Cheng Li-wun’s China visit: A test of the KMT itself

Cheng Li-wun, chair of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), has set off on a visit to mainland China, with reports suggesting she may meet Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing on 10 April. This could mark the first meeting in a decade between the incumbent leaders of the KMT and the CCP, following Hung Hsiu-chu in 2016. 

The trip signals not only a consolidation of Cheng’s political identity but also a clear declaration of her policy direction.

In April 2005, then KMT chair Lien Chan undertook a “journey of peace” to the mainland as leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party, meeting with then CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao. At the time, Cheng — formerly a member of the Democratic Progressive Party — had just joined the KMT and served as spokesperson for the trip. Today, she stands at the centre of attention herself.

Public perceptions of Cheng have largely centred on her sharp debating style, forceful rhetoric and a career path within the KMT that has not entirely followed traditional lines.

Thus, if she meets Xi in her capacity as party chair, the outcome would not only be media coverage — it would represent a formal political symbol, placing her within the lineage of cross-strait interactions between KMT and CCP leaders. For a chair still consolidating her authority within the party, this carries considerable weight.

For this reason, the visit should not be viewed solely through the lens of cross-strait relations; it also has implications for the KMT’s internal power structure, resource allocation and electoral strategy.

Whether the party chair can command the discourse on cross-strait relations has always been a crucial factor in determining whether a KMT leader can firmly hold their position.

Aside from Lien, KMT chairs who have visited the mainland or engaged with senior CCP figures include Eric Chu who met Xi in Beijing in 2015 and the aforementioned Hung who did so in 2016.

However, Lien was the first highest-level KMT leader to set foot on the mainland after both sides of the Taiwan Strait were ruled separately in 1949. Meanwhile, former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou became the first Taiwanese leader to meet a mainland counterpart when he met Xi in Singapore in 2015, marking another milestone in cross-strait relations.

Interestingly, Cheng mentioned only these two highly symbolic figures when referencing the history of KMT-CCP exchanges ahead of her trip.

Meanwhile, Chang Jung-kung — now a KMT vice-chair and a key architect of Lien’s 2005 visit — has repeatedly stressed that the arrangements for this invitation mirror those of the “Lien-Hu meeting” in both protocol and wording, reflecting goodwill, parity and dignity. Such remarks not only serve to endorse Beijing’s form of invitation, but also to help shape Cheng’s place in history.

However, it is no longer 2005, when cross-strait relations were only just emerging from a prolonged deadlock, and the “journey of peace” carried the historic significance of breaking the ice. Two decades on, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is far more sensitive: language praised in Beijing may prove politically toxic in Taiwan, while rhetoric tailored to Taiwanese public opinion could provoke backlash on the mainland.

On the eve of Cheng’s visit to the mainland, Lien Sheng‑wen, another KMT vice-chair, also took to Facebook to recall his father Lien Chan’s “journey of peace”, stressing the need to speak and act with caution, to plan before moving and to remain composed under immense pressure. While these words sound like the passing on of experience, they are in fact also a reminder to Cheng.

Judging from Cheng’s recent remarks, she too knows that if she is to continue down this path, goodwill gestures towards Beijing alone would not suffice.

In an interview with US media, she stressed that improving cross-strait relations while deepening Taiwan-US cooperation can happen concurrently, arguing that Taiwan should not be a flashpoint, but an important force for regional peace. She also expressed support for necessary defence spending and military cooperation with the US, but insisted that arms purchase budgets must still be reviewed in a transparent fashion and undergo due process.

This is the most noteworthy aspect of Cheng’s approach. For years, the KMT’s difficulty on cross-strait issues has not been a lack of stance, but its inability to convince centrist voters that their positions can coexist with current international realities, security anxieties and Taiwanese identity. Whenever the Blue camp appears to move closer to Beijing, societal instinct immediately asks: what happens to Taiwan’s relationship with the US, and where does Taiwan’s sense of security fit in?

Cheng clearly wants to answer these questions. Before her trip, she repeatedly emphasised “peace and stability” and the idea that cross-strait ties and Taiwan-US relations could proceed in tandem and need not be in opposition. She is trying to persuade society that the KMT has the ability to walk a balanced path, one that could be better at reducing risk amid the current climate. 

There is indeed a political timing to raising such arguments now. With war raging in the Middle East, how the US allocates its strategic resources is closely watched in Taiwan. As the outside world grows more turbulent, calls to “hedge risk”, “cool tensions” and “leave room to manoeuvre” resonate more easily.

However, Cheng’s pre-departure comments that “the whole world adheres to the ‘one China’ policy” closely echoed Beijing’s recent talking points on Taiwan. While such language may win goodwill and applause on the mainland, it easily arouses suspicion in Taiwan. Under the magnifying glass of Taiwan’s electoral politics, any wording seen as too friendly to Beijing would quickly become an opening for opponents to attack.

Thus, Cheng’s mainland visit is ultimately a test of the KMT itself: can the party, in today’s Taiwan, put forward a new approach that allows dialogue with Beijing while reassuring Taiwanese society, take into account security as well as peace, and is in line with reality yet still maintains political boundaries?

Cheng has stepped onto the stage, and the test has already begun. Whether a path can truly be forged now depends on what she brings back — and whether it is able to withstand the scrutiny of Taiwan’s voters.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “郑丽文路线测试登场”.

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