Not just about China: New Japan-India synergies

Against the backdrop of China’s rise and Japan’s growing perception of the threat posed by China, Japan has been weighing India’s strategic importance for many years. In 2005, amid escalating anti-Japanese demonstrations across China, then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid his first visit to India in five years, declaring that the Japan-India Global Partnership would be given a “strategic orientation”.

Since then, the two countries have set up a mechanism for annual reciprocal leaders’ visits and advanced political and diplomatic ties through cooperation on promoting the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

‘Hot politics, cool economics’

However, looking back over the past two decades, tangible achievements have consistently fallen short of expectations despite the strong political momentum between the two countries. Ten years have passed since the signing of the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, yet Japan’s planned export of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s US-2 amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft has never materialised, and not a single piece of Japanese defence equipment has been delivered to India.

The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Corridor (MAHSR), a flagship initiative financed by Japanese yen loans, has also suffered severe delays, while Japanese companies have failed to expand into the Indian market to the extent originally anticipated.

Although Japan and India enjoy exceptionally close political ties, their economic links remain limited. In sharp contrast to Sino-Japanese relations, often described as “cool politics, hot economics”, Japan-India relations have long been characterised as “hot politics, cool economics”.

A changing situation

A turning point in this prolonged stagnation came with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan in August 2025, followed by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to India in July this year.

Behind this shift lies a significant change in the international environment. Under US President Donald Trump’s second administration, Washington has scaled back the Indo-Pacific strategy that previously placed considerable emphasis on India as part of efforts to balance China’s influence, even displaying an attitude that could be interpreted as downgrading India’s importance. Faced with this change, Japan has found it necessary to strengthen cooperation with India on a basis relatively independent of US policy, while continuing to regard the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Moreover, the US and Israeli military strikes against Iran beginning in late February this year, together with the subsequent effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, have once again highlighted the vulnerability of both Japan and India in terms of energy security. For two countries that depend heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies, enhancing supply chain resilience and deepening cooperation in resources and energy have become even more pressing priorities than before.

Seeking concrete cooperation

At the latest summit meeting in New Delhi, this shared understanding was finally translated into concrete policy initiatives. The two sides identified five priority areas for cooperation: semiconductors; critical minerals, including rare earths; clean energy such as ammonia; information and communications technology; and the pharmaceutical industry. They also agreed to establish a working group to strengthen cooperation on the strategic stockpiling of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

In addition, the two countries proposed introducing direct settlement between the Japanese yen and the Indian rupee to facilitate bilateral investment and trade. Held alongside the leaders’ summit, the Japan-India Economic Forum attracted more than 150 Japanese companies and saw the signing of 129 cooperation agreements, underscoring the high expectations within Japan’s business community for deeper economic cooperation with India.

Some challenges, but moving forward

Nevertheless, there were several challenges. While the summit was eventually held in New Delhi, earlier media reports indicated that the summit would be held in Assam, the northeastern Indian state that had originally been scheduled to host the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit in 2019 before it was cancelled on the eve of his departure.

Northeastern India occupies a strategic position linking Japan’s FOIP vision with India’s Act East Policy, and Japan has actively supported infrastructure development in the region in recent years. The cancellation of Abe’s visit was therefore a major disappointment for the local community. At the same time, continuing instability in Myanmar has made plans to improve overland connectivity increasingly difficult to realise.

In addition, although the two governments reaffirmed their commitment to a joint artificial intelligence research programme involving around 500 researchers, they again failed to make concrete progress on the proposal first announced at the 2025 summit to bring 50,000 highly skilled Indian professionals to Japan.

Even so, the significance of this latest summit should not be underestimated. At a time when the liberal international order is increasingly under strain and the US is gradually reducing its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, Japan and India have begun translating their partnership into practical cooperation in areas directly affecting their national interests, including economic and energy security.

Japan-India relations are gradually evolving from a symbolic strategic partnership aimed largely at balancing China into a pragmatic relationship capable of generating shared benefits. Whether this trend can be firmly consolidated will ultimately depend on whether both sides can implement the initiatives announced at this summit and finally transform their longstanding pattern of “hot politics, cool economics” into a genuinely comprehensive strategic partnership.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the organsation to which the author belongs.

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