The new AI blocs: Are China’s WAICO and America’s Pax Silica splitting the tech world?

When representatives of 29 governments signed the agreement establishing the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in Shanghai on 16 July, the event marked a new stage in China’s technology diplomacy.

Beijing had already promoted principles, United Nations (UN) resolutions, training programmes and policy initiatives on artificial intelligence. WAICO provides these efforts with a permanent organisational framework: an intergovernmental body headquartered in Shanghai, intended to support cooperation, governance and capacity building. Its importance will depend on whether it can translate broad political commitments into sustained programmes, shared standards and credible institutional practices.

WAICO also reflects a wider pattern in Chinese foreign policy. Over the past decade, China has supported or created new institutions in areas where existing arrangements were seen as incomplete, insufficiently representative or poorly suited to new policy challenges. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank demonstrated how financial resources could underpin new multilateral platforms. More recent initiatives in mediation, data governance and artificial intelligence extend this approach into newer fields. In each case, China has sought a larger role in shaping agendas, procedures and forms of cooperation at an earlier stage of institutional development.

China’s implementation advantage

The route to WAICO was gradual.

China’s 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative set out principles centred on sovereign equality, development, security, fairness and access. In 2024, Beijing promoted a UN General Assembly resolution on AI capacity building, helping establish broader recognition of disparities in access to computing resources, expertise and infrastructure. In 2025, China issued a more detailed action plan and proposed a permanent organisation. The 2026 founding agreement brought these strands together. The sequence moved from policy principles to multilateral endorsement, practical cooperation and formal institutionalisation.

China’s material capabilities give WAICO a practical basis. Chinese companies can offer relatively affordable open-weight models, telecommunications systems, cloud services, data centres, robotics, industrial applications and technical training. State-backed institutions may also support projects through financing and government-to-government cooperation. These resources could allow WAICO to link policy discussion with implementation in areas such as agriculture, healthcare, education, public administration and industrial production. At the same time, the extent to which projects rely on Chinese firms, standards and financing will require close attention.

WAICO responds to concerns that are especially prominent in developing countries. Many governments remain more concerned about basic access than about the most advanced regulatory debates. Their priorities include computing capacity, skilled personnel, local-language datasets, infrastructure and productive uses of AI. They also seek greater participation in the formulation of international standards.

WAICO places development and representation near the centre of its agenda. Participation by member states may therefore reflect practical interests in investment, training, technology transfer and policy influence, rather than broad alignment with every aspect of China’s domestic governance model.

US-led Pax Silica based on exclusive network

The US-proposed initiative Pax Silica offers a useful comparison. Led by the US, it connects trusted partners across the AI supply chain, including advanced models, cloud services, semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, critical minerals, energy, logistics and capital.

The two initiatives therefore embody different approaches to organising international cooperation. WAICO relies on formal multilateralism, broad participation by sovereign states and a development-oriented agenda. Pax Silica relies on a more selective network of trusted and technologically capable partners. WAICO may derive influence from its institutional structure, regular intergovernmental processes and representation from the Global South. Pax Silica derives influence from access to advanced technology, capital, supply chains and large markets. Their difference is best understood in terms of institutional form and sources of leverage, rather than as a direct contest between two equivalent organisations.

WAICO’s institutional form may offer advantages if it develops beyond high-level declarations. Secretariats, annual meetings, technical working groups, training programmes and project pipelines can create continuity and shared administrative practices. Over time, these mechanisms may influence procurement, standards, regulatory language and cooperation among member states. A multilateral framework could also give smaller members more opportunities to coordinate their positions than a collection of bilateral agreements would provide. Much will depend, however, on how decisions are made and how responsibilities are distributed.

Can WAICO deliver?

Several uncertainties remain. The technological capabilities of WAICO’s members are uneven, and China is likely to remain the principal source of models, infrastructure, finance and technical expertise. This imbalance could limit the organisation’s autonomy if other members have little influence over project design or strategic priorities.

WAICO’s membership also does not yet include many of the world’s leading AI economies. Questions surrounding voting rules, funding, leadership selection, transparency, project allocation and independent oversight will shape its credibility. Its emphasis on sovereignty will also need to be balanced with privacy, transparency, accountability and individual rights.

Pax Silica faces different constraints. Its participants control many of the resources needed for advanced AI development, giving it immediate economic influence. Yet a selective, trust-based structure may offer limited participation to countries outside established technology networks and may reinforce existing disparities in access. WAICO, by contrast, has broader developmental ambitions but has yet to demonstrate comparable implementation capacity. The comparison suggests that formal inclusion and material capability are distinct assets, and neither alone is sufficient to produce a stable international framework.

WAICO should therefore be assessed through its institutional performance rather than through its founding rhetoric. Key indicators will include whether it establishes a functioning secretariat, publishes clear decision-making procedures, secures stable and diversified funding, appoints leaders from several member states and delivers verifiable cross-border projects. Its longer-term significance will depend on whether participating countries gain practical capabilities and meaningful influence over the organisation’s priorities.

WAICO represents a significant development in China’s approach to global governance. It brings together policy principles, technological resources and partnerships with developing countries within a formal institutional structure. Pax Silica illustrates a different model based on trusted networks and control over strategic technological nodes. The future AI order may be shaped by interaction between these approaches rather than by the dominance of either one. WAICO’s central test will be whether it can combine Chinese support with sufficient transparency, shared decision-making and member autonomy to function as a genuinely multilateral institution.

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