China sidelines denuclearisation to strengthen ties with North Korea

For his first overseas trip of the year, Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping chose to visit North Korea, seven years after his last visit. In the intervening years, the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have profoundly transformed North Korea, China, and the geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia and beyond.

Silent shift away from denuclearisation

In a signed article published on 8 June in North Korean state media Rodong Sinmun prior to his arrival, Xi declared that China-North Korea relations are at a “new historical starting point”. 

Whether this was merely diplomatic rhetoric or signalled something substantively “new” immediately drew attention. However, as the issue of denuclearisation disappeared entirely from the summit agenda, the meaning of this “new historical starting point” became unmistakably clear.

Xi’s remarks during his talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, coupled with his statement before departing North Korea that “mutual understanding between China and the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] has become deeper and more comprehensive, and the future development direction has become clearer and more definite”, left little room for doubt about the significance of this new phase in bilateral relations.

Some South Korean academics have described this Xi-Kim summit as “the most consequential of the seven summit meetings” the two leaders have held to date.

One key factor is that China has effectively come to tacitly accept North Korea’s nuclear-armed status, halting North Korea’s increasingly evident tilt towards Russia and away from China. 

This reflects both strategic diplomatic considerations and practical realities. After all, North Korea has endured decades of economic sacrifice and international sanctions to acquire what it possesses today: dozens of nuclear warheads, operational nuclear deployment and intercontinental delivery capabilities. It has even enshrined its nuclear policy in its constitution. 

China was never under pressing pressure to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme; today, such an objective is even less realistic. Pushing the issue would instead risk driving Pyongyang further into Moscow’s orbit.

Meanwhile, since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, North Korea has supported Russia by sending troops and exporting military supplies, in exchange for foreign currency and Russian military technology. In 2024, the two countries also signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty.

Although China has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline, its influence over Pyongyang has been in relative decline. One clear indication of the cooling in China-North Korea relations in recent years is that, even two to three years after the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, civilian air services and international passenger train links between the two countries only fully resumed this spring.

Drawing clear lines

On the eve of Xi’s visit to North Korea, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, publicly stated that North Korea’s nuclear-armed status is “irreversible”. She also dismissed US claims that the Chinese and American heads of state had jointly reaffirmed the shared goal of denuclearising the Korean peninsula as “a complete fabrication” and “false information”, effectively drawing a clear “no-go” line for her Chinese guests.

China has not declared any abandonment of its position on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, but placed it on the back burner for the time being. Instead, Beijing is seeking to strengthen ties with North Korea across multiple fronts. In his article in Rodong Sinmun, Xi noted the need to “strengthen exchanges at all levels and across party, government and military institutions”.

During his talks with Kim Jong Un, Xi also put forward four proposals, including consolidating the foundation of political mutual trust and enhancing exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement and military affairs; strengthening the alignment of development strategies and expanding practical cooperation in such areas as economy and trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, as well as healthcare; increasing people-to-people exchanges by leveraging the full reopening of border crossings; and strengthening strategic coordination and cooperation.

Bringing military exchanges out of the shadows

They were Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the Central Secretariat; Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi; Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC) Liu Haixing; Tang Fangyu, director of the Central Policy Research Office; Defence Minister Dong Jun; Zheng Shanjie, chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); Commerce Minister Wang Wentao; Chinese ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun; IDCPC Vice-Minister Sun Haiyan; Lü Luhua, secretary to the general secretary and state president; and Vice-Foreign Minister Hua Chunying.

By comparison, a North Korean documentary produced in 2019 showed that the Chinese delegation accompanying Xi at that time included two Politburo members, Ding Xuexiang and Yang Jiechi, as well as then State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi; He Lifeng, then vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and chairman of the NDRC; IDCPC Minister Song Tao; and Commerce Minister Zhong Shan. China’s defence minister did not accompany the delegation on that occasion. 

However, Miao Hua, then a member of the Central Military Commission and later suspended pending investigation after 2024, was seated at the negotiating table. 

Footage of the Chinese delegation’s arrival at the airport also showed Wang Yajun accompanying the visit in his then capacity as an IDCPC vice-minister, while then Vice-Foreign Minister Qin Gang could also be seen.

Comparing the composition of the two delegations, Dong Jun’s participation this time highlights Beijing’s desire to bring China-North Korea military exchanges out from behind the scenes and into the open, thereby formalising ties between the two armed forces. Tang Fangyu’s presence, meanwhile, may have been related to inter-party exchanges. 

Incidentally, the 63-year-old Tang served as deputy director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee between 2018 and 2023, briefly became chairman of the Chongqing CPPCC committee in 2023, returned to Beijing in 2024 as deputy director of the Central Policy Research Office, and was promoted to director in January this year, suggesting a promising political future.

Consolidating the North Korea card

Ultimately, under the banner of a “new historical starting point” in China-North Korea relations, North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state has, for the time being, gained tacit acceptance, enhancing its standing and making it the biggest beneficiary of the emerging China-Russia-North Korea strategic triangle. 

China, for its part, has reinforced Sino-North Korean friendship and projected an image of strategic coordination between the two countries in regional affairs. In the Rodong Sinmun article, Xi called for closer multilateral cooperation with North Korea to “reject any scheme or action aimed at reviving militarism and undermining regional security and stability” — a clear reference to Japan.

In its report on the Xi-Kim summit on 9 June, Rodong Sinmun omitted Xi’s remarks about strengthening exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement and military affairs, as well as the full reopening of border crossings, hinting at lingering North Korean concerns about Beijing and some reservations on expanded military exchanges with China. 

Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un stated, “The international community is undergoing unprecedented and immense changes. The DPRK will unswervingly adhere to the One China principle and firmly support China’s policies and positions on safeguarding its core interests.”

This was also one of the key achievements of the Chinese leader’s visit to North Korea: consolidating the North Korean card, not only to help manage developments on the Korean peninsula, but also to constrain Japan on issues related to the Taiwan Strait. 

It remains an open question whether closer coordination among China, North Korea and Russia will in turn drive Japan and South Korea into a tighter strategic alignment, accelerate regional bloc formation, or even encourage South Korea to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. None of these possibilities can be ruled out. As Northeast Asia becomes increasingly complex, stability is becoming ever more precious.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “习近平访问朝鲜各取所得”.

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