A tungsten mine exposes Myanmar’s China-Russia balancing act

On a remote ridge in eastern Myanmar, a small tungsten project has become an unusually revealing story about great power politics. The mine, reportedly backed by Russian interests and approved by Myanmar’s military authorities, sits near an existing Chinese-linked operation in Shan State, close to the Thai border. Tungsten rarely makes front-page news. In Myanmar, however, minerals have become currency in a civil war, and outside powers are learning to navigate a country where legal authority and territorial control often diverge.

Three-way piece of the minerals pie in Myanmar

The question is whether Russia’s entry into tungsten mining marks a new competition with China over Myanmar’s resources. The answer is more complicated than a simple rivalry. The Russian project creates local overlap with Chinese-linked mining interests, especially in eastern Shan, where Chinese firms and China-friendly armed actors have long shaped extractive industries. Yet the larger pattern is a three-way resource-security triangle: China controls much of the flow, Russia is seeking a stake, and Myanmar’s military government is using access to resources as leverage.

China’s position in Myanmar is deeper than ordinary foreign investment. Beijing is tied to the country through a long border, infrastructure corridors, pipelines, trade gates, armed group relationships and processing capacity. In rare earths, the link is especially important. Myanmar has become a major source of heavy rare earths for China, including dysprosium and terbium, essential for magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies. Many deposits lie in frontier areas, especially Kachin and Shan, where authority is fragmented among the military, ethnic armed organisations and militias.

That geography matters. China does not only deal with whoever holds formal office in Naypyidaw. It also has to work with those who control roads, border crossings, mining zones and local security. Beijing engages the military government as Myanmar’s formal state authority while maintaining channels to border forces that shape conditions on the ground. For China, the objective is a workable balance: protect its border, keep strategic projects moving, prevent disorder from spilling into Yunnan, and maintain access to minerals and trade routes.

Russia’s role more security-linked

Russia enters from a different position. It has no border with Myanmar, no comparable local networks, and no processing chain equivalent to China’s. Its value to the military government lies elsewhere: weapons, aviation equipment, diplomatic backing, nuclear cooperation, space and remote-sensing projects, and the symbolism of another major partner willing to engage Naypyidaw despite Western sanctions. Moscow’s role is more security-linked than market-linked. A tungsten project in eastern Shan matters as it extends Russian involvement from arms and diplomacy into a resource frontier.

For Myanmar’s military government, that matters. Since the 2021 coup, the military has struggled to restore nationwide control. It continues to hold the central state apparatus, major cities, formal diplomatic channels and the legal authority to issue permits, but many resource-rich areas are contested or controlled by ethnic armed organisations and militias. This creates a gap between sovereignty on paper and power on the ground. By inviting Russian companies into conflict-affected mining areas, the junta is trying to internationalise claims over territory it does not always securely govern.

The logic is understandable. If Russia develops a material interest in Myanmar’s resource sector, Moscow’s stake in the military government’s survival deepens. Mining permits, future extraction rights and infrastructure projects can be used to bind Russian political and security support to the junta’s territorial ambitions. Naypyidaw is turning resources into diplomatic collateral. It is also sending a message to Beijing: China remains indispensable, but it is not the military government’s only external option.

That message has limits. Russia cannot replace China in Myanmar’s resource economy. The minerals that matter most to global supply chains require processing, logistics, market access and border management. China holds advantages in all four. Even if Russian firms gain concessions, they will still operate in a landscape shaped by Chinese demand, Chinese-adjacent armed networks and China’s ability to open or close trade channels. Moscow can strengthen the military government; it cannot easily reroute Myanmar’s mineral geography.

For Beijing, the Russian tungsten project is unlikely to be alarming by itself. China and Russia under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination, share broad interests in opposing Western pressure on Myanmar, preserving state-to-state relations with Naypyidaw, and preventing the country from becoming a platform for hostile influence. Their roles are also largely complementary. China is the dominant economic and geographic actor. Russia is a political and military backer. A limited Russian mining presence may even help stabilize the junta, which Beijing increasingly treats as a necessary partner.

Friction is still possible. The eastern Shan project reportedly sits near a Chinese-linked operation and in an area where the United Wa State Army has long enjoyed influence. If Russian-backed projects enter zones associated with China-friendly armed groups, local actors may resist. If Russian military support encourages the junta to escalate campaigns near the Chinese border, Beijing may worry about instability, refugee flows, supply disruptions and threats to Chinese projects. The risk is less a public split than local tensions managed quietly through pressure and negotiation.

Locals control access

The most overlooked actors are Myanmar’s own armed organisations and communities. Foreign analysis often treats the country’s minerals as if they are simply controlled by the junta or competed over by outside powers. In reality, extraction depends on who controls the hills, streams, roads and checkpoints. Ethnic armed organisations and militias are gatekeepers of territory and revenue. Local communities often bear the cost through land loss, water contamination, militarized security and displacement.

The Russian tungsten project should therefore be read carefully. Its commercial scale may be modest. Its political meaning is larger. It shows how Myanmar’s war economy is becoming more international, how the military government is using mineral access to hedge dependence on China, and how Russia is moving from symbolic support toward a tangible stake in contested resource zones.

Myanmar is unlikely to become an arena of open China-Russia rivalry. The broader relationship between Beijing and Moscow is too important, and their roles in Myanmar remain too unequal. Yet the entry of Russian mining interests into a Chinese-influenced resource frontier reveals a more crowded and delicate order. China controls the flows. Russia seeks footholds. The junta sells access. Armed groups control much of the ground. Communities live with the consequences. That is the real significance of a tungsten mine in eastern Shan.

Related: How China outmanoeuvres the West in Myanmar | Trump and Putin’s visits confirm Beijing as the new global pivot