Can India still trust Trump’s America?

As the G7 summit convened in Evian, France, India eagerly awaited visuals of the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump on the sidelines. The classic Modi hug was missing, but the two leaders exchanged niceties and spoke of a growing partnership. On the surface, relations were warm, and President Trump was all praise for his Indian counterpart. 

But the two sides had actually been caught up in a tough spot over trade and tariff issues. While a trade deal is still to be concluded, both sides have been in tough negotiations. A trade delegation was just in India on 23 June to “deliver fairer and more reciprocal trade, and finalise a strong bilateral trade agreement that benefits both our nations”. As the negotiations continue and the top leaders meet, a key question remains: is a change underway in US-India relations for good, or will the trust deficit continue to widen? 

US wants to dictate the relationship

Before the two leaders met, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was in India to attend the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 26 May. Over the first 18 months of Trump’s second term, three Quad members — India, Australia and Japan — have experienced a marked shift in their bilateral relationships with Washington. These changing equations are now shaping the future of once-promising groupings such as the Quad. The state of US-China relations has also remained a key factor in determining the Quad’s cohesion and long-term durability.

Meanwhile, the problem arises when the US, despite its past failures to persuade India to meet its strategic demands, continues to tell Delhi what it wants — whether it be opening its market to American agricultural produce or questioning India’s oil purchases from Russia. Meanwhile, Delhi seems clear that it does not like “to be told” and that any offering to the US must be in sync with the country’s interests and the wishes of 1.4 billion Indians. However, with nationalist governments in both Delhi and Washington each bargaining for the best possible deal, India-US ties remain in a state of flux.

Optimists in Delhi would like to believe that the growing trade and technological partnership with the US would continue to boost bilateral ties, and that the aim of doubling bilateral trade to US$500 billion under “Mission 500” by 2030 would be achieved ahead of the set deadline. However, soon after this goal was announced at the Trump-Modi summit in February 2025, Trump’s tariffs on India reached as high as 50% and bilateral relations hit their lowest point. While trade talks are making steady progress and a deal might be in the works, there is no guarantee of its finality due to trade volume, market access issues and disagreements over agricultural tariffs. 

Changing US regional strategy holds key signal for Delhi

While trade and tariffs have generated growing anxiety in New Delhi, India is also closely watching shifts in America’s regional strategy, which many believe has taken a U-turn — particularly in its approach to China.

The Biden administration opted for an upfront strategy aimed at “countering China” and saw India as a key regional partner. And whether through diversifying manufacturing under the China+1 strategy or advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, India was a key strategic consideration. However, the Trump administration seems to have demolished that fortress against China, and a firm handshake between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in Beijing in May 2026 was a key political and strategic sign of a changing American strategy in the Indo-Pacific. 

The change is primarily that the Trump-led American order believes in managing and negotiating with China rather than confronting it. Those affected by the change, including its allies, ran to the White House to make deals. Non-treaty allies like India only had two options: one, deepen partnerships with like-minded countries in the region. Two, reiterate its “strategic autonomy” and build a strong, independent defence against Chinese expansion. Against this backdrop, India continues to strengthen its defence capabilities to protect its borders against Chinese aggression. This builds on what it has been doing since the wake-up call it received from China during the Galwan Valley conflict in 2020.

India taking a proactive approach on China

Therefore, if the US’s strategy for deterring Beijing has shifted, especially in the regional context, India, too, has made progress toward peace with China. From signing the border agreement in October 2024 to the meeting of Modi and Xi in August 2025 in Tianjin, China, on the sidelines of the SCO summit, India’s approach is clear: it would not let a third country determine its equation of friendship or competition with China. 

But why was a handshake between Xi and Trump crucial for Delhi, and why was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China in May this year not? Simply put, India and the Soviet Union, since the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1971, have not changed the basic foundation of their ties, which is “trust”. 

US-India trust deficit still a worry

If building military capacity, diversifying partnerships, and engaging the US on its own terms has been India’s answer to the looming uncertainty, Delhi is yet to find an answer to Washington’s cosiness with Islamabad — something that continues to broaden the “trust deficit in real-time”. For instance, India continues to be a victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and has borne the pain of the horrific terror incidents like the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. Similarly, the US Navy SEALs found and killed America’s most wanted terrorist, Osama Bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011. The question remains, what does Pakistan offer to the US that, despite the roots of 9/11 being found in Pakistan, the White House continues to welcome its leadership? 

All answers are intricate, but an easy one would be Pakistan’s strategic location between the Middle East and Central Asia on one side and South Asia and China on the other. One could also argue that for the US, the Pakistani deep-state (government, army and intelligence) offer easy military bases — something that India would never agree to. 

This phase of political hiccups between India and the US is not new. Looking at the seven decades of India-US relations, the partnership has not been without its problems, and the Pakistan factor has always been a key irritant. Be it American support to Pakistan during its war against Bangladesh’s Independence in 1971 or the access to the White House given to the duo — Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff and Field Marshal Asim Munir, especially against the backdrop of the India-Pakistan war in May 2025 — Delhi always questions when the US will stop hyphenating India and Pakistan. 

While State Secretary Rubio would like to assure Delhi that the US does not see its “relation with any country in the world as coming at the expense of our strategic alliance with India”, but Delhi may still want to question this guarantee. Against these assurances from Washington, Pakistan’s increasingly visible place in US strategic calculations — particularly after its war with Iran in March — has been viewed with caution in Delhi. From hosting the initial rounds of US-Iran talks to becoming a signatory to the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding”, Pakistan’s growing role in American diplomacy is viewed by policy analysts in Delhi as a major source of irritation.

Way forward for Delhi

A shift in US strategy towards India, particularly under the new Trump administration, underscores the need for New Delhi to strengthen its own capacities and capabilities. But this change in Washington should not be viewed in isolation.

The backdrop of a global churn from Asia to Europe and the Middle East to the Americas must be viewed as a pressing call for India — a major regional power in Asia, the world’s 5th largest economy and leading military power — to achieve a sustainable balance of power in the region; second, narrow the GDP gap with the world’s top two economies; and third, utilise its “young nation” potential as a strategic asset. It is there that building skills, innovation capacity, advanced manufacturing and technology partnerships would become an asset for the country’s youth, rather than having the latter be shocked by changes in the US visa rules.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the author’s current or past affiliations in any form.

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