Why Xi is looking far beyond Washington

(Edited and refined by Grace Chong, with the assistance of AI translation.)

Chinese President Xi Jinping has recently been constantly on the move on the diplomatic stage. To borrow a phrase commonly used online: he is either on a foreign visit or on his way to one.

At the beginning of this year, China hosted an intensive series of diplomatic engagements, with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and then British Prime Minister Keir Starmer among those visiting China in succession. US President Donald Trump also visited in May, when the Chinese and US leaders held the much-anticipated “Xi-Trump summit” in Beijing. By comparison, the Chinese leader made very few foreign trips. In the first half of the year, Xi made just one: a brief two-day state visit to North Korea in June.

That changed on 30 August, when Xi embarked on a tightly packed foreign travel schedule, travelling first to Bishkek to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. During the summit, he met with the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Russia, among others, and delivered two speeches, at the SCO heads-of-state meeting and the “SCO Plus” meeting.

The SCO and China’s vision of a multipolar world

The SCO was originally established as a mechanism for security cooperation in Eurasia. In recent years, however, it has expanded beyond Central Asia, driven by China and Russia, bringing in member states including India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus, as well as a number of observer states and dialogue partners in Asia and the Middle East.

Although the SCO maintains that it is “not an alliance directed against other states”, the organisation has placed greater emphasis in recent years on security and economic cooperation. In particular, amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Iran facing US military action and economic sanctions, and Washington’s use of tariffs as a weapon, the grouping has taken on a stronger role in counterbalancing the West.

India is one example. After repeatedly skipping SCO summits, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended last year’s summit in Tianjin and travelled to Bishkek this year, with the main aim of counterbalancing pressure from the US.

For Beijing, meanwhile, the SCO provides a platform for promoting the Global South’s efforts to establish an international order independent of the West-led system. During the summit, Xi called for putting development and the people first, making security a key goal, and promoting dialogue and consultation. Without naming specific countries, he criticised the resurgence of “hegemonism, unilateralism and protectionism”, stressing that the overwhelming majority of the world does not condone power politics, and strongly advocating “an equal and orderly multipolar world”.

Egypt: trade, security and the Taiwan question

After the SCO summit concluded, Xi travelled to Cairo on 1 September for a state visit to Egypt. It was his first visit to Egypt in ten years and coincided with the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt.

Located at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia, and controlling the strategically important Suez Canal, Egypt is not only a huge market for China but also a gateway to other regions. Chinese companies have made a major push into Egypt in recent years, undertaking projects including the Central Business District of the country’s new administrative capital; the Iconic Tower, Africa’s tallest building; and the light rail transit system in the 10th of Ramadan City. Through the China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, they have also moved closer to African, Arab and European markets.

Beyond China-Egypt cooperation, Taiwanese political commentator Tang Hsiang-Lung made a bold prediction on a programme: that Xi might, during his visit to Egypt, visit a monument commemorating the Cairo Declaration that China established this year at the Mena House Hotel in Cairo, thereby signalling Beijing’s position on the Taiwan issue. In 1943, the Cairo Declaration was confirmed at the Cairo Conference held at the Mena House Hotel.

India next?

After this trip through Central Asia and the Middle East, Xi is expected to take a brief break before setting off again, this time for India. Reuters previously quoted sources as saying that Xi is highly likely to lead a large delegation to attend the BRICS summit, to be held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September. If the visit goes ahead, it would be Xi’s first trip to the neighbouring country, with which China has a territorial dispute, in seven years.

Although Beijing has yet to announce Xi’s visit to India, the possibility appears quite high. Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval visited China on 25 August and co-chaired a meeting of the special representatives on the China-India boundary question with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The two countries reached an eight-point consensus after the meeting, and Doval’s trip to Beijing was likely also intended to pave the way for Xi’s visit to India.

A message ahead of the next Xi-Trump meeting

If the second Xi-Trump meeting, which Washington has repeatedly floated and which is expected to take place in late September, is included, Xi will have travelled to at least four countries within a single month. Compared with the years after he first became Chinese president in 2013, Xi has made fewer foreign trips since the pandemic.

By embarking on this intensive series of foreign visits ahead of the second Xi-Trump meeting, Beijing is sending a clear signal: China needs to manage its relationship with the US, but it also needs to cultivate the rest of the world beyond the US.

From the SCO summit to Egypt and then the BRICS summit — and particularly through efforts to improve relations with India — Beijing is presenting itself as a driver of a multipolar world and a leader of the Global South. Beyond challenging the US-led unipolar world order, the diplomatic push is also building leverage ahead of the second Xi-Trump meeting, transforming China-US competition into a question of how two great powers can coexist within a multipolar international system.

There are, of course, significant differences in interests within the SCO. The longstanding factors that have strained China-India relations — including the border dispute, China’s longstanding support for India’s arch-rival Pakistan, and trade imbalances — will not disappear. Egypt, meanwhile, is not at the centre of the Middle East’s current problems. And although Washington has strained relations with countries around the world, even with allies such as Canada, America’s global influence still cannot be ignored.

Nevertheless, with China’s leader travelling from one country to another in the run-up to the second Xi-Trump meeting, Beijing has at least sent an important signal on a psychological level: relations with the US are China’s most important diplomatic relationship, but China’s foreign policy will not revolve solely around the US — and neither will the world.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as ““习特二会”前中国元首连轴转为哪般？”.

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