Aircraft carriers cannot erase Asian civilisational memory

Military superiority can destroy infrastructure, but it cannot erase a people’s past. Historian Wu Guo takes a look at how centuries of collective identity have formed an unbreakable shield against American intervention.

People hold pre-revolutionary Iranian flags as they protest the Iranian regime outside Carson Sports Park before Iran’s training session in Los Angeles on 14 June 2026.
People hold pre-revolutionary Iranian flags as they protest the Iranian regime outside Carson Sports Park before Iran’s training session in Los Angeles on 14 June 2026. (Patrick T. Fallon/AFP)

Since the 20th century, the US has undoubtedly been the world’s most powerful military and economic force. Yet one striking historical phenomenon deserves attention: whether in East Asia or West Asia, the US has often been able to gain advantages on the battlefield but has found it difficult to completely subdue its opponents. 

From the Korean War to the Vietnam War, from the war in Afghanistan to decades of confrontation with Iran, the US has continually faced the same challenge: how to reshape the political order of these societies according to its own vision.

Strategic paradoxes

When the Korean War ended, North Korea was not eliminated; instead, it emerged as a de facto nuclear weapons state. The Vietnam War concluded with an American withdrawal. The 20-year war in Afghanistan likewise ended with a hasty American departure. 

In its long struggle with Iran, the US has had overwhelming military superiority, yet it never succeeded in forcing Iran to abandon its chosen path of development. On the contrary, during the recent crisis and its resolution, Iran not only maintained its national sovereignty but also continued to expand its influence in Middle Eastern geopolitics, even transforming the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world’s most important strategic waterways — into a powerful bargaining chip.

If the strategic purpose of the war was to ensure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the objective itself appears paradoxical, since the strait had been open before the conflict. To spend enormous resources only to recreate a situation that already existed beforehand would seem, at the very least, a questionable strategic achievement. 

Participants gather at the Youth Park Open-Air Theatre in Pyongyang Municipality in Pyongyang, North Korea, on 24 June 2026, to mark the "Day of Struggle Against US Imperialism".
Participants gather at the Youth Park Open-Air Theatre in Pyongyang Municipality in Pyongyang, North Korea, on 24 June 2026, to mark the "Day of Struggle Against US Imperialism". (Kim Won Jin/AFP)

Moreover, each of these international conflicts, without exception, generated domestic controversy within the US, provoking public criticism, protests, political backlash or inflationary pressures.

Resilience of civilisational identity

A broader view of civilisational history reveals a common pattern. Behind these countries stand longstanding civilisational traditions, resilient historical memories, and from them, a strong sense of collective identity.

The Korean peninsula has a state tradition extending back more than two millennia. Through reforms of its writing system and language, Korea cultivated a strong sense of national confidence and cultural autonomy. Vietnam, long situated within the broader Chinese cultural sphere, absorbed Confucian political traditions while simultaneously developing a powerful sense of national independence. This consciousness was demonstrated repeatedly throughout the complex 2,000-year history of political interaction and military confrontation between Vietnam and China.

Iran inherited the civilisational legacy of the ancient Persian empire, and its national identity can be traced back to the era of the Achaemenid dynasty. During my own research on the history of Chinese Buddhism, I discovered that many elements of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism — including numerous bodhisattvas familiar to ordinary Chinese people — originated from interactions between Buddhist civilisation and ancient Iranian civilisation. 

Even Afghanistan, a country often perceived as politically fragmented, has long stood at the crossroads of Central Asian, South Asian and West Asian civilisations. Over centuries, it has developed complex yet resilient forms of internal identity, while the influence of religion over society has often exceeded outside observers’ expectations.

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Ships and tankers in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Musandam, Oman, on 18 April 2026.
Ships and tankers in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Musandam, Oman, on 18 April 2026. (Reuters)

After World War II, the US believed that economic modernisation and, later, globalisation would gradually lead the nations of the world towards convergence. Yet Asia’s experience suggests that modernisation does not necessarily result in cultural homogenisation. South Korea, Japan, China, Vietnam, Iran and India have all modernised while preserving distinctive civilisational characteristics. They have embraced modern technology, market economies and state institutions, but they have not necessarily accepted political trajectories prescribed by external powers.

In this sense, what the US has encountered in Asia is not merely military resistance but also a civilisational challenge and a form of civilisational self-defence. Aircraft carriers and air strikes cannot easily erase a people’s historical memory, and economic sanctions struggle to eliminate a society’s deeply rooted cultural identity and its pursuit of national security.

To be sure, Asia has also experienced wars, fragmentation, internal conflicts and periods of decline. Yet the cases of Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iran remind us that societies with deep historical traditions and strong cultural identities are oftentimes more resilient than expected.

Fate of Asian societies

The US’s repeated frustrations in Asia may therefore be more than a series of isolated accidents. They reflect a broader historical pattern: military power may kill lives and destroy infrastructure, but it does not necessarily conquer civilisations. 

The recent war involving Iran further suggests that in an age of artificial intelligence and drones, even the US’s conventional military superiority faces significant constraints on the battlefield. At the same time, the US’s “Asian experiences” — or “lessons” — of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan have made contemporary American leaders deeply cautious about committing large numbers of ground troops to foreign wars that could result in substantial casualties.

A US National Guard troop stands at an entrance to the “The Great American State Fair: The Future of America”, as part of celebrations marking the 250th anniversary of the US, in Washington, DC, US, on 8 July 2026.
A US National Guard troop stands at an entrance to the “The Great American State Fair: The Future of America”, as part of celebrations marking the 250th anniversary of the US, in Washington, DC, US, on 8 July 2026. (Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters)

International relations in the 21st century may need to recognise this reality. For Asian nations, the most valuable assets are not merely economic growth or military strength, but also the cultural traditions, social organisational capacities, national consciousness and collective memories that have accumulated over multiple centuries. 

These factors constitute the deeper foundation for the endurance and development of Asian civilisations. They also explain why external powers, even with overwhelming advantages, may ultimately be unable to determine the fate of Asian societies.

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