China’s nuclear push meets Southeast Asia’s trust deficit

China accounts for roughly half of the world’s nuclear reactors currently under construction, but its overseas reactor exports have succeeded only in Pakistan. In Southeast Asia, where Chinese companies already enjoy a substantial presence in clean energy industries, Beijing has yet to secure a commercial reactor construction contract.

Disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz have renewed Southeast Asia’s interest in nuclear energy. This presents an opportunity for China to extend its technological and commercial reach in the region. Yet Russia, South Korea and other suppliers are offering competing technologies, financing arrangements and long-term services. As Southeast Asian governments explore their nuclear options, their choice of partners could carry geopolitical implications lasting generations.

A revival with limits

Among the options for meeting Southeast Asia’s growing electricity demand, nuclear power offers steady, low-carbon generation for 60 years or more, though at high upfront cost and with long construction periods. For decades, however, nuclear power has remained more aspiration than reality in the region. Southeast Asia has zero operating commercial nuclear plants.

Before the recent conflict, Southeast Asia sourced around 60% of its crude oil imports and a third of its gas imports from the Middle East. Meanwhile, industrialisation, electrification and growing demand from data centres are expected to see the region account for nearly 20% of global energy demand growth through 2035. Nuclear power could eventually reduce reliance on imported gas for electricity generation.

Vietnam has revived its Ninh Thuan projects, while Indonesia and the Philippines are advancing nuclear plans. Other countries are reassessing their options, and ASEAN has included civilian nuclear energy in its 2026-2030 energy cooperation programme. Yet high financing costs, limited regulatory capacity, lengthy construction and public opposition have repeatedly stalled earlier ambitions. With solar, batteries and geothermal offering faster alternatives, and the economics of small modular reactors (SMRs) still uncertain, Southeast Asian governments face difficult choices over which technologies to pursue and which foreign partners to engage.

China’s nuclear ambitions in Southeast Asia 

China has formidable advantages as a potential nuclear supplier. Its Hualong One design draws on an extensive domestic manufacturing base, while Chinese companies have accumulated experience delivering energy and infrastructure projects overseas. Beijing can offer reactor technology alongside engineering, training and potentially state-backed financing.

China has also cultivated nuclear relationships across Southeast Asia for years. Thailand’s RATCH acquired a 10% stake in China’s Fangchenggang nuclear project in 2015, while Chinese institutions have signed cooperation agreements with several regional partners, most recently Singapore in August 2026. Yet these relationships have not yet produced commercial reactor construction contracts in Southeast Asia.

Part of the explanation lies in the region’s limited progress towards nuclear deployment. Most countries are still evaluating their options, while Vietnam’s renewed programmes build on longstanding relationships with Russia and other suppliers. China also has less experience than Russia in delivering reactors across different overseas markets. The low costs achieved through China’s domestic nuclear expansion may prove difficult to replicate in countries developing their first plants. Smaller designs such as the Linglong One could widen China’s prospects.

Political considerations present another challenge. Despite their extensive economic ties with China, Vietnam and the Philippines remain embroiled in serious territorial and maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. Nuclear cooperation involves sensitive infrastructure, long-term technical assistance and considerable trust between governments. These considerations may make some neighbours more cautious about Chinese participation, even where its technology and financing options are attractive.

What are competitors offering?

Russia has made the most progress towards actual projects in Southeast Asia. In March 2026, Vietnam signed an agreement with Moscow, reviving a nuclear project negotiated over a decade ago. Russia’s state-owned Rosatom offers reactor construction, fuel services, training, and potentially state-backed financing. Interestingly, its recent agreement with Indonesia proposes something different, that Russian floating reactors would sell electricity to local buyers under a long-term contract. At current, both projects still face implementation hurdles and construction have yet to begin.

South Korea brings experience delivering reactors overseas, including in the UAE. While Vietnam has committed to working with Russia on its first Ninh Thuan plant, it is simultaneously discussing the second with South Korea, illustrating Hanoi’s willingness to engage competing suppliers within the same nuclear programme. Seoul has also signed exploratory agreements in the Philippines, including cooperation involving Korean state financing. Its May 2026 nuclear export strategy further signals its intention to compete independently for overseas contracts.

