Min Aung Hlaing in India: Hedging between giants, seeking legitimacy

The visit by Myanmar’s newly elected president, Min Aung Hlaing, to India from 30 May to 3 June 2026 underscores the enduring weight of historical legacies and border realities in shaping New Delhi’s neighbourhood diplomacy. The visit can also be viewed through the prism of altered circumstances following the recent change in leadership in Bangladesh. Further, it may be seen as a lesson on the suppleness of the concept of “multi-alignment” and the strategic allure of “soft power”. 

High-level meetings between officials of the two countries since the 2021 coup in Myanmar have been ongoing. The prime minister of India met Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the recent Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summits. An invitation to Min Aung Hlaing to visit India, however, came only after he was elected president. This visit signals India’s readiness to engage the elected government of Myanmar, while stating that it was “not intended to be a commentary on the internal political arrangements of that country”.

Age-old imperatives: border concerns

Historical cartographic decisions that produced contested and often unruly borders remain sacrosanct considerations in India’s neighbourhood policy, particularly where they translate into security challenges rooted in the unresolved legacies of partition.

India and Myanmar share a crucial border that is currently more imperilled than usual. Inchoate control over the borders, which was exacerbated since the 2021 coup and the ethnic clashes in the Indian state of Manipur, which borders Myanmar, has deemed it necessary for urgent cooperation between the leadership of the two countries. 

An unstable Myanmar impacts India’s security, economic prospects and creates geopolitical uncertainty. Such predicaments have led to loss and displacement that adversely affect trans-border connectivity projects, trade and life along the borders, apart from an overall deteriorating security situation. The regions in Myanmar that border India have repeatedly changed hands between the armed groups and the military rulers since the coup. India thus kept channels of communication open with the multiplicity of such centres of power. That Min Aung Hlaing assured, during his visit, that he will not let his country’s territory be used against India’s security interests can be read against such a backdrop. 

Linked to India’s border security concerns are issues stemming from the change in leadership in Dhaka, which also bears a regional strategic reckoning. While Myanmar has been in the throes of domestic upheaval since 2021, Bangladesh, which shares a “fraught” boundary with both Myanmar and India, has also recently undergone internal political change. The old leadership in Dhaka under Sheikh Hasina had close ties with India, leading to the resolution of boundary issues, collaboration against anti-state elements and progress on connectivity projects and transit.

The new leadership, however, under a party that has historically had less cordial ties with India, introduces uncertainty regarding the future of India-Bangladesh relations. Questions persist over a possible reversal of progress in security and economic cooperation, particularly after the relative stability of Hasina’s 15 consecutive years in power. With Hasina no longer in power in Dhaka, cultivating close ties with neighbouring Myanmar, which borders the same region in India as Bangladesh, becomes vital.

Further, China, which neighbours both India and Myanmar, continues to have an overwhelming influence on the latter. China has myriad interests in Myanmar, including continued trade, access to energy resources and critical minerals, curbing scam centres and protecting its investments and transit corridors.

Beijing’s outsized role in shaping outcomes deepens India’s concerns about China’s influence in Myanmar. Its leverage over the regime — through economic capital, defence assistance and ties with ethnic armed organisations — significantly exceeds India’s reach. This imbalance may undermine New Delhi’s strategic interests, as its presence remains considerably more limited than Beijing’s. These concerns are further compounded by perceptions of encirclement, given China’s extensive infrastructure footprint along Myanmar’s land and maritime borders with India.

India and ‘multi-alignment’ in a prickly neighbourhood

The equations between Myanmar and its neighbours — China and India — are likely to retain a pronounced strategic dimension, given their competing security, economic and connectivity objectives in relation to critical minerals, energy resources and transport corridors. At the same time, reports of Dhaka’s outreach to Pakistan, alongside its pursuit of closer ties with China, are heightening India’s concerns. Further, Nepal’s request for Chinese involvement in border issues with India adds another layer to New Delhi’s neighbourhood challenges.

India’s invitation to the Myanmar president highlights the flexibility of its multi-alignment strategy as an expression of strategic autonomy in managing neighbourhood challenges. Multi-alignment enables engagement with a wide range of partners, including those that may be at odds with one another, as well as with states irrespective of their political systems or ideological orientations. In this sense, it is a non-discriminatory approach to external engagement.

Despite appearing potentially capricious, it opens the door to partnerships with a wide range of states. As the Myanmar case illustrates, multi-alignment also accommodates changing leadership configurations within countries. It is particularly useful in dealing with neighbours like Myanmar, where fluid domestic political arrangements can shift policy parameters every few years, often with significant cross-border implications. For its part, Nay Pyi Taw is also likely to favour such an approach, as it would seek to avoid overdependence on any single external partner.

Soft power calculations

A soft power dimension may have played a role in Min Aung Hlaing’s choice of India for his first foreign visit as president. Yet soft power is uneven rather than absolute, varying across different domains. In Myanmar’s case, China is perceived as exercising stronger economic influence and political leverage, and is also seen as a more attractive destination for education than India.

However, for the new and still fragile leadership in Nay Pyi Taw — both in terms of international perception and domestic consolidation — apart from investment considerations, India’s democratic credentials significantly outshine those of Beijing. The choice of India for the president’s first foreign visit may therefore serve to bolster his legitimacy more effectively than a visit to Beijing, which, despite its economic and military prowess, remains associated with a tightly controlled one-party system and limited political space for activism.

Thus, as a new regime emerges under President Min Aung Hlaing, longstanding concerns continue to shape India-Myanmar engagement. New Delhi’s overtures, despite reputational risks, seek to strengthen bilateral ties and reinforce regional influence. Yet such engagement will require constant recalibration, given Myanmar’s instability, its diverse domestic stakeholders and the shifting postures of Beijing and Dhaka.

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