[Video] Bilahari Kausikan: How to navigate the new world order

Host: Chow Yian Ping Interviewee: Bilahari Kausikan

Chow Yian Ping (Chow): Hello and welcome to ThinkChina Conversations, a series of in-depth interviews with experts on China. I’m Yian Ping, your host. And with me in the studio is Mr Bilahari Kausikan, former Singaporean diplomat and the author of books, including Singapore Is Not an Island and The Myth of the Asian Century. Mr Bilahari, thank you for joining us today.

Bilahari Kausikan (Bilahari): Oh, thank you for inviting me.

Chow: Thank you. Many people look at the world today and see growing uncertainty. There was a time when the US believed in the American dream and wanted to promote its values around the world. Today that sense of direction has faded. The world is more fragmented and unpredictable, with every country trying to navigate an uncertain future. And at the centre of it all is the US-China relationship. In your book The Myth of the Asian Century, you said the US-China rivalry is not an existential contest like the US-Soviet Cold War, because it is competition within a system, and not between two separate systems. If so, what would it mean for China or the US to lose this competition?

Modernity has no Eastern alternative

Bilahari: I think precisely because it’s a complicated competition, to think of it in simplistic binary terms is not the best way of trying to understand their competition. It’s a competition over many dimensions. One party or the other may have some advantage in one dimension, a disadvantage in the other, and so on. Secondly, I think it is a process. It’s a long process, and I think both sides have recognised that they are going to be in competition for the foreseeable future. It’s not particularly useful to try to characterise a process by “win or lose”, because somebody may be up at one point and they may be down at the other point. Maybe even at the third point. And it will fluctuate over time. Thirdly, I don’t think this is a competition that is going to end in any clear-cut way. It’s not going to end in a neat denouement: “China won” or “China lost”; “US won” or “US lost”.

What I mean by competition within a system is that they are both locked in an interdependency that is very profound, which is not going to bifurcate, and they are using their interdependency as a tool of competition. They may try to dominate each other, but they are not trying to destroy each other. They can’t do that without destroying themselves. It’s not a question, as you said, of one system replacing another, because they are both part of the same system. That also means it’s not going to end in any clear-cut way, unless the whole system of which they are both parts collapses, which I don’t think is very likely.

Chow: You also said that it is not existential because, unlike the Cold War, both countries operate within the same global economic system. But I’m just wondering, has the competition evolved? Because today, like what you said just now, it seems less about merely the economic system that can generate wealth, but more about which political, social, or civilisation model can sustain prosperity and national strength over the long term. So has the contest shifted from economics to values, institutions, and ways of life? Or has it elevated to the realm of civilisation and culture? And if so, does that make the rivalry more existential in a way?

Bilahari: No, I don’t think so. The US-Soviet rivalry was existential because they were two different systems. Two different ways of life, if you like. And which is the better way for human beings to live? That is, in principle, what the contest between communism and capitalism was about. Now, there is that dimension there, and use of values, use of the rhetoric of values is certainly a tool of competition. But the fact is, both the US and China now are mixed economies. China is not a totally planned economy; neither is the US a totally market economy. In the West and the US, they call the planned elements “regulated elements”, but it’s the same thing. So we are all mixed economies; the only difference is in the balance between the different elements.

Also, and I think this is a much more fundamental point: Every country in the world — and this is the most important element of globalisation — is trying to become a modern industrial society. There are very few traditional societies left in the world, and even they are trying to modernise. Now, you know this idea that the Chinese have been propagating? That they have discovered a way of modernisation without Westernisation? That is complete nonsense, because the very idea of modernity is Western. Traditional societies — ancient China, ancient India, ancient Indonesia — they were not static societies. They could innovate, they could invent, they changed over time, but the idea of modern industrial society is a Western idea. And there are only two models, and both are Western models. There is the liberal democratic market model, and there’s the Soviet Russian socialist model. Some countries chose this way, some countries chose that way, but they are both Western. Marx, Engels, and Lenin are not ancient Chinese sages, right? And just by adding “with Chinese characteristics” onto it doesn’t change the fact that the Chinese model of a socialist society is a Western model.

Now, that doesn’t mean that we are all going to become carbon copies of any Western society. That is simply not true. But if China is unique, it’s the same way that Japan is unique, Singapore is unique, India is unique. In other words, we have adapted one or other of these Western models to our own particular circumstances. So in a way we are all western, with a lowercase “w”, not a capital “W”.

I don’t think this is a civilisational conflict, because modern civilisation is one civilisation, with certain cultural characteristics in different groups, in different countries. I think this whole idea of it shifting… The West has its own version of this nonsense. The Chinese nonsense is that “We have discovered a new way of modernisation without Westernisation.” I told you that’s nonsense, because modernisation is Westernisation. The Western idea is: there is a contest between democracy and authoritarianism. That’s also nonsense, because there are many types of democracy and many types of authoritarianism, and not everybody needs to follow one model of authoritarianism nor one model of democracy. So I think this is all a red herring.

This is one world. And that is the true meaning of globalisation. Everybody aspires to the same thing. There are different paths to the same thing, but they are the same thing. And, more or less, the difference between different paths is narrow now. It is not a question of a planned economy or a market economy: There is no pure market economy or pure planned economy anymore. We are all mixed economies. Of course there are cultural differences, but those are epiphenomenal. They are not the most essential thing.

Chow: But of course the Chinese are saying that they are bringing in Confucianism, even aspects of Buddhism and Taoism, into their way of life and also in the kind of approach that they will look at politics…

Bilahari: A while ago, you’d get into deep trouble in China if you were talking about Confucianism and Buddhism. They are facing a very fundamental problem, and they are reverting to these traditional philosophies. I think Chinese society is very individualistic, much more than, say, Japanese society or some other cultures. It is actually very individualistic. I think it was Sun Yat-sen who said, “Chinese people are grains of sand.” And the Chinese Communist Party has been struggling, from the very beginning, to impose something more abstract, more impersonal, over what is really an intricate network of personal relationships. And that is how Chinese society has always been organised.

There is a Chinese sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, and his essential insight is this: Chinese society is a dense network of personal relationships which is more powerful than any institution. Now this is an idea against which the Communist Party, which is supposed to be an impersonal institution, has been struggling with from the very beginning. So I think they have resorted to many things: It was once Marx, Engels, Lenin as that impersonal idea over personal relationships. Didn’t work. Now they are trying… And then they got rid of Confucianism, but now they are trying Confucianism. Well, good luck to them. Everybody is struggling with the same thing in different ways in different societies. I doubt it will be more successful than what Fei Xiaotong talked about: this network of personal relationships which trumps other kinds of impersonal relationships.

Chow: So you think this Western foundation, this base which is built on Western civilisation, is something that the Chinese cannot ignore and cannot put aside?

Bilahari: Look, they are a Communist Party. The idea of communism is Western. As I said, Marx, Engels, Lenin – these are not ancient Chinese sages. Two are German and one is Russian. They don’t like to admit it, they will not admit it, but that’s the fact. Unless they change the whole system to something more traditional, right? But they’re not. It’s a party system, a Leninist system.

