How Japan’s FOIP is reinforcing ASEAN’s strategic autonomy

“Will ASEAN choose China?” According to the 2026 edition of The State of Southeast Asia Survey published by Singapore’s ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 52% of respondents — more than half — chose China if forced to align with China and the US. Yet the reality is that on the one hand, ASEAN’s economic dependence on China continues to deepen, while on the other, it remains highly wary of China in the political and security spheres. This duality lies at the heart of ASEAN’s perception of China today.

What ASEAN truly seeks is strategic autonomy. While maintaining a balance between China and the US, it aims to preserve relationships with a diverse range of partners in order to safeguard its bargaining power and strategic room for manoeuvre. This is precisely what the concept of “ASEAN centrality” represents.

As a framework which supports such strategic autonomy, Japan’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has attracted increasing attention.

FOIP as a complement to ASEAN centrality

The FOIP was proposed in 2016 by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Rather than being just foreign and security policy for Japan, it is more of a vision for regional order that promotes regional cooperation while respecting ASEAN centrality.

The FOIP is often portrayed as a strategy to contain China, but that is not its essence. Under the FOIP framework, Japan has consistently supported ASEAN centrality and ASEAN unity. It also shares key principles with ASEAN’s own ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), including openness, inclusiveness, the rule of law, dialogue and cooperation.

Ten years after the inception of FOIP, the Sanae Takaichi administration has unveiled an updated version of the initiative. Its most notable feature is that, while continuing to emphasise “freedom” and “openness”, it places “autonomy” and “resilience” at the core of the vision. Against a backdrop of a rapidly changing international order, its objective is to strengthen countries’ ability to withstand external shocks while enhancing their capacity to choose their own paths of development. This aligns closely with ASEAN’s longstanding pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Implementation of the updated FOIP

The updated FOIP outlines three priority areas. First, building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data; second, co-creation of economic growth opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule sharing; and third, enhancing cooperation in the field of security to ensure regional peace and stability.

Particularly noteworthy is that the scope of economic security has expanded beyond traditional infrastructure and trade to encompass areas such as AI, semiconductors, submarine cables, satellite communications and critical minerals. Through initiatives such as the ASEAN-Japan Co-Creation Initiative for AI and the FOIP Digital Corridor Concept, the Japanese government is supporting the development of native-language AI while promoting the construction of submarine cable networks and open radio access networks.

This is not merely a matter of technological cooperation. In the digital age, the ability to safeguard a country’s own data and industrial foundations, and to develop artificial intelligence tailored to its own needs, has become part of a new form of sovereignty. If ASEAN is to establish genuine strategic autonomy, it must not only achieve greater self-reliance in critical minerals and energy but also possess autonomous capabilities in the digital domain.

Working with ASEAN

Furthermore, the upgraded FOIP does not regard ASEAN as a passive beneficiary. Instead, it positions ASEAN as a partner in jointly building regional resilience. Its emphasis on synergy with the AOIP reflects this philosophy.

One concrete example is Japan’s proposed POWERR Asia (Partnership for Strengthening Energy and Resource Supply Chain Resilience in Asia). This initiative aims to enable Japan and ASEAN to jointly strengthen supply chains for energy and critical materials. Support for crude oil procurement by Vietnam’s Nghi Son Refinery has become the programme’s first project.

Such cooperation not only enhances Vietnam’s energy security but also helps ensure a stable supply of critical goods produced by Japanese companies operating there, including medical catheters and medical devices. ASEAN’s resilience supports Japan’s economic security, while Japan’s technology and investment help strengthen ASEAN’s capacity for self-reliance. The FOIP vision seeks mutually beneficial cooperation through “(becoming) more resilient and prosperous together.”

For many years, Japan has supported ASEAN’s development through initiatives such as the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor, as well as through human resource development and industrial revitalisation programmes. Many of ASEAN’s supply chains and industrial clusters today have emerged from these long-term partnerships.

The updated FOIP should not be viewed as a new geopolitical strategy. Rather, it should be seen as a vision for regional cooperation aimed at enhancing ASEAN’s autonomy and resilience. It is, in essence, a cooperative framework that supports ASEAN’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and expands its range of strategic options.

ASEAN centrality and FOIP are complementary concepts. Strengthening ASEAN’s strategic autonomy and enabling Japan and ASEAN to “become more resilient and prosperous together” is the new mission that Japan and ASEAN must undertake together in an increasingly uncertain Indo-Pacific era.

Related: Beyond China: Japan’s unseen diplomacy under Takaichi | Why the Philippines and Japan are preparing for a Taiwan contingency