armed status.

More recently, political figures in the US and South Korea have begun debating whether the policy focus should shift from pursuing denuclearisation to managing the risks posed by North Korea’s nuclear programme. While such proposals remain controversial, they reflect the growing practical implications of North Korea’s longstanding efforts to secure recognition as a nuclear-armed state.

South Korean media argue that China’s tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status, the consolidation of the Kim family’s hereditary system and the dimming prospects for denuclearisation could encourage Pyongyang to further seek international recognition as a nuclear-armed state. As a result, the prospects for improved relations between North and South Korea are also likely to narrow.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “朝中峰会聚焦战略协作未谈无核化 中国对朝政策现微妙变化”.

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