Control the oil, shape the world: Trump’s disruptive diplomacy and the risks for Taiwan

Donald Trump’s election as US president at the end of 2024 has left people around the world anxious about what lies ahead. In particular, his highly idiosyncratic style and decision-making have shocked the world; from diplomatic issues to fluctuating tariffs, governments have been left scrambling to respond. Yet, his unconventional approach to negotiation has prompted widespread curiosity about the logic and strategy guiding his decisions.

As a property mogul, Trump is already the subject of numerous books and interviews from his business career, and many politicians and officials have written about their experiences working with him during his first term. While some of this material is inevitably coloured by personal grudges or biases, it still offers valuable insights into his decision-making style, personality traits and distinctive approach to management.

Perhaps shaped by his background, Trump has a distinctive approach to geopolitics, and many of his actions after taking office can be understood through this lens. Early in his second term, he made comments about the Panama Canal. Later, from issues involving Greenland and Arctic sea routes to the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and the US campaign against Iran in early 2026, his focus on geostrategy has been consistently evident.

Take the attack on Iran. While it was aimed at the Middle East and energy issues, a geopolitical reading yields a different perspective. In geopolitics, Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory has long occupied an important position — later theorists such as Nicholas Spykman argued that control of the Middle East allows one to sever or connect Eurasia and Africa, shaping trade and military movement across the World Island (Europe and Asia).

The Middle East is one of the most important parts of the Rimland (a belt of nations stretching from France and Germany across the Middle East, to India and China) surrounding this core, and plays a decisive part in controlling the world’s fate. Such ideas profoundly influenced the Axis powers in World War II, as well as the US-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War, both of which revolved around the region. Trump, who is keenly aware of geostrategy, is naturally familiar with this.

At China’s military parade on 3 September 2025, China, Russia and North Korea stood together, with Xi Jinping flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. Add Iran, and it forms a line stretching from the Heartland to the Rimland, not only controlling energy but giving these four states a dominant geostrategic position. Even with its maritime supremacy, it would not be easy for the US to counter such a new axis. 

Since the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 1980s, Iran has been a key backer of anti-US and anti-Israel militant groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. For the US, the purpose of its latest military action against Iran is to reshape the Middle East’s geostrategic and international order so that Iran is no longer a major latent threat to the US and Israel. It is also a forward deployment in its strategy against China, seeking to head off deeper military cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. In recent years, joint drills such as “Exercise of Peace Will 2026” and the “Maritime Security Belt” naval exercises have underlined the growing military ties among China, Russia and Iran. All this reflects US efforts at geostrategic defence.

Trump has shown in many interviews that he does not do tradition, or traditional diplomacy. In a 1990 Playboy interview, he discussed tariffs, but for Trump, tariff hikes are just a ploy, while tariffs are just a means to force the other side to the negotiating table. The important thing is the exchange of interests during talks and, for Trump, his grand strategy for the future of the US.

Tariffs are not merely a matter of international trade; they are intertwined with diplomatic, military, and technological considerations, serving as leverage in negotiations. So, Trump’s tariff war cannot be understood purely through the lens of bilateral trade; it must be assessed holistically, taking into account his decision-making style, US national security interests and political calculations, to interpret and respond to it accurately.

It is also important to note that Trump is not shy to use military force to signal resolve. He has not hesitated to launch cruise missile strikes on Yemen’s Houthi movement, and in early 2026, he deployed special forces and air power to attack Venezuela and bring Maduro back to the US to stand trial. Beyond the purported issue of drugs, there were clear strategic implications for the US in terms of oil. 

Taken with the February 2026 strikes on Iran, one can better understand Trump’s focus on energy. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, the oil valve of the Persian Gulf, and US military action is to ensure Iran does not remain a source of regional instability or a key backer of anti-Israel forces. If at the same time the theocratic regime is toppled and US companies come to dominate Iranian and Gulf oil, along with the previous action in Venezuela, the US would effectively control most of the world’s oil supply, naturally giving it absolute global influence.

These military operations show that Chinese and Russian air defence systems face integration problems and do not work. In the Iran conflict, US forces would still take some losses, and cannot defend against harassment by Iranian drone strikes on key infrastructure. However, in terms of weapons integration, it is undeniable that Chinese arms sold to Venezuela and Iran are ineffective, which might also be linked to Beijing’s recent anti-corruption purge in the military-industrial system.

It is possible that a lot of equipment in these arms deals seems to be very different from the original specifications, with major issues in terms of their function and value. In particular, during the US raid on Venezuela, Chinese-made equipment and radars did not function. Does this mean US electronic warfare technology has a handle on Chinese electronic signatures? These are likely among Beijing’s most pressing concerns.

The biggest variable for security in the Taiwan Strait lies in how the Trump-Xi summit will play out. Due to the situation in the Middle East, Trump has officially postponed the meeting, originally scheduled for late March or early April, by a month. Many see this as an attempt to pressure Xi to send Chinese forces to help secure the Strait of Hormuz and contribute in terms of the Middle East. 

While the fact that the summit was delayed rather than cancelled shows that both sides still want leader-to-leader diplomacy, the war in the Middle East remains a major uncertainty for the Trump-Xi meeting. Beijing may opt to wait and see, assessing whether the US economy can withstand the shock of a Middle East conflict, how the American public responds to Trump’s frequent use of force, and the overall state of US national defence. Taken together, this suggests that China stands to lose nothing by prolonging the timeline.

Regarding Taiwan’s security, the key point to watch is that, in anticipation of a Trump–Xi meeting, China postponed large-scale military exercises in the first half of the year to avoid complications ahead of the talks. However, with the conclusion of the Two Sessions and the summit now pushed to late April or early May, the CCP may resume its large-scale drills as before, signalling to the US that any attempt to use the delay to pressure China could be met with the continuation of regularly scheduled exercises around Taiwan.

While there is no one in the current top leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC) with deep operational military expertise, looking back to 2022, He Weidong led the large-scale exercises from the joint operations command centre following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, and was promoted to CMC vice-chair at the 20th Party Congress in autumn of that year. In light of this timeline, it is worth considering whether Beijing will fill vacant positions in the CMC at the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Party Congress later this year, with large‑scale exercises around Taiwan similarly serving as a litmus test for generals such as Han Shengyan of the Central Theatre Command and Yang Zhibin of the Eastern Theatre Command. All this will increase the pressure Taiwan faces from the PLA. 

At the same time, movements of US forces along the first island chain may not immediately change its defence posture, but from Beijing’s perspective, there could be an opportunity to exploit any gaps and—possibly in coordination with North Korean missile tests—conduct large-scale exercises around Taiwan in April.

At the same time, movements of US forces along the first island chain may not immediately alter their overall defence strength and capabilities, but from Beijing’s perspective, there could be an opportunity to exploit any gaps and — possibly in coordination with North Korean missile tests — conduct large-scale exercises around Taiwan in April? This is worth watching.

Related: Taiwan in the shadow of a Trump-China deal | Is Trump a disrupter or a stabiliser in US-China relations?