What Saudi Arabia wants from China over the Houthis

On 20 October, the UK said RAF Typhoons would help guard Saudi airspace. The next day, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi offered to help defend Saudi territory, provided Egyptian forces stayed out of Yemen. Earlier in September, Washington had cleared a possible US$24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35s, while reportedly declining to back a Saudi counteroffensive. In August, Turkey and Pakistan had signed a defence pact with the kingdom, which Ankara sent to parliament for ratification on 20 October. What Riyadh asked of Beijing was of another order. It wanted China to talk to Iran.

Riyadh’s request came in September, after a Houthi advance towards Bab el-Mandeb and strikes on the East-West pipeline, the line that carries Saudi crude to Yanbu when Hormuz becomes unsafe. Three Iranian sources told Reuters that Chinese officials later raised the appeal privately with Tehran. Neither government has said what was discussed. On 10 October, Houthi attacks shut Riyadh’s main airport and further strikes hit oil facilities.

On 2 November, Wang Yi held separate talks in Beijing with Iranian security official Ali Bagheri Kani and Saudi national security adviser Musaed bin Mohammed Al-Aiban. Al-Aiban brought a letter from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Xi Jinping. China spoke of dialogue and of protecting regional shipping and energy supplies. No agreement over Yemen was announced. The same day, the Houthis said they had launched drones towards Dammam airport and military targets in Jizan. Saudi Arabia had not confirmed the claim.  

Zhai Jun, China’s Middle East envoy, is currently on a visit to Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

Tapping into Iran’s biggest oil customer

What Riyadh seeks from Beijing is something the other players cannot give: the attention of Iran’s biggest oil customer.

In 2025, Chinese buyers, chiefly independent refiners in Shandong, took more than 80% of Iran’s seaborne crude exports, averaging about 1.4 million barrels a day according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. Those figures, though, describe the trade before the US naval blockade sharply curtailed Iranian exports this year, and a customer whose purchases have already shrunk has less leverage. According to the Reuters report, the Iranian sources said Beijing had made no explicit threats or indicated that it would exert economic pressure on Tehran if Iran failed to use its influence over the Houthis.

Discounted Iranian oil has served Chinese refiners well, though not without cost: Washington has sanctioned several Shandong refineries and port terminals for handling it since 2025. Leaning on Tehran in public would look like taking sides, and Iran seems to have read even the private message that way. According to the same sources in the report, its officials replied by blaming the regional crisis on the US-Israeli war against Iran.

China may not want to get too involved

Beijing has little interest in choosing between Tehran and Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is its largest trading partner in the Middle East, with bilateral trade exceeding US$100 billion in 2025. Chinese naval task forces have escorted ships through the Gulf of Aden since 2008, and from 2017 they have operated out of a base in Djibouti. Even so, China kept out of Operation Prosperity Guardian in late 2023, and issued a joint statement with Djibouti calling for freedom of navigation through Bab el-Mandeb.

The obvious comparison is March 2023, when Beijing hosted the agreement that brought Saudi Arabia and Iran back into diplomatic contact. Iraq and Oman had spent the previous two years bringing the two sides closer. By the time China stepped in, much of the difficult work had already been done. The agreement held even as the Houthis began attacking ships in the Red Sea later that year, helped by the fact that Saudi territory remained largely untouched. 

What China can do

Saudi officials say they talk to Iran and the Houthis directly. What they seem to want from China is a second voice in Tehran, backed by an economic relationship Iranian officials cannot easily brush aside. Iran has armed and trained the Houthis, but the movement has built up its military capabilities and pursues its own politics. Whether Iran could then deliver is doubtful. The Houthis’ Red Sea choices since 2023 appear to have followed their own reading of Gaza and their standing at home more closely than any instruction from Tehran. 

In his ongoing visit, special envoy Zhai Jun could ask Tehran what it is prepared to do about the Houthis and bring that answer back to Riyadh, while Iran could use the visit to explain what influence it still has without promising to end attacks it cannot control. In media reports, Zhai spoke of the need for a “focus on political solutions with a rational and pragmatic spirit, and promote the early restoration of stability and development in the region” in talks with Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

On 21 March 2024, Bloomberg reported that the Houthis had told China and Russia their ships would be spared in the Red Sea. Two days later, a missile hit the Huang Pu, a Panama-flagged tanker with Chinese owners. The ship suffered minor damage, despite the assurances reported earlier that week. In April 2025, the US State Department accused Chang Guang Satellite Technology of providing satellite imagery for Houthi attacks, an allegation the Chinese company denied.

In an October 2026 report, Conflict Armament Research examined specialist missile components intercepted on their way to the Houthis. Shipping documents named a Chinese supplier, although the researchers said they could not independently verify that information with the company. The findings do not establish any involvement by the Chinese government. The shipping papers give Beijing a lead it can follow on its own. Chinese authorities could check the supplier named in the documents against customs and export records without depending on Tehran. China has restricted exports of some drone parts since 2023, but components that move through ordinary trade are much harder to track.

Limited options

Iran has offered to mediate between Riyadh and the Houthis, but Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on 20 October that neither has answered. Accepting Iranian mediation would have meant treating Tehran as a neutral party in a war fought by its allies.

Washington has become harder for Riyadh to read. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress in the 3 November midterms, with the war against Iran and rising energy costs weighing on the Republicans. The new majority will not take office until January, and the result could leave Trump choosing between renewed escalation and a negotiated way out.

China cannot tell the Houthis to stop firing, and Tehran may not be able to make them listen either. But China can still ask Iran for a clear answer about what it will do and check the supplier named in the intercepted shipment papers. Riyadh would have something concrete to judge Beijing by, as Zhai Jun’s visits this month may offer a clearer indication of whether Beijing is prepared to take those steps, even if they fall short of ending the attacks.

Related: China’s illusion of influence in the Middle East | As Israel strikes Iran, China’s diplomatic leverage wanes