The US has signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with five Southeast Asian countries, allowing transfers of US nuclear technology under non-proliferation safeguards and restrictions on sensitive activities. These agreements, which establish legal frameworks for future exports, do not bind and commit countries to American reactors. Washington is also working with Japan and South Korea to jointly develop overseas SMR projects, although the recent initiative has yet to secure a reactor contract in Southeast Asia.

Other options are emerging: France and Canada have also pursued nuclear cooperation agreements with ASEAN economies. At current, Southeast Asian governments are engaging suppliers through a wide-array of arrangements.

How much room do Southeast Asian governments have?

A country’s first reactor can give its supplier an advantage in securing subsequent projects. As local engineers and regulators become familiar with its technology, repeat orders can draw on established training and supply chains. A successful first plant could also encourage neighbouring countries to follow, helping early suppliers establish a foothold in Southeast Asia’s nuclear market. However, pressuring customers through fuel or maintenance services could damage a supplier’s reputation and future business.

For Southeast Asian governments, competing offers provide room to negotiate. Singapore has developed nuclear cooperation with several countries. Vietnam’s agreement with Russia for its first plant, alongside discussions with South Korea for the second, gives Hanoi opportunities to compare terms and diversify partners. Yet Japan’s withdrawal in 2025 over an ambitious construction timetable also illustrates the limits of such leverage. For financially constrained countries, securing credible financing and delivery commitments remains difficult. Operating different reactor designs could also add costs for those governments.

Foreign dependence also extends beyond reactor procurement. Russia accounts for around 40% of global uranium-enrichment capacity, while US nuclear utilities purchased 20% of their enrichment services from Russia in 2024. Under Rosatom’s proposed Indonesian project, the Russian company would own and operate floating reactors, with Indonesian customers purchasing electricity under long-term contracts. This could ease upfront financing for giving Russia a continuing role in local electricity generation.

Nuclear competition under a changing landscape

China’s nuclear ambitions come amid its extensive economic and energy relationships across Southeast Asia. Chinese banks and firms have historically financed and built coal-fired power plants in countries including Indonesia and Vietnam, while Indonesia remains China’s largest supplier of imported coal. More recently, Chinese firms have expanded rapidly into solar, batteries and electric vehicles, alongside broader infrastructure and industrial investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. Nuclear exports could extend Beijing’s involvement into long-term electricity generation and services.

Yet China’s economic gravitas has also raised concerns about excessive reliance on Beijing. In ISEAS’s 2026 survey of regional elites, 55.4% of respondents who identified China as the region’s most influential economic power expressed concern about its growing influence, with strong reservations in Vietnam and the Philippines. These perceptions reflect political sensitivities surrounding further and more extensive Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure.

For Russia, nuclear exports offer a means to sustain longstanding relationships, particularly with Vietnam, and expand its relatively limited economic presence in Southeast Asia. The US, Japan and South Korea are pursuing a more coordinated approach. Their joint SMR initiative seeks to combine technology, construction expertise and financing to compete for overseas projects. This gives Southeast Asian governments another set of prospective partners as Chinese firms expand elsewhere in the energy sector. A country could purchase Chinese solar panels and batteries while developing nuclear power with South Korea or Russia, diversifying its technological partnerships while maintaining extensive economic ties with Beijing.

Energy security and strategic autonomy

Nuclear cooperation requires considerable political trust — this is especially relevant in Southeast Asia, where suppliers and buyers have unresolved security disputes. Civilian nuclear development also brings proliferation concerns, requiring governments to uphold international safeguards and Southeast Asia’s nuclear-weapon-free commitments.

The current energy crisis has revived interest in nuclear power, but the financial, technical and institutional obstacles that delayed earlier projects have hardly disappeared. Renewables and storage can offer more immediate relief, while nuclear energy could provide reliable, low-carbon electricity over decades. The region’s enthusiasm for nuclear may therefore outpace its ability to deliver it.

Nuclear power presents yet another test to ASEAN economies’ longstanding approach to great power relations. Governments have sought economic and technological cooperation with competing powers while preserving room to pursue independent foreign policies. Nuclear introduces commitments that can outlast political administrations and shifts in regional relations. As countries seek greater energy security, they must also consider how far they are willing to entrust their electricity systems to foreign partners.

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