After Trump and Putin, Xi turns to North Korea

Chinese President Xi Jinping is reportedly considering a visit to North Korea as early as next week, and may act as a mediator between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

On 20 May, Yonhap News Agency cited South Korean government officials to report that a Chinese delegation comprising security guards and ceremonial staff had recently arrived in Pyongyang, a move widely interpreted as a sign that Xi may visit North Korea in late May or early June. This could mark Xi’s first overseas visit of the year.

China’s broader geopolitical play

Interviewed academics analysed that, given the strong diplomatic significance attached to a leader’s first overseas trip of the year, Xi is unlikely to travel abroad solely to strengthen China-North Korea ties or serve as a go-between in US-North Korea communications. The move may instead reflect broader geopolitical manoeuvring and strategic intent.

They believe China is seeking to seize the strategic opportunity created by the US and Russian leaders visiting China less than a week apart. Through Xi’s potential visit to North Korea, Beijing aims to demonstrate that it firmly holds a dominant hand on Korean peninsula affairs, leveraging closer coordination with Russia and North Korea to counterbalance the US, while also sending layered diplomatic signals to various parties, including the US, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

At a regular press conference on 21 May, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun responded to media queries that he has “no information to offer at the moment”, neither confirming nor denying the South Korean media reports. He noted that China and North Korea are friendly socialist neighbours, where both parties and countries enjoy a long-standing tradition of friendly exchanges, which serves the interests of both sides as well as peace and stability in the region.

Xi last visited North Korea in June 2019. His most recent meeting with Kim took place in September last year, when Kim travelled to Beijing to attend the 3 September military parade.

Nuclear and Nobel Peace Prize ambitions

This year marks the 65th anniversary of the signing of the China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had visited North Korea in April, during which he met Kim and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui. South Korean media interpreted Wang’s visit as laying the groundwork for a potential trip by Xi to North Korea. 

According to the Chinese foreign ministry’s website, Kim said during his meeting with Wang that he was willing to work with China to “strengthen high-level exchanges and enhance strategic communication”.

Citing South Korean diplomatic sources, Yonhap News Agency reported speculation that Xi’s potential visit may be linked to calls made during Trump’s visit to China last week, urging Beijing to play a constructive role in facilitating the resumption of US-North Korea talks. The report also quoted a senior South Korean government official as saying that Xi’s visit to North Korea is likely intended to mediate relations between North Korea and the US.

Since taking office in January last year, Trump has repeatedly said he would like to meet with Kim, but North Korea has not responded. Trump has met Kim three times before: first in Singapore in June 2018; then in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019; and a third time on 30 June 2019 at Panmunjom, when Trump briefly crossed the military demarcation line separating the two Koreas to step onto the North Korean side for a photo opportunity.

Lye Liang Fook, a senior fellow affiliated with the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, told Lianhe Zaobao that Kim has already made clear he would not give up nuclear weapons and that the Iran war would only reinforce North Korea’s determination to keep its nuclear weapons. Thus, he said, it is unlikely that a Trump-Kim summit would have any substantive meaning — or help Trump realise his ambition of winning a Nobel Peace Prize.

China’s key role in Korean peninsula

Kang Jun‑young, head of the Center for International Area Studies at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) and a professor at HUFS’s Graduate School of International and Area Studies, believes that Beijing hopes to use this state visit to North Korea to show Washington that Xi not only maintains good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim, he also wields real influence. 

In contrast, Trump can only talk the talk — he was unable to pressure Putin into a ceasefire in Ukraine, while Kim has not shown any interest in meeting him.

Kang further analysed that beyond using the broader China-Russia-North Korea framework to counter the US, Beijing also hoped to leverage Xi’s North Korea visit to demonstrate to Japan and South Korea its dominant hand on Korean peninsula issues. At the same time, China looks to restrain Russia-North Korea cooperation to prevent the two from moving too close and eroding Beijing’s influence.

He noted that in recent years, China has mentioned “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” less frequently in public, yet the White House fact sheet on the latest US-China leaders’ meeting stated that both sides confirmed their shared goal to denuclearise North Korea. Kang opined that Xi would likely communicate Beijing’s position to Kim. If Kim were to meet with Trump, Beijing would also stress that US-North Korea talks cannot bypass China.

Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University of China, analysed that Xi’s visit to North Korea carries multiple meanings. Besides consolidating China-North Korea ties, Beijing also wants China, Russia and North Korea to deepen cooperation to “counter the threat of Japan’s new militarism”. 

Following the US-China summit, Beijing could also use the trip to communicate with North Korea and convey the message that Trump is keen to engage with North Korea.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “传习近平最快下周访朝鲜 北京欲借中俄朝联动抗衡美国”.

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