Look, I’m not saying that China, or Singapore, or Japan, or India, or Indonesia, is a carbon copy of the West. Obviously we are not. But China is unique in the way every country is unique. It doesn’t have a unique way of development, any more than Japan has a unique way of development. Yes, Japan has a unique way of development. In fact, Japan was the first Asian country to westernise, or modernise, in Meiji times, followed by others. So the path is a similar path: It’s an adaptation of a Western idea of modernity to particular cultural and historical circumstances, and that is unique in the sense that every country is unique.

China’s narrative is powerful but limiting

Chow: Another idea that you have written about is the China dream. It’s the narrative of national humiliation, rejuvenation, and the restoration of China’s rightful place in the world. While you have expressed doubts about this narrative, it clearly resonates with many Chinese, both in China and overseas, who see the country’s rise as a culmination of a century of hardship and recovery. What do you see as the limitations of this narrative? And if China is to tell a different story about its rise, what might that story look like?

Bilahari: Well, that’s a very good question. I think that narrative is a powerful narrative precisely because it is not untrue. It is true. It is simplified, but it is not untrue. It’s exactly the same narrative that the Kuomintang (KMT) used to use. When was it? 1947 or thereabouts, two years before the Communist victory. Chiang Kai-shek published a book called China’s Destiny. In English. If you read that book — it’s still around, you know, in second-hand bookshops — it’s exactly the same narrative. Just cancel out KMT and insert CCP (Chinese Communist Party). The story is the same. But it’s a simplistic narrative. It is also one that has inherent… it is attractive to Chinese, but I think it’s attractive mainly to Chinese. It has no larger attraction.

Chow: You are referring to ethnic Chinese or mainland PRC Chinese?

Bilahari: To different degrees, the people who are attracted to this narrative would be people who have some sentimental attraction to China even if they have left it. And it’s not untrue. The narrative is not untrue. But it is limited. It is limited because if you… I have told Chinese friends, “If you say you are a great power, and you are a great power, you need to stand for something that is a bit more forward-looking. Rather than a revanchist narrative of getting back to where you were after you were laid low.” And I think they recognise it. They have got a Global Civilisation Initiative, a Global Security, a Global Development, all kinds of things, but they are not very credible because they are rather hollow. I don’t think anybody believes them. This idea of a common human civilisation. Yeah, we have a common human civilisation, so what?

Chow: Common destiny.

Bilahari: Common destiny. Yeah, we are all on the same planet, so what? It’s a rather trite idea. Now I think the limitation of that idea is that it infuses… the narrative of humiliation and rejuvenation…By the way, it is not just the hundred years. If you read the second resolution of history of the Chinese Communist Party, which came out a few years ago, in 2018 or thereabouts, it claims that this is the culmination of the entire sweep of Chinese history. The Chinese Communist Party is the logical culmination of the entire sweep of Chinese history, which is a revolutionary idea because it means that… The whole idea that it is a break with the past? No, we are the culmination, the logical consequence. Okay, never mind about that. But it’s not just the last hundred years they are claiming. This is thousands of years.

But the limitation of this is: if you have a narrative, a national narrative, a legitimating narrative, that looks backwards rather than forwards — and it is actually backward-looking, because what you are saying is “I’m reclaiming the place I had” — it infuses everything you do with a great sense of entitlement. It thinks that “I am the victim”. It is a narrative of victimhood. Now if you are a great power, you should be a bit more than a victim. I think. You ought to be. But if you feel that you have been victimised, and what you are doing is only reclaiming what was yours before it was stolen or taken away from you, then it’s going to be very difficult to come to the normal kinds of diplomatic compromise.

South China Sea — I give you an example. You say this was all mine anyway, until I lost it when I was weak. If that’s the case, there is no way to come to a compromise. Because if it was mine, then why should I compromise? What will my people think of me if I compromise? And they don’t compromise. So I think it’s a very limiting narrative. In fact, yeah, I think it’s most attractive to somebody — whether you are living in the People’s Republic of China or not — that has some sentimental attraction to China. And it is not a wrong narrative, but it is a backward-looking narrative of victimhood. But what do you therefore stand for? In a positive way?

They tried various things, you know, Global Civilisation and all that. And I told you that’s all nonsense, because it is actually an adaptation of a common Westernisation that affects everybody whether we like it or not. You don’t see anybody in China, except on special occasions, going around in traditional robes, right? You don’t see it in Singapore. You don’t see it in India or in Indonesia or anywhere. We are all part of different types of adaptation to this new idea of modernity, which is a Western idea. One form is the Western democratic form; the other form was the Russian Soviet form. We all chose one or the other. So when you say you want to develop — yeah, everybody wants to develop — when you say you have a unique way, I will say yes, you’ve got a unique way, but so has Japan a unique way, so has Singapore a unique way, so has Malaysia, or Vietnam, or Thailand. So has Sweden. Right? Sweden is not the same as America. In fact, the UK is not the same as America. So every country is unique. Now that’s a very… That’s true but trite.

So I think they are struggling to find a broader narrative that has a bigger appeal and a more positive appeal. So far they haven’t found it. And building on that sense of victimhood: As you said, it is actually very powerful. It’s a way of bringing people together, in a sense. It is, but I sometimes think there are as many China dreams as there are Chinese. Because they are individualistic people. Everybody has their own dream. So why is your dream better than my dream?

Chow: So when you bring out your doubts to your Chinese friends, what are their…

Bilahari: They change the subject usually. They don’t usually argue about it. Because I tell them, “You’re right. Your narrative is not wrong, but it’s very limited, and it limits you.”

Chow: I see. Alright. And they change the subject. You have also said that the China dream is, at its core, a revanchist narrative, with implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea. We see that between the Philippines and China, there are a lot more clashes over South China Sea issues. And then we also see the US joining the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and many countries in reaffirming that arbitration ruling ten years ago. So what do you think is the best way to reduce tensions in the South China Sea?

The South China Sea, Taiwan and the risk of war

Bilahari: Well, first of all, nobody is going to give up their claims, right? And everybody’s claim is as good as anybody else’s claim because it’s there. Nobody thought, in fact, in modern terms, of territorial possessions in the same way in ancient times. Nobody had that concept. China was not a country; it was an empire. That’s very different. Whether or not the writ of the Chinese empire covered all the areas of the South China Sea? That’s historically debatable. Whether the writ of the Qing dynasty, the last traditional dynasty… Where it covered waxed and waned. At some point, because of contact with the West, they drew a line around what was the limit of their empire then and said, “This is now China.” And that has caused immense problems because it includes a lot of places that are only peripherally China. Xinjiang, Tibet, among other places. But okay, we are stuck with it. That’s the line. Nobody really disputes Tibet and Xinjiang. Taiwan is a bit more ambiguous, as you know, if you look at Chinese history. It was, and it was not Chinese. It was a place of exile, if anything, for the troublesome members of various dynasties. And actually that’s why…

Chow: But I think the Chinese will dispute that. They will say that they have been looking after the island since the Qing dynasty.

