Xi’s purge rolls on: Two Sessions test loyalty and ‘correct’ ambition

China’s “Two Sessions” (the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) will convene this week. 

As is customary, the Standing Committee of the NPC held a plenary meeting on 25 February to review a slew of draft documents to be submitted at the Two Sessions. They include a report on the NPC Standing Committee’s work, an agenda for the NPC session, a list of people considered for the presidium and the secretary-general, and a list of non-voting delegates.

This is routine work undertaken by the NPC Standing Committee ahead of the Two Sessions every year. However, two details drew particular attention this time: the meeting heard a deputy qualification report and “reviewed proposals on appointments and removals”. State media did not specify whose qualifications were under discussion or who had been appointed or dismissed. But Announcement No. 16 issued by the NPC Standing Committee on 26 February provided the answer: the removal of 19 NPC deputies from office, including military representatives.

But some commentators were puzzled as to why there was no mention of any action concerning the two most prominent figures in recent high-profile Chinese Communist Party (CCP) personnel news — CCP Politburo member and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia, and CMC member Liu Zhenli.

In fact, both Zhang and Liu remain NPC deputies — their names are still included in the latest list of deputies. Yet, this is not unusual. It was only on 24 January — just over a month ago — that Zhang and Liu were officially announced to be placed under investigation for suspected disciplinary and legal violations. Rightfully, formal investigations take time. Accordingly, Zhang and Liu remain CCP members and NPC deputies, and their respective posts as vice-chairman and member of the CMC have not yet been formally revoked.

Compared with another CMC vice-chairman He Weidong, after being missing for nearly seven months, it was not until last October that it was officially announced he was under investigation, at which point he was expelled from the party and dismissed from the military. His removal as an NPC deputy was later announced in December. It was said that He had in fact already been stripped of his NPC deputy status by the servicemen congress of the CMC General Office as early as last November — which is possible — but this was not announced immediately.

Take Li Shangfu, former CMC member and defence minister, as another example. He was placed under investigation in August 2023. In October that year, he was removed from his posts as state councillor, defence minister and CMC member. It was not until June 2024 that he was expelled from the party, with the authorities stating that his offences included “resisting organisational review”. In September 2024, he was formally stripped of his status as an NPC deputy. 

Among China’s senior officials, there is typically an interval between the announcement of an investigation and formal dismissal from office. The length of that interval depends on the progress of the investigation and may also relate to whether the individual is deemed to have “resisted review”. Therefore, it would be considered relatively swift if Zhang and Liu were to have their NPC positions revoked in February or during the Two Sessions in March. Regardless, a conclusion is expected in due course, and there is unlikely to be any sudden reversal.

This year’s Two Sessions will be held just a year and a half before the CCP 21st Party Congress, also marking the first year of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) for economic and social development. In principle, the 15th Five-Year Plan should be the main focus of the Two Sessions, but personnel reshuffles ahead of the party’s leadership transition, as well as uncertainty in the international economic and trade environment, have stolen the spotlight, and would inevitably dilute attention to China’s domestic economic agenda.

According to forecasts and calculations by economists, the 31 provinces, municipalities and regions in mainland China have already announced their economic growth targets for 2026, with a weighted average of 5.04%, 0.2 percentage points lower than in 2025. In the weeks leading up to the meetings, some overseas media had already reported that the authorities might slightly lower the national growth target at this year’s Two Sessions, trimming it from around 5%, where it has been set for the past three years. 

The average downward adjustment in targets for local regions indirectly supports this possibility. Logically, lowering the target can ease growth pressure and allow for greater policy flexibility.

This shift echoes the CCP’s recent emphasis on cultivating a “correct view of political achievements”. This is not a new concept in Chinese officialdom, but it has carried noticeably more weight this year and is set to become a key focus of intra-party study. 

The General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee issued a circular calling for a party-wide education campaign on “establishing and practising a correct view of political achievements”, targeting leadership teams and officials at the county and director level and above, in particular the “number one officials”. The campaign is to start after this year’s Spring Festival holidays and be largely completed by the end of July. In addition, a volume titled Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Discussions on Establishing and Practising a Correct View of Political Achievements was just published in February.

The “correct view of political achievements” is a broad concept that can encompass many elements, such as upholding the party spirit, advancing modernisation in a grounded manner, avoiding arrogance and impatience, taking a long-term view, creating welfare for the people and so on; not placing excessive emphasis on GDP growth is clearly also part of it. Thus, the large-scale push to instil this outlook not only serves to tighten discipline within the cadre corps in a leadership transition year, it also likely aligns with the trend of de-emphasising growth.

Given the size and influence of China’s economy, whether this year’s growth target would be lowered is bound to attract close attention. Observers would wait for Chinese Premier Li Qiang to reveal the figure in his government work report when the NPC opens on 5 March. Through the Two Sessions, analysts would also watch for how officials articulate the priorities of economic and social policy, plan to tackle local government debt and the property sector’s issues, restore consumer confidence, and use “extraordinary measures” to drive innovation.

Under the cloud of an intense anti-corruption drive, the state of China’s officialdom would undoubtedly continue to draw attention. For instance, much can be inferred from whether Politburo member Ma Xingrui — who has not appeared in public for some time — stays out of sight or turns up at this important occasion.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “2026年两会前瞻”.

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