China’s military purge is reaching the heart of Xi’s reformed PLA

(Edited and refined by Grace Chong and Candice Chan, with the assistance of AI translation.)

On 26 June, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee revoked the NPC membership of 15 delegates, including six senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers.

The move confirms that several senior officers who had been absent from public view for months have been formally placed under the official disciplinary process. It also suggests that the latest wave of military anti-corruption efforts, launched in 2023, is far from over. Instead, the campaign appears to be expanding, reaching some senior officers who rose through the ranks after China’s military reforms.

The six officers stripped of their NPC membership are General Xu Xueqiang, former head of the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Equipment Development Department; General Guo Puxiao, former political commissar of the PLA Air Force; General Li Fengbiao, former political commissar of the PLA Western Theater Command; Lieutenant General Wang Kangping, former commander of the Joint Logistics Support Force; Lieutenant General Yin Hongxing, former political commissar of the Southern Theater Command Army; and Lieutenant General Zhang Minghua, former commander of the Cyberspace Force.

The disappearances before the fall

During this year’s Two Sessions in March, Xu, Guo and Li were still listed as military delegates to the NPC. However, all three were absent from activities held by the PLA and People’s Armed Police delegation. By then, they had already been out of public view for several months.

Xu had been absent from a series of high-profile events since October last year, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s fourth plenary session, the launch ceremony for the Shenzhou-21 crewed spacecraft, the commissioning ceremony of the Fujian aircraft carrier, and the Central Economic Work Conference.

Guo was absent from the CMC’s ceremony conferring the rank of general in December last year, while Li missed the Sichuan military and local leaders’ Spring Festival symposium in February this year.

Wang, an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee, was also passed over during the replenishment of full Central Committee membership at the fourth plenary session in October last year, despite being next in line according to the established order.

The NPC Standing Committee’s latest announcement has now officially substantiated long-circulating reports in overseas media and public discourse that some of these officers had “disappeared” or fallen from power.

Although authorities have yet to disclose the reasons behind the six officers’ removal or identify the investigations, if any, to which their cases are connected, the sustained military anti-corruption campaign over the past two years suggests that their cases are linked to the current round of disciplinary purges.

The purge moves into post-reform PLA

Most of the six officers served in key organisations established after the military reforms launched in late 2015, or rose to prominent positions following those reforms. They came from across the military system, including the CMC, the armed services, theatre commands, the Joint Logistics Support Force, and the military’s new-domain and new-quality combat forces.

Their cases suggest that the current anti-corruption campaign has expanded beyond earlier areas of focus, such as the Rocket Force and equipment procurement, to encompass the major institutions created under the post-reform military structure.

The fall of Xu Xueqiang

The most closely watched figure among the six is arguably the 64-year-old Xu.

According to publicly available information, Xu previously served as chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region Air Force, deputy commander of the Northern Theater Command, and commander of the Northern Theater Command Air Force. In 2021, he was appointed president of the PLA National Defence University and promoted to the rank of Air Force general in September that year.

At the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xu was elected to the Party’s Central Committee for the first time. He later succeeded Li Shangfu as head of the CMC’s Equipment Development Department, while also serving as commander-in-chief of the China Manned Space Program.

The CMC’s Equipment Development Department was established following the 2015 military reforms, a key body responsible for overseeing the PLA’s equipment development, procurement and defence research. With Xu now falling from power after Zhang Youxia and Li Shangfu, all three heads of the CMC’s Equipment Development Department since its inception have come under investigation. 

This once again highlights that the military’s equipment development and procurement system remains one of the central focuses of the current anti-corruption campaign.

Even the PLA’s newest forces are not spared

Another figure attracting attention is Zhang, the former commander of the Cyberspace Force. Officially established in April 2024, the Cyberspace Force was a new service branch created following the restructuring of the Strategic Support Force, with Zhang serving as its inaugural commander. 

That the first commander has been brought down barely two years after the force’s establishment reflects that even the newest service branch created under the latest round of military reforms has not been immune from the ongoing purge.

Li, Guo, Wang and Yin, meanwhile, represent different parts of the military system, including the theatre commands, individual service branches, the Joint Logistic Support Force and the Ground Force Commands.

The 67-year-old Li spent most of his career in the Airborne Corps, with service spanning both the Strategic Support Force and the theatre command system, effectively covering many of the key institutions established after the military reforms. He was promoted to commander of the Strategic Support Force in 2019, elevated to the rank of general in December that year, and transferred to become political commissar of the Western Theater Command in 2021.

Guo, Wang and Yin all assumed key positions following the military reforms. The 62-year-old Guo, who comes from the Air Force, was promoted to general in December 2020, becoming the PLA’s youngest serving full general at the time, before being appointed political commissar of the Air Force in January 2022. 

Wang and Yin Hongxing were promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in June and December 2021 respectively. The 61-year-old Wang became deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command in June 2021 before being transferred to commander of the Joint Logistic Support Force in October 2024. The 59-year-old Yin became political commissar of the Tibet Military Region in 2021, and Chinese media reported in January 2025 that he had been reassigned as political commissar of the Ground Forces of the Southern Theater Command.

It is also noteworthy that, following the earlier downfall of former political commissar Gao Daguang, Wang has now also come under investigation. This means that both the commander and political commissar — the two highest-ranking officers of the Joint Logistic Support Force — have become embroiled in the anti-corruption crackdown. 

The Joint Logistic Support Force was officially established in September 2016 as part of the 2015 military reforms and is responsible for building and managing the PLA’s logistics support system.

Reshaping the military after reform 

If the earlier investigations into former CMC vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong marked an important step in the post-18th Party Congress military purge by dismantling entrenched vested interests, then the current anti-corruption campaign, which began in 2023, has focused far more on the new institutions and leadership teams created under the military reforms.

Over the past two years, the crackdown has expanded from the Rocket Force and military procurement to encompass CMC organs, theatre commands, service branches, the Joint Logistic Support Force and emerging combat capabilities such as the Cyberspace Force, and its scope has continued to widen.

Judging by the institutions involved and the seniority of the officers targeted, this latest campaign appears to be an ongoing review of the leadership structure established after the military reforms. It also suggests that the Chinese leadership’s efforts to enforce political loyalty and organisational discipline within the armed forces have not ended with the completion of the reforms. On the contrary, the anti-corruption drive has only intensified.

At least until the convening of the CCP’s 21st Party Congress, the military purge is unlikely to subside. Instead, it will continue reshaping the post-reform leadership structure, with far-reaching implications for the PLA’s future personnel arrangements and distribution of power.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “解放军反腐持续扩围”.

Related: China delivers its harshest military corruption sentences in years | Last man standing: Xi’s purge of the Central Military Commission