Bilahari: Yeah, but what is the real writ? The Qing dynasty is just the latest dynasty. Was it looked after in the Ming dynasty? Was it looked after in the Han dynasty? Was it looked after in the Tang Dynasty? So, why do you think the… As you know, maybe, Qing history is extremely contentious in China, and they have their own interpretation of Qing history. And that is the root of the legitimating narrative of what is China. But anyway, I think most countries in the world, except for maybe ten or 12, do recognise Taiwan is part of China. Now what do we mean by “China” is another issue. It’s an ambiguous term.

The South China Sea is another thing. Philippines has a claim to some bit, Malaysia has a claim, Vietnam has a claim. Malaysia has a claim. Brunei has a claim. What makes your claim more valid than these claims? There’s nothing except force, right? And, you know… It’s not a question of just resisting or being unfriendly to China, therefore, they are more forceful in pushing their claim against the Philippines. Duterte was extremely friendly to China, and that was when the claim became much more forcefully pushed — Scarborough Shoal and so on. It was there all the time.

I sometimes remind Chinese friends that they have forgotten certain laws of physics. The second law of thermodynamics, for a start. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. If you behave this way, you must expect the Philippines and others to push back. If they can’t push back by themselves, they will form coalitions with other countries. If you push back, you push against not just the Philippines. Let’s say, you push Japan, in those islands they call Senkaku and you call Diaoyu, you must expect them to push back. And so on. So I don’t think it serves anybody’s purpose to act as a victim again here. It’s just international relations: If you push against me, I will push back. If I cannot do it alone, I will form coalitions to push back against you.

Chow: But of course we are worried about whether this pushing back and forth will get…

Bilahari: Okay, I’m worried about that. The way to make sure that it doesn’t get out of hand is to have a balance of power. And that balance of power, whether you like it or not, is held by the United States. The South China Sea issues, the disputes, whether with the Philippines or any of the other claimants, are never going to be settled. The rights and wrongs are not the issue. Even the legality of it — the legal arguments are so complicated, there will never be any settlement. So all you can do is manage them, and the basis of management must be a balance of power. And the vital element in that balance of power is the presence of the US Navy. That’s the fact. If that is so, then these things will not go too far, and that’s the best we can hope for.

Chow: I also want to look at the Taiwan Strait. What do you think is the current possibility of war in the Taiwan Strait? We know that US President Donald Trump has stated that he’s not looking to have somebody go independent. He has said he’s not keen on sending US forces to fight a war. And then you see Philippine President Marcos Junior and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi preparing for a Taiwan contingency. So given all these contrasting signals, how do you assess the actual likelihood of war?

Bilahari: First of all, I think Donald Trump’s position on Taiwan is the American position since 1972. Mr Biden was a little bit different. He said, “I will defend Taiwan.” But every time he said that, his own senior officials contradicted him and said, “This is not what he really meant.” I don’t know whether he… maybe he was not totally compos mentis. But Donald Trump’s position on Taiwan is the general US position on Taiwan. They have always maintained this ambiguity about what they will do and whether they are going to fight for it or not. So I don’t think there’s any change there. They have also, since 1972, always recognised there’s only one China.

Now, I don’t believe, however, this is going to lead to conflict. You always… You can’t say never, but the probability of armed conflict breaking out — and by armed conflict I mean a war by design. That means China launches a war of reunification. I think that is very low probability, for a number of reasons. The most important reason is: it’s going to be such an immense gamble. And a gamble that the Chinese cannot afford to lose because the stake is the legitimacy of the Communist Party. They are not going to gamble with that. Secondly, it’s not necessary. They can squeeze Taiwan, strangle Taiwan, and they can wait. This is not something that needs to be settled next year or the year after or anytime soon.

I see two trends over time in this issue on the Taiwanese side of the Strait. One is there’s been a drastic reduction over time in the Taiwanese will to defend themselves. At the same time, there has been a great increase in the Taiwanese sense of entitlement that “somebody will help me”. Now this is kind of dangerous because it could lead to miscalculations.

Now I don’t find anything unusual about Japan, or Taiwan, or the Philippines preparing for a Taiwan contingency. You have to prepare. I would not be surprised if other ASEAN countries are also preparing for a Taiwan contingency. It would be irresponsible not to prepare. But I don’t think the likelihood of a conflict — a war by design as I said; the Chinese launching an invasion — is very high. It’s a huge gamble, one that they cannot be sure of winning. And a draw is not good enough: That will shake the roots of Communist Party legitimacy deeply. And it’s not necessary: They have time, they can squeeze, and the Taiwanese will to defend themselves is being eroded.

There is a lot of magical thinking in Taiwan, I find, in this sense: “I want the status quo to continue.” Very few Taiwanese want reunification; very few really want independence. They want the status quo to continue, but somehow magically by doing nothing. I don’t think that’s going to happen either. The risk is accidents getting out of hand. Miscalculations. A miscalculation on the Chinese side, a miscalculation on the Taiwanese side. I don’t know whether you go to Taiwan often? Every time I go to Taiwan, I find it a very pleasant place, but a rather parochial place. They think they are the centre of the universe. They are not, actually. And thinking they are the centre of the universe, their politicians sometimes act as if they are entitled to help. And that can be dangerous. In fact, right now, if you ask me, I’m a bit more worried about the Taiwanese side doing something foolish than the Chinese side doing something stupid.

Chow: But some commentators would say that reunification is actually part of the goal of the China dream.

Bilahari: Don’t need a commentator; Xi Jinping has said so.

Chow: Yeah, and President Xi himself. So what do you think of this?

Bilahari: But he didn’t say when.

Chow: Yeah, of course nobody will say when.

Bilahari: As long as you keep… There are many international issues that have no solution, right? This is one of them. But that doesn’t mean it cannot be managed. And one of the ways of managing — in fact, the crucial tool for managing it, without conflict of course — is to keep this idea of reunification alive. Peaceful reunification, of course. Keep this idea alive, then you can manage. Then other things can be discussed. Once you take it off the table, then however reluctant they are, they will have to go to war, right? So as long as the Taiwanese side doesn’t do something foolish like unilaterally declare independence, and as long as the Chinese side doesn’t get ideas beyond their capabilities, I think this can be managed, provided you keep this idea of unification as a goal and aspiration.

How nuclear weapons could freeze Asia’s power balance

Chow: You have also talked about the threats from China and North Korea, that they are driving nuclear ambitions in Northeast Asia. And you have said that a multi-way balance of mutually assured destruction could ultimately stabilise the region and benefit smaller states. However, don’t you think this complex network of deterrence will actually dramatically increase uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation? And also, wouldn’t smaller nations simply be forced to choose sides? If you look at the history between India and Pakistan, the nuclear arsenals actually don’t necessarily prevent conventional warfare.

