China leads Northeast Asia’s nuclear buildout

On 9 February 2026, Japan restarted Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in Niigata prefecture — the world’s largest nuclear plant — after 15 years of inactivity following the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Three weeks later, the US and Israel struck Iran, effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and sending crude oil and LNG prices surging 51 and 77% respectively within a fortnight.

The shockwaves were immediate. In Seoul, President Lee Jae-myung convened an emergency Cabinet meeting. In Beijing, planners accelerated timelines already in motion. At first glance, Northeast Asia’s renewed embrace of nuclear energy appears reactive — a direct response to geopolitical instability. In reality, it reflects a deeper structural convergence that has been unfolding for years.

Across China, Japan and South Korea, three pressures are aligning. Electricity demand is surging, driven by artificial intelligence infrastructure, advanced manufacturing and industrial electrification. Fossil fuel dependence persists despite ambitious climate targets, leaving all three exposed to external shocks. Meanwhile, renewable energy — while expanding rapidly — remains constrained by intermittency, storage limitations and grid integration challenges that no system has fully resolved.

In this context, nuclear energy offers what other sources cannot: stable baseload power, high energy density, and insulation from volatile global markets. It is increasingly not just a complementary option, but a structural necessity.

Across Northeast Asia, the structural logic driving nuclear expansion is shared — but is varied by country, shaped by different energy systems, political constraints, and strategic priorities.

China: “all-of-the-above” energy strategy with nuclear at its centre

In China, the trajectory is defined by scale and speed. Nuclear currently accounts for around 4.7% of electricity generation, but its expansion is decisive. China aims to reach 110 GW of nuclear capacity by 2030, a surge from 62.48 GW at the end of 2025, and consistent with the 15th Five-Year Plan’s broader push for coastal nuclear expansion. If sustained, it could reach 130 GW by 2035 and potentially 200 GW by 2040, making it the world’s largest nuclear fleet. 

The country is already on track to surpass France as the second-largest nuclear power by installed capacity before the end of 2026, with nearly half of global nuclear construction underway within China. China has also signed onto an international pledge to triple global nuclear energy capacity between 2020 and 2050, with Vice-Premier Zhang Guoqing describing the commitment as serving both climate and energy security goals.

This expansion reflects a broader “all-of-the-above” energy strategy in which nuclear power plays a central role in achieving both energy security and the “dual carbon” goals of peaking emissions by 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2060. As National Energy Administration head Wang Hongzhi noted, the current planning cycle is both a decisive phase for carbon peaking and a critical period for building a new energy system. 

Japan: PM hopes to achieve 100% energy self-sufficiency with nuclear

In Japan, nuclear revival reflects a necessity constrained by politics. Before the 2011 Fukushima disaster, nuclear power generated around 30% of electricity; by 2024, that share had recovered to only 9.4%, with the shortfall filled largely by imported LNG. Today, Japan depends on imports for roughly 90% of its primary energy, leaving it highly exposed to external shocks, as the Iran crisis has made clear.

But policy has since shifted. Japan’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan (2025), approved in February 2025, replaced earlier commitments to minimise nuclear reliance with a target of 20% nuclear generation by 2040, which would require up to 30 reactors in operation. As of March 2026, 15 reactors are operating, with additional units approved or under regulatory review. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has made nuclear power central to her ambition of 100% energy self-sufficiency — a goal she has pursued since taking office in October 2025.

South Korea: urgently needing to beef up energy resilience

Meanwhile, South Korea, the world’s fifth-largest nuclear energy producer, operates 26 reactors supplying nearly one-third of its electricity. Yet its vulnerability is acute: around 70% of its crude oil and up to 30% of its natural gas comes from the Middle East, most of which transits the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the Lee administration is also pursuing a longer-term energy resilience through renewables and nuclear energy expansion, while calling for a “locally produced, locally consumed” energy strategy.

Despite growing momentum, tensions persist across all three countries. Regulatory timelines continue to lag political ambition, and structural constraints remain unresolved.

In Japan, decommissioning continues to outpace restarts, while high costs, lengthy regulatory reviews and public opposition to restarting nuclear reactors cast doubt on whether the 2040 nuclear target is achievable.

Meanwhile, China, despite its ambition, has missed nuclear capacity targets — including both its 2020 and 2025 goals. Its inland nuclear moratorium — imposed by the State Council in March 2011 following Fukushima, and still in effect — leaves significant planned capacity in limbo.

South Korea faces significant challenges too. It remains entirely dependent on imported enriched uranium, leaving its nuclear fuel supply exposed to external control. Under the 2015 US-South Korea civil nuclear agreement, Seoul is restricted from domestic enrichment and reprocessing, and must seek case-by-case US approval for uranium enrichment beyond 20% as well as any reprocessing activities.

The Lee administration has moved to renegotiate these terms, establishing a dedicated nuclear task force in late 2025. What was once a conservative security position now commands cross-party support, likely driven partly by growing doubts about the durability of US security commitments under the Trump administration. 

Nonetheless, Washington remains hesitant. This is likely due to concerns that granting Seoul latent enrichment capabilities could undermine US non-proliferation objectives globally alongside concerns that Pyongyang will use this as pretext for further escalation. 

The Strait of Hormuz crisis has sharply exposed Northeast Asia’s energy vulnerabilities, demonstrating how quickly external dependencies translate into domestic instability. 

China is moving the fastest. Its Hualong One is already among the most widely deployed third-generation designs globally with 41 units approved, under construction or operational globally. Additionally, the Linglong One — a 125 MW small modular reactor (SMR), a compact and faster-to-build alternative to conventional nuclear plants — is on track to become the world’s first commercially operating SMR.

With nearly 40 countries committed to tripling nuclear capacity by 2050 and Southeast Asia emerging as a key growth market, Beijing has moved early to consolidate its position. Chinese firms have signed nuclear-related agreements with Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, with plans to supply up to 30 reactors to Belt and Road Initiative partners by 2030.

Geoeconomically, this positions China to capture a growing share of the global nuclear market, shaping long-term technology standards and supply chains aligned with Beijing. Geopolitically, it deepens China’s footprint across Southeast Asia and beyond — potentially at the expense of Western and Russian influence in emerging nuclear programmes across the Global South. 

The dynamic is already visible: despite unresolved South China Sea tensions, the Philippines resumed high-level talks with China on oil, gas and broader energy cooperation in late March.

Within this shifting landscape, Russia — also a major fossil fuel producer/exporter — is repositioning itself alongside China. As Beijing expands its nuclear export footprint, Moscow’s nuclear diplomacy has gained renewed relevance as an alternative partner for countries seeking to diversify risk. Recent relevant agreements with Vietnam and Uzbekistan illustrate how Russia continues to deepen strategic partnerships, offering parallel pathways to energy security even as Northeast Asia’s nuclear convergence reshapes the competitive landscape.

Northeast Asia’s nuclear pivot reflects the culmination of deeper structural pressures and a strategic realignment in which nuclear power underpins decarbonisation, economic resilience and geopolitical influence simultaneously. 

Nuclear power is now moving to the centre of economic and strategic planning, underpinning decarbonisation, industrial resilience and energy autonomy. In an era of volatile markets and disrupted supply chains, states able to scale nuclear deployment and pair it with state-backed financing gain disproportionate influence.

As China, Japan, and South Korea press ahead — by different routes and at different speeds — their convergence will redraw not only the region’s energy map and its balance of power. The rest of Asia is already taking note.

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