How Turkey arms China’s rivals without angering Beijing

Turkey has quietly positioned itself as a critical defence player in the Indo-Pacific by expanding military cooperation with China’s regional rivals while successfully shielding its economic ties with Beijing. Following a strategy perfected during the Russia-Ukraine war — where Ankara supplied combat drones to Kyiv while deepening trade with Moscow —  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is managing a complex web of overlapping alignments.

Turkey’s defence and aerospace exports reached a record-breaking US$10.6 billion last year, as the country currently controls an estimated 65% of the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) market. Malaysia’s launch of the first two of three corvettes based on Turkey’s Ada-class design between 24 May and 7 June, as well as Indonesia’s purchase of 12 Bayraktar Kizilelma unmanned combat aerial vehicles last month, highlight Ankara’s rising influence as an arms supplier in Asia.

A low-profile export model

Turkey’s defence exports are moving steadily eastward, including toward nations contesting China’s maritime and territorial expansion such as Japan, Australia and the Philippines. There are also signs that Ankara is exploring forms of arms cooperation with democratically governed Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory.

To sustain this delicate diplomatic balance, Turkey relies on a low-profile export model. Rather than delivering high-profile, fully assembled combat systems like the Baykar Bayraktar TB2 or the Akıncı to China’s opponents — which would trigger an immediate backlash from Beijing — Ankara focuses on joint production, subcomponents, dual-use frameworks or platforms that the Chinese may not see as game changers.

This strategy of calculated ambiguity is clearly visible.

Last month, Turkey formalised an official defence industry partnership with Japan based on the co-development and procurement of UAV technology. Ankara seems ready to penetrate a notoriously stringent market traditionally reliant on US military hardware. In doing so, it capitalises on Tokyo’s urgency to bolster domestic defence manufacturing amid China’s growing geopolitical assertiveness and North Korea’s nuclear escalation.

Similarly, the bilateral defence relationship between Turkey and Australia centres on high-tech industrial collaboration rather than direct arms sales. In February, Turkish state-run manufacturer Roketsan signed a cooperation deal with Australia’s Electro Optic Systems (EOS) to co-develop advanced laser-based weapons and directed energy systems for the global market.

In recent years, Turkey has also emerged as a reliable partner for the Philippines’ military modernisation under a bilateral defence memorandum. Turkish firms have offered Manila competitive pricing and tech transfers without political strings. Crucially, the Philippine Air Force operates a fleet of six Turkish-manufactured attack helicopters, while the Philippine Navy’s guided-missile frigates are equipped with Turkish naval subsystems, including Aselsan’s close-in and remote-controlled weapon platforms.

Furthermore, Turkey appears to be pursuing limited cooperation with Taiwan. During the recent XPONENTIAL 2026 drone exhibition in Detroit, Taiwanese defence and industrial delegations reportedly engaged in direct talks with several Turkish defence firms.

In 2023, Taiwan’s domestic drone manufacturer GEOSAT Aerospace & Technology signed an agreement with Britain’s Flyby Technology and its Turkish partner Fly BVLOS Technology to locally manufacture 160 Jackal UAVs. The programme is structured around a local technology transfer and domestic production rather than a direct off-the-shelf purchase — even though delivery goals have been shifted.

So far, Beijing has “tolerated” Turkey’s regional manoeuvres. Commercial indicators show that China-Turkey bilateral trade turnover grew by 9.2% in the first quarter of 2026 compared to 2025, with cumulative Chinese investments in Turkey crossing US$3.2 billion.

This economic pragmatism is driven by mutual strategic utility. While Turkey remains a NATO member and a staunch ally of the US, its diplomatic ambitions align with China’s multilateral architecture. Ankara is pursuing full membership in the BRICS bloc and maintains dialogue partner status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. For Beijing, Turkey serves as a crucial transshipment and logistics hub to bypass Western tariffs and secure alternative Eurasian trade routes. This complements the convergence between Turkey’s “Middle Corridor” scheme and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

However, Turkey’s defence industries remain highly vulnerable to China’s dominance over critical minerals. The complex internal electronics, sensors and communication suites of advanced Turkish arms systems, including the Bayraktar TB2, depend strictly on rare earth element technologies. Beijing controls more than 90% of the world’s processing capacity for rare earth magnets, thus any sweeping export controls heavily expose Turkish manufacturing chains.

Staying under the radar

Ultimately, Turkish defence contractors have managed to sell sensitive weaponry, such as anti-ship missiles to Malaysia or combat drones to Indonesia, without incurring China’s ire because Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have so far been able to handle their territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Taiwan are another story, of course, given also their close relationship with the US. That is why Erdogan’s balancing act can only succeed as long as Turkish defence collaboration with China’s Indo-Pacific adversaries remains below the threshold of direct, high-profile platform transfers. If Turkey crosses that line, Beijing’s grip on the critical mineral supply chain will give it an immediate and crippling veto over Ankara’s global drone ambitions, especially since Turkish attempts to develop a domestic rare earths industry face numerous challenges.

In the midst of the US-China geopolitical power play, Washington cannot but welcome Ankara’s expanding arms sales in the Indo-Pacific, provided that they bolster the defences of regional allies and partners. This requires careful monitoring, since Turkish weapons sales must not complicate interoperability with US and NATO systems, nor inadvertently transfer restricted Western technologies to rivals like Beijing.

Related: The Middle Corridor: Where Turkey’s rise meets China’s ambitions | The side war against a not-yet-ready China