Bilahari: It didn’t prevent conventional warfare between India and Pakistan, but it stopped their conventional warfare pretty quickly without escalation. Because both suddenly realised this is too dangerous. So they stopped. Now let me go back a bit. I think that train has left the station. In other words, it’s a matter of when, not whether, South Korea and Japan will have independent nuclear deterrents. And what’s driving it is not so much… It’s the erosion of the American nuclear umbrella, the credibility of it. And what’s eroding the nuclear umbrella is the modernisation of Chinese nuclear forces with a better second-strike capability and North Korea’s development of a nuclear capability. These are not things that are going to be reversed. If you are a nuclear weapon state, you are going to modernise your nuclear weapon force. There’s nothing unusual in that. There’s nothing unusual in China modernising it. And actually that creates… in a sense, it creates that… it’s a necessary condition of strategic stability.

Until very recently, China’s second-strike capability — that means the ability to take a nuclear hit and then retaliate and therefore deter — was very rudimentary and not very credible. North Korea is still moving towards that. It’s not very credible yet, but it is a nuclear weapon state. So it is bound… The credibility of the American nuclear umbrella is bound to be questioned, as it was in Europe many decades ago. Many decades ago, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, or on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis, then President Charles de Gaulle asked then President John F. Kennedy, “Will New York be sacrificed to save Paris?” He didn’t get a straight answer. Of course he wouldn’t get a straight answer. So I’m sure people in South Korea and in Japan are asking, “Will San Francisco or Los Angeles be sacrificed to save Tokyo or Seoul?” And the answer is: obviously not.

Now if the answer is obviously not, what can you do? You can try to do various things to extend extended deterrence, but in the end, the only way to deter a nuclear weapon state is to have your own nuclear weapons. You don’t have to match one for one, but you need to have that capability. Now I don’t think this is going to be a more complicated… What does a nuclear balance of power do? Essentially, the nuclear balance of power freezes the status quo. In other words, this cannot be a hierarchical East Asia anymore, with China at the apex, which is what the China dream is about ultimately, because that was the imagined past or the real past that they are trying to reclaim, without saying so so explicitly. It’s not possible anymore. So you’re going to have a nuclear balance: China, US, Russia, Japan, South Korea, North Korea. And if we take the broader region, India, Pakistan. In other words, you’re going to have a frozen multipolar Asia-Pacific.

Now that’s a more complex thing, but actually it gives smaller countries more choice, more room for manoeuvre. If there’s only one pole, you have no room for manoeuvre. If there are two, there’s a bit more room, but not a lot. But if you have a multipolar balance, which is what ultimately a nuclear balance will create, you have more room to move. Now whether you have the brains to see the opportunities and the capability to take those opportunities to manoeuvre, those are different questions. But objectively you will have a multipolar East Asia, or multipolar Asia-Pacific, which gives small countries more room to manoeuvre and less need to have to choose. Now whether you have the brains to see it or not? That’s another matter. Many countries have no brains, but that’s a different issue.

Chow: I would like to talk about the leadership succession issue in China. Do you see leadership succession as a critical vulnerability for the current Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping, given the lack of a clear heir? Or do you agree with some commentators who argue that this is not a unique crisis, as China’s political system and historical precedents have always evolved their own ways of managing power transitions?

Bilahari: Well, I think if you want to put it in a slightly extreme form, the whole of Chinese history has been a series of leadership crises, from dynasty to dynasty, from different parts of the… since 1949, right? And I think this will be another one. I don’t think it’s going to be a unique one. I don’t think it’s a critical vulnerability. I think there will be a crisis, but I think they’ll get over it. How? Nobody knows. They themselves don’t know. But this is not new. Every dynasty is a crisis, that’s why there’s a new dynasty. Every new leader since 1949 was a crisis. There’s only been what? How many? Not so many. Four. Mao Zedong to Hua Guofeng. One, two, three, four, five. Five so far, right? So every time there was uncertainty, but they got over it.

This one maybe a little bit more uncertainty. Deng Xiaoping tried to minimise the uncertainty by putting term limits, right? That has gone out of the window. So there will be some sort of crisis, but I don’t think it’s going to be a critical vulnerability or an existential crisis. There will be some form of crisis, but they will get over it. They always have, so they will. Anyway, we better hope they will, because the alternative for all of us is much worse.

Chow: So you don’t think it’s a critical vulnerability for the CCP?

Bilahari: I don’t think it’s a critical vulnerability. For Mr Xi Jinping himself, maybe. But for the system, no.

Chow: For the CCP, for the party. You don’t think so?

Bilahari: For the CCP, no. What’s the alternative? If it’s either Mr X or Mr Y or Mr Z, but they’re all party. It’s not going to be from outside the party. I don’t see any credible scenario where the party is overthrown. And I don’t think it’s desirable that it should be overthrown, because chaos is worse.

Chow: So stability is still something that is very important domestically for China, for the Chinese party.

Bilahari: The stability of China is important for the whole world, and definitely for this region.

Chow: And also something that they emphasise very much in how they govern the country.

Bilahari: Well, they are… China is full of contradictions, as you know. One of the most… One of the biggest contradictions is that the Chinese Communist Party is unprecedentedly powerful but still extremely insecure. And I think it goes back to what I mentioned about Fei Xiaotong: the deep structure of Chinese society. But they have gotten over it. They will get over it. And anyway we better hope they do.

Washington doesn’t define America

Chow: Okay. I’d like to look at the US. Many of us remain very baffled by US behaviour during Trump’s first term. You said that he wasn’t an aberration but an overcorrection to post-Cold War excesses. At 250 years of independence, the US remains wealthy, innovative, and immensely influential, yet China has moved much closer to parity in a bipolar regional order. Now, looking at the mixed signals of Trump’s second term — from the truce with China, strikes on Iran and Venezuela, to resurrected rhetoric over Greenland — do you see a country that’s acting out of insecurity and reacting in all directions? Or is there a coherent grand strategy behind these seemingly erratic actions?

Bilahari: Alright, I think there’s one very fundamental fact that I think is not well understood about the US, particularly in East Asia, including Singapore, including China. The US was founded by people who fundamentally distrusted government. Therefore, they made the central government as weak as possible. Politely, it’s called checks and balances. Arguably, the central government today is weaker than absolutely necessary. But what it means is this. The essential sources of US strength: US innovation, US creativity, US resilience does not lie in Washington, DC. It lies in their civic institutions. It lies in their corporations, in their universities, in Wall Street, or in their states. That’s where the strength of the US lies. And those strengths, more often than not, is not because of Washington, DC. It’s despite Washington, DC.

Now I can… I don’t see a grand strategy of the US right now. I’ve never seen a grand strategy of the US. A grand strategy is a theoretical concept, whereas… because any grand strategy consists of reactions to things that happen.

Chow: But we all imagine there was a grand strategy in the past when we looked at the US as the beacon…

Bilahari: In the past, that grand strategy is competition with the Soviet Union. In so far if there’s a grand strategy now, it’s competition with China. But that is such a broad statement that even during the Cold War it didn’t amount to too much. Because it is always a series of improvisations to unpredictable events. Now I think… we don’t… we should not see that... You made a statement that I don’t quite agree with. You said the regional order is becoming more bipolar. I think that needs to be qualified. The global order needs to be qualified.

