Japan and Taiwan’s strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific

In early May, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered a foreign policy speech in Vietnam, unveiling an updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) that builds on the vision first championed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

The updated framework seeks to promote an international order founded on freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the rule of law. It rests on three pillars: building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data including strengthening supply chain resilience for energy and critical materials; co-creation of economic growth opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule sharing, including the expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); and enhancing cooperation in the field of security to ensure regional peace and stability, with a particular focus on maritime and cyber security.

The updated FOIP places particular emphasis on economic security and supply chain resilience, reflecting the reality that both the US and China are increasingly using economic tools in pursuit of national security objectives. Japan believes that, while upholding a free and open international order, it must also strengthen cooperation with allies and like-minded partners to enhance its own strategic autonomy and resilience.

The Takaichi administration has actively advanced its Indo-Pacific diplomacy on the basis of this vision. At the leaders’ level alone, since May, Japan has reached an understanding with Vietnam on cooperation in crude oil procurement; concluded agreements with Australia on critical minerals and resilient energy supply chains; launched cooperation with South Korea centred on strengthening energy security and mutual support in liquefied natural gas (LNG); agreed with the Philippines to reinforce maritime security cooperation; and confirmed with Malaysia and Laos that they will deepen collaboration in energy, resource security and maritime security. In early July, Takaichi visited India, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation in economic security, energy security and private-sector investment.

Taiwan’s willingness to work with Japan

Taiwan has long hoped to strengthen cooperation with Japan’s FOIP initiative, and the Lai Ching-te administration has responded positively to the updated FOIP. On 9 June, Lai delivered a video address to a forum organised in Tokyo by National Chengchi University’s Shinzo Abe Research Centre. He said that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s FOIP vision, together with his oft-quoted remark that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency”, had heightened international attention to peace in the Indo-Pacific and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The Lai administration has proposed a strategy of “integrated diplomacy”, representing a further evolution of the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s policy of “steadfast diplomacy”. The latter sought to uphold Taiwan’s principles while avoiding unnecessarily provoking China, placing particular emphasis on practical cooperation with like-minded countries. Integrated diplomacy goes a step further by stressing “values diplomacy” centred on freedom and democracy, leveraging Taiwan’s industrial capabilities and technological strengths to deepen cooperation with like-minded partners. It also emphasises Taiwan’s role as an important force for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and as a model of freedom and democracy.

Matching interests

Although Taiwan has yet to formally adopt its own Indo-Pacific strategy, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation — a think tank established during the Tsai administration to advance the New Southbound Policy — published Taiwan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy last autumn. The initiative proposes four interconnected networks: a security resilience chain, a democratic values chain, a non-red supply chain, and a friendship and mutual benefit chain. It recommends further developing the New Southbound Policy into a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy and deepening cooperation with partner countries across these areas.

Policy developments in both Japan and Taiwan dovetail in their strategic interests across the Indo-Pacific. From Japan’s updated FOIP with its emphasis on resilient supply chains, rules-based economic prosperity, maritime security and cybersecurity, to Taiwan’s own initiatives, both share similar values and are strong in industrial and technological capabilities. This makes Taiwan an important practical partner for Japan in advancing its Indo-Pacific agenda. Both sides also believe that, while ensuring continued engagement by the Trump administration in Indo-Pacific affairs, it is equally important to strengthen cooperation among like-minded countries within the region.

Naturally, Japan and Taiwan should seek to avoid unnecessarily provoking China as they deepen cooperation. Nevertheless, many of these areas of collaboration can be pursued within the framework of unofficial economic, trade and cultural exchanges. As demonstrated by the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) — launched by the US and Taiwan in 2015 and which Japan joined in 2019 — practical cooperation should be further expanded to Southeast Asia and Oceania.

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