How shifting powers in Washington will rattle US allies and rivals

(Edited and refined by Bai Kelei, with the assistance of AI translation.)

A blue tsunami, a Waterloo, a rout, dominoes falling…

Political observers had long foreseen that US President Donald Trump and his Republican Party would suffer badly in these congressional midterm elections. But few predicted a defeat quite so crushing.

The Democrats look set to secure around 255 seats in the House of Representatives, well above the 218 needed for control. In the Senate, deep-red Republican strongholds fell one after another: Kansas elected its first Democratic senator since 1932, while a bellwether Senate seat in South Carolina flipped from red to blue for the first time in years. Texas delivered an even more stunning result by electing its first Democratic governor in more than 30 years. The “blue tsunami” also brought in a series of electoral records, including the simultaneous election of five black governors, the first black female governor in US history and the first Muslim senator.

American voters used their ballots to punish Trump and his supporters, driven less by ideology than by the pain they felt in their daily lives. Soaring prices were the main issue, compounded by the protracted US-Iran war. Other controversies also came home to roost: Trump’s heavy-handed expulsion of immigrants, his dismissal of hundreds of thousands of federal employees, the sharp increase in his personal and family wealth, and the poor public image of some Republican candidates.

This extraordinary electoral tsunami has inspired plenty of inventive commentary. One joke ran: “Breaking news! Iran has successfully brought about regime change in the US!” Some media outlets also described the election results as American voters unleashing their “epic fury”.

Allies brace for unpredictable Washington

Now, politicians and tech titans who once rallied behind Trump must work out how to pick up the pieces. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth is seen as the likely first sacrificial lamb. With their long-term political careers in mind, Vice-President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are also expected to recalibrate their distance from Trump, with Vance already doing so.

Yet this Waterloo for the mercurial Trump does not mean the rest of the world can breathe a sigh of relief. A redistribution of power in Washington will not necessarily make US foreign policy more predictable. Gulf states are deeply worried that with Trump’s power significantly weakened, even if a US-Iran peace agreement is reached, its durability will be uncertain. Neither maintaining the status quo nor escalating the war can break the deadlock, and the situation could become more volatile.

Europe has little reason for optimism either. If Gulf states question how much the “president’s will” can achieve, Europeans might ask how useful congressional support will be, and how far it will translate into executive decisions. The Democrats are clearly more supportive of Ukraine, but Trump can still use his presidential powers to block military aid to Kyiv. A change in control of Congress does not mean the Russia-Ukraine war will end any sooner and Europe’s security and energy anxieties remain difficult to resolve. There are also concerns that Trump, with his penchant for political theatre, may seek a new stage abroad as his room for manoeuvre at home narrows. He has already spoken of “taking care of Cuba”, so military intervention there is a possibility.

For South Korea and Japan, Trump’s return to the White House last year brought high tariffs, while the new political landscape brings fresh uncertainties. They know that the president controls US security and foreign policy decisions, and that a Democratic-led Congress will not abandon the US-South Korea or US-Japan alliances. A wholesale shift in the direction of US foreign policy is therefore unlikely. But Trump could intensify pressure on allies such as South Korea to reverse his political setbacks. At the same time, concessions that allies make to please Trump could come to nothing because of congressional constraints. Trump agreed last October to work with South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines, but there has been no substantive progress. Advancing the project will be even harder under a Democratic-controlled Congress.

Many countries will face the diplomatic complexities of dealing with Trump’s America and the Democrats’ America. While US foreign policy is unlikely to change course dramatically, countries will need to guard against agreements being hollowed out or reinterpreted. The costs of engagement and the risks of miscalculation will rise sharply.

Meanwhile, China faces a different set of challenges. In terms of optics, when Chinese President Xi Jinping meets Trump on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Shenzhen in the middle of this month, a lame-duck Trump may appear diminished, highlighting China’s stability. In substance, however, the bigger question is whether the hard-won understandings between the two leaders can endure.

Hedging bets in uncertain world

In May this year, China and the US agreed to build a “constructive strategic stability relationship”. A key premise is that the US respects Beijing’s concerns over the Taiwan Strait and this directly concerns a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan that Trump has yet to approve. Having retaken both the House and the Senate, the Democrats can use their advantage to bargain with Trump and pressure his administration to approve the sale. If that happens, China-US relations could destabilise.

The uncertainty arising from two Americas stems from the possibility of intense institutional infighting. For China and the world, this introduces another layer of complexity. Some European scholars have noted that China has undoubtedly benefited from Trump’s two years in office: its image has generally improved and its international standing appears to have strengthened. Yet fear of China has recently spread from the US to Europe and continues to grow, along with sentiment favouring measures to guard against China.

The “blue tsunami” has demonstrated American democracy’s capacity for self-correction, but tensions within the US have not eased. As the US appears increasingly unreliable, every country faces difficult choices and adjustments. Some will strive to maintain good relations with both China and the US, while others will remain wary of both. For more countries, the pragmatic choice will be to buckle up and accelerate their pursuit of strategic autonomy.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “特朗普惨败世界面对更深不确定性”.

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