Chow: Yes, we’ll come to that question.

Bilahari: Yeah, but anyway, in some respects, in some domains, it is becoming a bit more bipolar. I don’t think it will become completely bipolar, but it’s more bipolar. In other words, the US and China are in a league by themselves in certain things. But in certain things it is multipolar and is likely to become more multipolar. And in certain things, in the military domain, it is certainly unipolar still, where the US is far ahead of almost everybody else. That doesn’t mean it can always get its own way, as we can see. But I think militarily… So if you look at the regional order, there are unipolar elements, there are bipolar elements, and there are multipolar elements, and I think it’s likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. So I don’t see that the US is such a mysterious country, if you bear in mind what I told you: that the essential source of the US is not in Washington, DC.

Chow: So, going by what you have just shared, then we actually do not need to be so worried about what is happening and the kind of policies, all the different actions…

Bilahari: You have to worry about it because… but you don’t have to… but that is not the decisive factor, I don’t think. You have to worry about it, just like you have to worry about what happens in Beijing, because these are big countries. But I think the difference is this: So much in China depends on the policies of Beijing. Not so much in America depends on the policies of Washington, DC. So I think they are very different kinds of countries. But I don’t think we in Singapore understand the US very well. We say we do, but I don’t think we do. Because instinctively we equate good government with strong central government. Whereas the strength of America is not in its government. It’s despite its government. Its government sucks, actually.

Chow: How do you see the future of democracy? Many democratic countries seem quite stuck, economically, politically, socially…

Bilahari: Aren’t we democratic too? Don’t you think? You don’t think Singapore is democratic? Are we stuck?

Chow: Should I answer your question?

Bilahari: Alright? What I’m trying to say… I get your point. What I’m trying to say is this word “democracy”: there are many varieties, right? So I don’t think it’s a very meaningful word to use. Yeah, certain types of democracies are not very functional. They probably focus too much on process and not enough on outcome. That’s probably true of most European democracies and most North American democracies. They focus on process, meaning giving people a say in how they are governed, forgetting that the fundamental purpose of government is to govern, is to deliver outcomes. If you don’t like the outcome, then five years’ time throw the rascals out and put somebody else in. So I don’t think you can say that “democracy”, that word, is not working.

Chow: But a lot of people will also say that is precisely the problem with that kind of system.

Bilahari: But that’s precisely the problem with one kind of democracy. Or some kinds of democracy. It’s not with that… Because that word itself is such a protean word. That means there are so many meanings, so many manifestations, to me, it is a rather meaningless word. Just like “authoritarianism” is a rather meaningless word because there are so many kinds. That’s why I tried to tease you. You said democracy doesn’t work. Then Singapore doesn’t work? How can you work for Zaobao and say that?

Chow: I shall not say that.

Bilahari: But you did, you know? You didn’t mean it, but you did. So in your mind, you don’t think that this is an issue with democracy itself. Different countries will adopt it, adapt it to their own circumstances. Yeah, I think there are many forms. China is a democracy. You ask them, they are a “people’s democracy”.

Chow: Yeah, they have come up with a new term to actually label it…

Bilahari: It’s a very old term. It’s a very old term coming from western political theory, Marxist political theory, Leninist political theory. They claim it’s a new term. No, it’s not. It’s a very old term. People forget about history, people forget about political philosophy. I don’t. Anyway, but I think the way you frame it… I know what you’re getting at, and I think it’s a valid question, but I think you framed it wrongly. Because you’re framing using those terms that are actually so broad that they become meaningless. I think, for example, most European democracies — Western European democracies — are in deep trouble, and some of them I’m not so sure they’ll get out of it. On the other hand, I think the US form of democracy will get out of it, because it’s much more resilient. It’s more resilient because the role of government is less in the US, whereas the role of government is greater in Europe.

In Western political discourse, “liberal” has the meaning of less interference by government in society, and “conservative” means much more state intervention. Oh, sorry, it’s the other way around. Conservative means more state intervention… Conservative means less state intervention, and liberal means more state intervention. Now, the most conservative European is much more liberal than the most liberal American. In other words, the most conservative European will accept much more state intervention than even the most… the American equivalent. So government generally plays, I think, a greater role in shaping societies in Europe than in the US. Now that is a strength of the US, because it often means that they cannot act quickly. But it doesn’t mean that they cannot act. And when they act, they can act decisively. And whatever happens, whatever nonsense happens in Washington, DC, doesn’t really matter that much. Whereas what nonsense happens in London matters a lot more. Whatever nonsense happens in Paris, or in Madrid, or in some other place, matters a lot more. Now that is a better way of framing the difference than talking about democracy working or not working. But every country is democratic now. There’s only a handful of countries that are absolute monarchies, right?

Chow: I mean, while that is true, I think a lot of people are looking at what’s happening in the US and they will equate it to democracy failing.

Bilahari: But they are not looking at the right thing. They are looking at what happens in Washington, DC, which I told you is not all that important. “Democracy failing.” Then Singapore is failing? Or you say Singapore is not democratic?

Chow: Well, I mean it’s a way of …

Bilahari: It’s democratic in a different way. So it’s better to talk about some kinds of democracy not working so well, with other kinds working better. But what I’m trying to say is people in Singapore in particular, they do not understand the US. Because what happens in Washington, DC, is not that important in the American form of democracy.

A multipolar world built on US-China stability

Chow: I want to go on to the question about world order that you talked about in some of your answers. You have discussed this term called “asymmetrical dynamic multipolarity” as an emerging shift in global politics in your books, where nations form fluid alliances around the US-China axis. And recently, during a forum, Ambassador Chan Heng Chee mentioned that we are already living in a G2 world whether China likes it or not. Given that, how would you look at this future world order? Do you think it is a hybrid? Or are we really headed towards this true multipolarity? Or will the US continue to play an overwhelmingly dominant role, even as its behaviour becomes more erratic?

Bilahari: I think Heng Chee and I are actually talking about the same thing, or different aspects of the same thing. What I see evolving is: There is a central axis. Because the US and China are in a league of their own. They are far ahead of most other powers in most dimensions, in most domains, not everything. But around them there are going to be different, fluid coalitions of countries. Now some of those coalitions may include the US but not China, some may include China but not the US, and some may exclude both. But at the bottom, all these coalitions depend on strategic stability. And strategic stability depends on a balance of power between the US and China. So in that sense it is a G2, but it’s not only a G2. If there’s no strategic stability…

Chow: So you don’t like the word “bipolar”?

