How Trump’s Iran war boosted Beijing

Given the intricacies of China-US-Iran-Israel relations, the impact of the ongoing Gulf War on China and China’s attitudes towards this war have gained much attention. Looking back to October 2023, there are other insights to glean, and if the timeline goes even further back to August 2021, one can discern yet another trajectory of China’s diplomacy in the Middle East. China’s diplomatic journey in the Middle East from 2021 to the present has been nothing short of a rollercoaster ride.

2026: Iran war boosted China’s status

We saw a brief ceasefire between the US and Iran in early April. But recently, both nations have resumed military actions. It now appears certain that Iran will fight to the end, as this is an existential war for the Islamic Republic. Conversely, US President Donald Trump will find it difficult to win this largely unnecessary war; he cannot afford the severe domestic and geopolitical losses that a full-scale war against Iran would inflict on the US. 

Meanwhile, Israel lacks the capacity to overthrow the Iranian regime on its own. Consequently, this war is unlikely to be decided on the battlefield; the negotiating table remains the only viable endgame. If that’s the case, then why did President Trump start this war? 

While the push from Benjamin Netanyahu’s government was a catalyst for the joint US-Israeli campaign, President Trump’s decision undoubtedly factored in Washington’s own strategic calculations. Following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro early this year, some senior US politicians stated bluntly that the objective was to expel external forces, such as China, from Venezuela and the western hemisphere.

Similarly, I believe President Trump’s decision to wage war against Iran was driven by great power competition. He likely calculated that he could force an unconditional Iranian capitulation in a very short timeframe, allowing him to fly to Beijing to meet President Xi Jinping in a triumphalist posture. It is highly improbable that Beijing failed to see through this calculus.

Iran is a crucial strategic partner for China in the Middle East, with ties extending far beyond economic cooperation. Given Iran’s immense geopolitical value, China cannot afford to remain indifferent to the conflict. I have consistently maintained that Beijing — alongside Moscow — will not tolerate Iran being completely defeated in a war that violates international law. From Beijing’s perspective, Iran possesses fundamental geopolitical significance that distinguishes it entirely from Venezuela.

On 31 March, China and Pakistan jointly issued a five-point initiative aimed at restoring peace and stability in the Gulf and the Middle East. A week later, Islamabad successfully brokered a temporary ceasefire between the US and Iran. Following intensive consultations in Tehran regarding a potential US-Iran agreement, General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s chief of army staff, flew directly from Tehran to Beijing on 25 May. Although China has avoided taking centre stage in resolving this crisis, its diplomatic footprint remains unmistakably clear.

A war against its own interests

This war has yielded catastrophic consequences for both the region and the global community. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have come to the painful realisation that hosting US military bases does not guarantee their security; rather, it acts as a lightning rod for Iranian military retaliation. In the wake of this conflict, these nations will inevitably recalibrate their assessment of the US.

Beyond facing direct military risks, GCC states have emerged as primary victims of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, alongside numerous other nations dependent on this maritime chokepoint. Ironically, the Trump administration’s primary demand now is the total reopening of the Strait — a status quo that existed naturally before the US launched this offensive.

Given that its actions have inflicted severe hardship on multiple nations, Washington cannot realistically expect to emerge as a beneficiary of this conflict. Frankly, I see no scenario in which the US avoids strategic self-harm as a result of this war.

Having spent a year as a visiting scholar in the US between 2023 and 2024, I experienced first-hand the intense atmosphere of US-China competition. I concur with the view of several international observers that the Iran war has ultimately elevated China’s global and regional strategic standing. Post-war, cooperation between Middle Eastern states and China is poised to strengthen further.

The post-7 October lows: Washington and Tel Aviv squeeze Beijing’s space

Before the outbreak of this war, Beijing was facing a diplomatic dilemma in the Middle East that originated from the events of 7 October 2023. On that day, Hamas and other Gaza-based militant groups launched a terrorist attack into Israel. In response, Israel mounted sustained military campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah. Simultaneously, a US-UK coalition launched airstrikes against the Houthis, while Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces successfully toppled the Bashar al-Assad regime. Within a short span, the Iran-led “axis of resistance” suffered devastating blows, significantly elevating Israel’s regional strategic leverage.