Bilahari: No, “bipolar” is, in certain aspects… I think in certain domains the world is bipolar or becoming more bipolar. For example, you’re talking about AI. There are only really two types that really matter: One is the US, and one is China. And the Europeans, for example, are very worried about it because they don’t have anything of their own. Not anything useful. But in certain respects it is a multipolar world. Economically it is a multipolar world. And I think in terms of military dominance, it’s very largely a unipolar world still. May not last forever. Nothing lasts forever. But I would conceive it this way: the base is strategic stability between two major powers, which is the US and China. Around that, different coalitions form around different issues: Some with US and not China, some with China and not US, and some with neither of them. And these coalitions are in constant motion because it won’t be the same coalition on Issue A as on Issue C. So they are constantly shifting and reconstituting themselves. But the basis must be strategic stability.

You must have heard of this speech by Prime Minister Carney of Canada earlier this year, where he was saying more or less the same thing. But I think his speech was rather… was fundamentally flawed in this thing. First of all, he failed to notice this is already happening. It’s not something new. And I think he failed to understand that the basis of coalitions of like-minded countries, of countries that share values has to rest on a foundation of stability. And that foundation of stability, one crucial element is the US.

They can’t deter… Is it possible to deter Russia without the US? No. Is it possible to balance China without the US? No. So Carney was not wrong. But first of all, he did not recognise the flaw in his own argument. He was arguing that the US is not willing to uphold world order, therefore we better do it ourselves, right? But if the US does not provide the foundation of stability, do you think anything you — Canada, Europe, or Japan — can do together is going to make any difference? I don’t think so. If you want to have rules, rules depend on a foundation of stability. And stability depends ultimately on deterrence and a balance of power. Who can maintain that?

Can China innovate without a new balance?

Chow: I would like to look at the tech aspects of things. Washington tried to cripple Huawei by cutting off its access to advanced chips. We see Huawei emerging stronger and more deeply embedded in China’s technology ecosystem. And since then, China has continued to produce major breakthroughs like DeepSeek, now Moonshot AI. And then recently also reusable rockets and other advances. Yeah. So how do you assess China’s technological rise? Does it challenge the long-held assumption that China’s state-led, tightly controlled system is ill-suited to innovation and breakthrough technologies?

Bilahari: I don’t think that’s the right way to frame the problem. I’m quite agnostic about this. I don’t either believe that only complete free market societies can innovate, neither do I completely believe that state-owned, state-led things have some intrinsic advantage in channelling resources. I’m quite agnostic about this. Now I don’t think… I think China’s technological breakthroughs are real. But I think… and I have seen translations of Chinese texts that say it is still based on a foundation of American science. They know that. Huawei has made breakthroughs, but I am told — I am not a tech person — I am told that what they have done is extremely costly and not very efficient, and the failure rate is still high. It’s going down, but still high. They will get there, but they are trying to catch up with a moving target. Don’t forget that.

If you look at China’s economy as a whole, it’s quite bifurcated actually. The high-tech part is doing quite well. Reusable rockets, this is not really new. Elon Musk is trying to do the same thing, lots of people are trying to do the same thing, and I don’t see any reason why there has to be only one success. There are probably many ways of doing the same thing. But China’s economy has always been bifurcated. The high-tech part is doing pretty well, but the rest is not doing so well. Just like in the US. Some parts are doing pretty well, but some of the traditional industries are not doing well. And that’s probably true of every country in different ways. So I don’t think this idea that only market economies can innovate is correct. But neither would I think that there is any intrinsic advantage in the more state-directed economies.

So I think this kind of technological innovation is something that, to me at least, is quite mysterious: it happens, or it doesn’t happen. It may happen next week, or it may happen in five years, or 50 years, or it may never happen. So these breakthroughs, to me, are rather unpredictable, or not totally predictable. They have done well so far. But I was just reading something this morning in the South China Morning Post, if you consider that a credible source, by some American professor. But it made some sense to me. Some professor, I forgot his name, was saying that China has probably over-automated. And with the advance of AI and youth unemployment, this is probably not a good thing in the long run. They need a different balance. But I don’t know. The way you framed the question is probably too simplistic. Anyway, it’s the way some people frame the question. This is not your question, actually. You were quoting a common view, right?

Chow: Yeah, because I think a lot of people see it as an intrinsic contradiction in having this tightly controlled system and giving the space for innovation and advanced technology.

Bilahari: As I said, I’m pretty agnostic. But I think up to a point, and there is a point. The point is this: you look at all the high-income countries and the more advanced economies in our part of the world, starting with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore. When we started the path to rapid growth, innovation, and all that, none of us was a democracy in any sense of the term. We were all pretty authoritarian countries, including Japan during the Meiji times. That was when they started. But as our economies grew more complicated, we had to broaden the political parameters. And I think China is facing some kind of a choice.

Back in 2012, at the 18th Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party itself publicly said that the growth model that gave it spectacular results in the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s was reaching the end of its shelf life. I’m using my own terms: That means they needed a new growth model. That old growth model was basically huge investment in infrastructure, led by state-owned enterprises. The next year, 2013, they rolled out a new growth model that promised “a decisive role for the market in allocating resources”, meaning more economic efficiency. They have not really implemented that new growth model. In fact, they have been oscillating between much more control and let go, control and let go. Now I think what they need… I don’t believe that only open economies, open societies can innovate and grow, because if that’s the case, Singapore should not have grown, Japan should not have grown, South Korea should not have grown.

Chow: People would argue that for breakthrough technologies to happen you actually need…

Bilahari: Well, that one I’m agnostic. I’m agnostic. But I do think that China needs a new balance. They have recognised it themselves. Not necessarily that if they don’t have that new balance, they won’t have breakthrough technologies, but it is causing some other problems for them. A lot of the problems that are well known, such as the perilous property market, a lot of local government debt and all that, I think that is the lack of that balance. It hasn’t stopped other innovation. On the other hand, there is a fundamental contradiction, and to some degree, frankly, it seems to me the party is afraid of innovation. Why? Because look, they try to control all the big tech companies.

And then it was last year… Was it last year? Yes. They called Jack Ma and others to a big meeting and said, “Oh, I love you anyway, please go and innovate”. Then two weeks later they called a Politburo meeting, and they publicised it. They didn’t have to do that, right? And they said, “Our priority must be the security of the party.” So they oscillate this way, that way, but they haven’t quite found a new balance. That doesn’t mean they will not be able to innovate, but when these tech companies innovate without the party’s control, they get a bit nervous. Then they try to control. Then they think this doesn’t work, so they let go. And then they get nervous again. So they are oscillating like that. Doesn’t mean that they cannot innovate. They obviously have, in some things. But so far still on a foundation of Western science. And there are certain choke points held by the West. So I think it’s still an open question.

Why the Iran war is a long-term conflict

Chow: Alright. I want to move from China to the Iran war. The Iran war has become a prolonged conflict with global implications for energy, shipping, and regional security. Now Asian countries, including Singapore, want to work together to safeguard vital sea lanes such as the Strait of Malacca. What does this conflict mean for US leadership and credibility? These days, when you look at the news, sometimes you will think… When President Trump announces it has been a good day of negotiations with Iran, you tend to not be able to trust whether that is actually the case or not. So how do you see this situation?

Bilahari: I think the confusion arises because people are looking for clear-cut solutions to complicated problems. Or in fact for binary solutions. Now, this war against Iran — when did it begin? Tell me, what do you think?

Chow: It’s very… from the past…

Bilahari: I think it began in 2002. Around that time. When it was revealed, credibly, that Iran was secretly pursuing a nuclear weapon. And you should think of this war as in phases. The first phase was around 2002 to 7 October, when the terrorist attack against Israel happened. That was very largely a shadow war, carried out by assassination, by sabotage and so on, in the shadows, with occasionally open conflict against Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and so on. After 7 October, with the terrorist attack against Israel and Hezbollah joining in, it became inevitable there would be direct conflict with Iran, and it happened in June last year. That was a very short, sharp conflict: 12 days. It ended with a kind of informal ceasefire. Didn’t last, that ceasefire. And the third phase started in February this year. I think we are still in this third phase.

This third phase is a phase of fight and talk, talk and fight, talk by fighting. And that’s what they’re doing now. They have not yet… That 14-point Islamabad MOU, which was hailed as a great triumph, was actually a lot of nonsense. Because both sides wanted to pause the conflict for their own reasons. It was contradicted. Because almost at the same time there was a tripartite agreement — which people don’t talk about — between Israel, Lebanon, and the US. And if you look at the… I don’t want to go into details; it’ll bore your viewership. If you look at the details of these two agreements, they contradict each other. In other words, we are still in that third phase of talking and fighting, fighting by talking, and talking by fighting. I don’t think they have gone into a new fourth phase of all-out war. And if there is a fourth phase, it may not be all-out war. It may be a reversion to shadow war: Of assassination, occasional bombings, sabotage, and so on. But this is a problem that is never going to be resolved. In other words, this is going to be a long-term problem that, over different phases, involves different kinds of conflicts.

The immediate problem is of course freedom of navigation, sea lanes and so on. The Straits of Hormuz — I can see why Iran played that card, because it had no other cards that are effective. On the other hand, it had no real reply to the American blockade, which was choking it. So I think that’s why they agreed to some agreement — both sides wanted some respite. But the Straits of Hormuz is a card that can be played effectively only once, in the sense that people — Saudi Arabia, UAE — they are now busily building infrastructure to bypass the Straits of Hormuz. And you put it together with my first point that this is a very long-term conflict, you’ll see that this is going to be a less and less important card.

Of course it has broad implications for other choke points around the world, including in Southeast Asia and the Straits of Malacca. But again, you know, this evil idea of closing, of using these choke points as political leverage, is not a new one. In 1971, Indonesia and Malaysia issued a joint statement that basically said the Straits of Malacca is not an international waterway. It’s their territorial sea, and they control it. Singapore distanced itself from that statement immediately. 1971 — long time ago, you know? What happened then? What happened then was, in a rare moment of working together, the United States and the former Soviet Union sent their warships up and down the Straits of Malacca, and there was nothing anybody could do to stop them. Just to prove a point. So this evil idea is not a new one. This evil idea is a very old one, in our region even. And recently, when this war started, the Indonesian finance minister said, “Let’s put tolls.” He later said he was joking. But you know, if you’re a finance minister and you want to tell jokes, please tell jokes about something else. So I don’t think he was joking totally. He was probably floating a balloon. So I think this idea will never go away. It’s not created by this war in Iran — it’s been around since 1971. And it’s something we should be concerned about, something we should be aware of.

Now the last point on this is that: given that this is so, which are the powers that can keep the Straits of Hormuz or the Straits of Malacca open? Who? Can we? By ourselves? I don’t think so. So you’re back to: the US is still a dominant military force. Doesn’t mean it will get its way all the time. We can see it. Big powers do not get their way all the time. The US didn’t get its way in Vietnam. The Soviet Union didn’t get its way in Afghanistan. The US is not getting all its way in Iran either. But Iran is not winning either. So this is going to go on for a long time. We better get used to it and build resilience into our supply chains, build resilience into our energy security, into our food security, and so on.

Chow: But of course the commentators will say that it is a war that the US should never have started in the first place, and some people will argue that the Strait of Hormuz was actually open before the war started.

Bilahari: Well, actually, the Strait of Hormuz was closed in the 1980s too, for a short time, before it was opened by the US. Iran tried to close it when they were fighting Iraq. Now, whether or not this was a necessary war depends on whether or not you think… This is not a war fought over the status of the Strait of Hormuz. The essential issue is whether Iran should become a nuclear weapon state or not. The Strait of Hormuz is collateral. The core issue has always been: Should Iran be allowed to have a nuclear weapon or not?

Now if you think Iran should be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, then this is an unnecessary war. If you think Iran should not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, or at least we should delay that as long as possible, then this was a necessary war because there is no other way to stop a country except… And you can’t really stop a country. Because you can destroy all the infrastructure, and it has been largely destroyed, but you can’t destroy the knowledge. So you can only delay this. So that’s the crucial question: Do you think Iran should be a nuclear weapon state or not? If you think not, then this was a necessary war. Then we can argue about whether this was the right way to fight the war, the tactics, the strategy, and so on. That’s a different argument. But if you think Iran should not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, then it’s needed. There’s no other way. So this thing about the Strait of Hormuz… To me it’s a serious problem, not a new problem. As I said, many countries have had these evil thoughts before, including Iran — they tried in the 80s. And you know, so I think we… Commentators ah, have to comment, right? And they have to comment once a week or twice a week, and they always have to find things to say. That doesn’t mean they are wrong, but I don’t get too excited about commentators.

Chow: Yeah, I mean, they’re coming from a certain point of view.

Bilahari: They have to have a point of view because they are paid for having a point of view.

Southeast Asia has survived worse

Chow: From Iran, I want to come back to ASEAN. ASEAN always talks about centrality. ASEAN talks about strategic autonomy. And given the growing US-China rivalry, we look at the Myanmar crisis, the issues with the South China Sea, what do you see as ASEAN’s greatest challenge in the years ahead?

Bilahari: I think we better start from a fundamental premise. The basic purpose of ASEAN is to manage relations between its members. Because we are not a happy band of brothers singing in perfect harmony. If we were a happy band of brothers singing in perfect harmony, there would be no need for ASEAN. Because we are not, we need some mechanism for ensuring at least a minimum level of stability and civility in relations among its members. From that point of view, ASEAN has been pretty successful, I would say. Not totally successful, but much more successful than people give it credit for.

ASEAN’s ability to manage international relations has always been a secondary function — a very far distant second. Managing international relations has always been a national responsibility, and one that ASEAN is only a supplementary tool, a very very supplementary tool. Furthermore, because the centre of gravity of the Asia-Pacific, despite our talk of centrality, has always been in the Northeast, not in the Southeast. The big powers are all in the Northeast, not in the Southeast. Southeast Asia is much more an arena. But I think… bearing in mind the primary responsibility is national, not regional, for managing these relationships, individual ASEAN countries have done not badly. We haven’t done badly. Indonesia has not done badly. Vietnam has not done badly. Thailand. Malaysia. Laos, that’s another matter. Cambodia? They have made their own choice. Myanmar is just a mess. Timor-Leste, I think will be a mess — it has no capability. The countries that I mentioned have done quite well are basically the five original ASEAN countries. I forgot to mention Philippines. And Vietnam. These are countries with a certain level of capability.