Beijing’s initial refusal to explicitly condemn Hamas or label the 7 October assault a terrorist attack triggered intense resentment in Israel. Tel Aviv, which already viewed China’s stance on the Palestinian issue as biased and resented Beijing’s deepening ties with Tehran, was profoundly alienated. Israel subsequently signalled its displeasure by visibly upgrading its engagement with Taiwan.

During this phase of Iranian containment and rising Israeli dominance, China found itself with limited room for meaningful diplomatic manoeuvre. Whether during the globally scrutinised Gaza war or the “12-Day war” in June 2025, Israel acted as the primary protagonist or dominant force. Riding a wave of relative geopolitical advantage, Tel Aviv was in no mood to accept Chinese mediation. China’s perceived absence during such a volatile period inevitably disappointed regional actors, hindering its soft power projection and regional appeal.

During Beijing’s diplomatic lull, Washington positioned itself as the indispensable regional actor. On 31 May 2024, President Joe Biden unveiled a “three-phase Gaza peace roadmap” to address the humanitarian crisis. On 15 January 2025, in his farewell address, President Biden announced a ceasefire and hostage-exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. On 23 June 2025, President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran to conclude the “12-Day war”. On 29 September 2025, President Trump unveiled his own “20-point Gaza peace plan”.

Evidently, prior to the joint US-Israeli campaign against Iran in 2026, China’s regional influence was being systematically suppressed by Washington and Tel Aviv. Crucially, because the US was not a direct combatant during that period, Washington enjoyed ample policy flexibility to manage both its Middle East strategy and its competition with China.

2021-2023: highlights of China’s Middle East diplomacy

However, once the US embeds itself as a direct party to a major regional conflict — as the Iran war demonstrates — its strategic options narrow drastically. Washington’s military interventions in the Middle East since 2001 have consistently boomeranged into strategic liabilities, undermining both its regional standing and its overarching great-power competition framework.

Actually, Washington recognised this risk years ago, prompting its hasty military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 to free up resources for its strategic competition with Beijing. Yet that very withdrawal expanded China’s regional visibility, sparking intense debate over whether Beijing intended to challenge or replace US hegemony in the Middle East.

During that post-2021 window, China’s Middle East diplomacy enjoyed a highly successful run. Following the US withdrawal, Beijing led and participated in regional diplomatic mechanisms, including the “Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan Plus Afghanistan” Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, to help ensure a stable transition. President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia to attend the inaugural China-Arab States Summit and the China-GCC Summit in December 2022. Also, China successfully brokered the historic Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in Beijing in March 2023, marking a major milestone for Chinese diplomacy.

The wave of regional reconciliation during this period served China’s core interests well. Because Beijing’s primary competitive advantage lies in economic and trade cooperation, a stable Middle East directly benefits Chinese strategy. Furthermore, the post-Afghanistan environment — coupled with the resilience of the “Axis of Resistance” — boosted the geopolitical leverage of Iran, China’s key regional partner. This was precisely the regional landscape that the US and Israel sought to disrupt.

Beijing’s strategy of mastering motion through stillness

Following the 7 October attacks in 2023, Israel — viewing Iran as its existential adversary — devised a comprehensive strategy to systematically dismantle Iran’s regional proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Assad regime) before shifting to direct confrontation with Tehran. Throughout this escalation, the US transitioned through various roles: from backroom supporter and Red Sea maritime guardian to limited striker, and finally, direct co-belligerent. Each role has brought distinct and complicated consequences for Washington.

In contrast, even during its brief diplomatic low point after the 7 October attacks, China’s trade volumes with the Middle East remained robust and continued to expand. Faced with the Middle East, a region of unpredictable geopolitical changes, Beijing will not panic due to temporary diplomatic difficulties, and can also tolerate temporary setbacks.

Through it all, Beijing has remained confident that its core philosophy of “peace and development” aligns closely with the structural needs of the Middle East. Consequently, China will not lack opportunities in the region. The shifting dynamics of the Middle East following the US-Israeli campaign against Iran offer the latest proof of this resilience.

All in all, while China’s Middle East diplomacy since 2021 has resembled a rollercoaster ride, Beijing’s strategic resilience, the region’s structural demand for Chinese cooperation and the strategic missteps of the US and Israel are collectively smoothing the path forward for China. In the foreseeable future, although China may still face some challenges or limitations in the Middle East, its strategic opportunities in the region will only continue to grow.

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