We don’t really use ASEAN as the primary tool. We depend on national efforts to manage great power relationships, to position ourselves in the midst of great power relationships, and we have not done badly. And I don’t see any reason why we should not continue to do well, for the reasons we had discussed earlier. I think this is going to be, a multipolar structure is going to be frozen in place in the Asia-Pacific. A multipolar structure in principle gives you more room to manoeuvre. Because if there’s only one pole, you have no room. Two poles — slightly more. The more poles you have, the more room. Now whether you have the capability to use that room is another matter, but as long as we maintain that capability nationally, I see no reason why we cannot cope.

Of course it’s going to be difficult, of course it’s going to be complicated, but we have managed much more dangerous situations before with fewer capabilities. Imagine the state of Southeast Asia when Singapore became independent. Because it’s almost our national day, we just take it: 1965. What was the state of Southeast Asia in 1965? We had just been asked to leave Malaysia, and the whole relationship was really fraught with racial tension. And there were voices in Malaysia calling for an involuntary reunification, a re-merger. In other words: to use force. Indonesia was still fighting an undeclared war against Malaysia, and when we were asked to leave, against Singapore too. Philippines was actively claiming a huge chunk of Malaysia. There were irredentist movements between southern Thailand and west Malaysia, between southern Philippines and it. And most of all, the Cold War was hot in mainland Southeast Asia, and all the original five members were fighting communist insurgencies — armed communist insurgencies supported by China. And all of us were much weaker than we are now.

Right now, yeah, tensions in the South China Sea can get ugly. They can be dangerous. They can be managed. US-China strategic rivalry? But it’s not hot rivalry yet. I don’t think it will become hot. So we have gone through far worse with far less capabilities. I don’t see why we… as long as we don’t get excited. But the commentators — which you are, of which you are one, and I’m one too — they like to get excited, right? Because their living depends on getting excited and getting other people excited. Because who the hell will read them otherwise?

Chow: So from your description, this is not too bad an era to be in.

Bilahari: I don’t think it’s too bad an era to be in. In my own short lifetime, I have gone through worse.

Chow: Okay, so do I need to ask my last question? I want to ask you, in this current situation of flux and uncertainty — because we still feel it, you know — what should Singapore do to stay out of harm’s way?

Why Singapore must better integrate immigrants

Bilahari: I think the crucial question for us, the crucial success factor, is maintaining internal cohesion. Singapore is a kind of unique society in that we are the only ethnic Chinese majority sovereign state outside the PRC. And Taiwan. Whatever you want to call Taiwan, but Taiwan is not sovereign, at least most people do not think it’s sovereign. We also live in an era of identity politics and influence operations. You talked about the China Dream. Under the current Chinese leadership, there has been a strong push to say that all Chinese, not just citizens of the PRC, should support the China Dream or his version of the China Dream. And that has been made very clear when in 2018, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Department was put under the United Front Department. Now that’s as strong a statement as you can make about what their idea of how the world should be ordered should be. It’s not just China, because you have certain forms of Islam considering themselves more authentic, and a higher loyalty than national loyalty. You have certain western political ideas claiming that kind of authority. You have certain variants of Christianity claiming a higher authority than national authority. But China is kind of unique because the majority of our population is Chinese. And there is this ethnic sentimentality, which is quite natural. So I think if we can manage social cohesion and understand that we have our own national interest, we can manage the external complexities. Because we have gone through worse.

Uncertainty is an inherent quality of international relations. It’s not new. Yes, there may be a little more uncertainty, a little more risk — and risk and uncertainty, by the way, are not the same thing — than in the last 20 years. But why go back and just look 20 years? One of the big problems is people thought that the 20 years or so immediately after the end of the US-Soviet Cold War was the norm because it was a relatively stable period in international relations. There were still wars, by the way, but it was relatively more stable. But that is actually the exception. What we are experiencing now is closer to the historical norm. People have very short memories, and therefore they lose perspective, and therefore they get too excited. And when you get too excited, your brains don’t work. And when your brains don’t work, you cannot use the opportunities to manoeuvre, that are always there; you cannot use the agency that you are never without effectively if your brains don’t work. And the key to your brains working is to keep calm and see things in perspective, and not get carried away by emotions or sentimentality, but be rational and be as clinical and cold-blooded as you can in analysing the world.

Then what is the biggest challenge to maintaining this integration? Well, you have got a country telling three-quarters of your population, “You should be loyal to my idea of the China dream.” You’ve got another form of things telling 15% of your population, “You should define your interest in terms of your religion.” And you got smaller groups doing the same thing. That is a huge challenge. And you got idiots in Singapore who do not see it. The government sees it very clearly. Why do you think you have POFMA, FOMA, and all these things? What do you think this is for? Why do you think you have a reserve presidency for? To tell the world that we are who we are, and what we are is not a Chinese country.

Chow: How about Singapore bringing in new immigrants all through the years?

Bilahari: Young women like you refuse to have children, so what can we do? Right?

Chow: I have children.

Bilahari: Not you lah. I don’t mean you personally. Young women in Singapore refuse to have children, and this is one thing you cannot make anybody do: Have children against their will. You have to rely on immigrants. But we need to socialise immigrants better than we do. We have not recognised, I think, sufficiently, that the nature of immigration has fundamentally changed. Your ancestors came from somewhere else, mine did — half of mine came from China, the other half came from India. But wherever they came from, whether China, India, Indonesia, wherever, when you left your ancestral country in the past, you really left. Even if you intended to go back, in between there was hardly any contact. Nowadays you don’t leave. You carry your country in your pocket. You may leave physically, but you’ll get your information, you get your contacts, you get everything in your pocket. So you leave physically, you don’t necessarily leave mentally.

Now I’m not saying that these people, whether from China, from India, from anywhere, are disloyal. But their cultural reflexes are different. And therefore our way of socialising people, new citizens, has to change. I don’t think it has changed. It’s rather mechanical, and it’s not adequate to the new challenges posed by technology. These efforts to influence different sections of our population are facilitated by new technology, and so we have to use new technology to counter it. We have to use new technology to socialise the immigrants we need. There’s no doubt we need immigrants, right? Where else would.. If not, we will be extinct in a generation or two.

Chow: Thank you, Mr. Bilahari. Thank you for sharing your insights with us. I really enjoyed this conversation with you.

Bilahari: Thank you for inviting me to talk to you.

Chow: You have given us really a lot to think about. We would love to present this gift to you, which is a…

Bilahari: Oh dear, you shouldn’t.

Chow: ...which is a portrait of you by one of our colleagues.

Bilahari: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Chow: It looks like you?

Bilahari: A younger me.

END OF INTERVIEW

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