A new foreign minister, but who really calls the shots in Indonesia?

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has reshuffled his cabinet several times in less than two years in office, and the latest reshuffle on 1 October could have some implications for Indonesian foreign policy. However, this does not mean that Prabowo will relinquish control over foreign affairs, but rather that the foreign ministry will now be headed by a career diplomat.

Replacing Foreign Minister Sugiono is 54-year-old Arrmanatha C. Nasir, a graduate of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta who also pursued further studies at two universities in the UK. A seasoned diplomat, he has served as Indonesia’s ambassador to France and the United Nations, as well as spokesperson for the Indonesian foreign ministry. Before his appointment as foreign minister, he was one of Indonesia’s three deputy foreign ministers. Indonesian observers believe that the career diplomat could steer the country’s foreign policy back towards its traditional course, potentially adjusting not only its Middle East policy but also its approach to managing relations with China and the US.

This article will focus on two issues: Indonesia’s relationship with ASEAN, and its relationship with China, particularly the South China Sea issue.

What is ASEAN to Indonesia?

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by five countries, including Indonesia. Since Suharto came to power, ASEAN has been a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Although Suharto also sought to exert influence on the wider international stage in the later years of his presidency, ASEAN always held a special place in his thinking. His contributions to the organisation’s growth and development were considerable.

Some believe this was related to Suharto’s approach to appointing officials. He placed considerable trust in career diplomats within the Indonesian foreign ministry. From Adam Malik and Mochtar Kusumaatmadja to Ali Alatas, all were accomplished diplomats. After Suharto’s fall, the foreign ministers who served under presidents B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo were also career diplomats. All attached considerable importance to ASEAN, effectively continuing the diplomatic tradition established during the Suharto era.

However, upon becoming president, Prabowo concentrated foreign policy decision-making firmly in his own hands and appointed Sugiono — a trusted member of his political party — as foreign minister. Sugiono was not a career diplomat and may not have fully appreciated ASEAN’s importance to Indonesia.

Prabowo himself has considerable political ambitions. He believes that Indonesia is a major Asian power that must play an important role on the international stage, and he appears to regard ASEAN as a constraint on Indonesia’s great-power ambitions, without fully recognising that Indonesia can still exercise leadership within the regional organisation. In fact, ASEAN’s stability and development are highly beneficial to consolidating Indonesia’s regional standing.

Some observers therefore hope that Indonesia’s new foreign minister will be able to persuade Prabowo to place renewed emphasis on ASEAN. Next year, Indonesia is due to assume the post of ASEAN secretary-general, while Singapore will take over the rotating ASEAN chairmanship. If the two countries can continue working together as they have in the past, it would greatly benefit regional stability.

China-Indonesia relations

Relations between Indonesia and China have steadily improved since Megawati became president. Under President Yudhoyono, bilateral relations developed further, with the two countries establishing a strategic partnership and deepening cooperation throughout his ten years in office. Relations also improved under Jokowi. Upon taking office, Prabowo declared that he would continue Jokowi’s China-friendly policy and hoped to further deepen cooperation between Indonesia and China.

Indonesia pursues a “free and active” (bebas aktif) foreign policy, seeking to strike a balance between China and the US to safeguard its national interests. China has become Indonesia’s largest economic and trading partner, while the US remains its most important partner in defence and security.

However, the international landscape has changed significantly since Prabowo came to power. With his military background, Prabowo is keen to develop Indonesia’s partnership with China while maintaining close military cooperation with the US. Nevertheless, given the realities of the strategic environment, there appears to have been no fundamental change in Indonesia’s relations with either country.

In late August this year, Indonesia and China announced the establishment of a new comprehensive dialogue partnership. Although the two countries have made some progress in military and security cooperation, including joint maritime activities, plans to establish an Indonesian-Chinese arms production facility in Indonesia, and efforts to further deepen military cooperation, these initiatives remain in the planning stages. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s military and security cooperation with the US and other Western countries has seen no significant changes.

A problematic joint statement

Of particular note is the Indonesia-China joint statement issued in November 2024. Prabowo, who had only recently taken office, was leading a delegation on a visit to China. Unexpectedly, the two countries issued a joint statement, which was published in English by the Chinese foreign ministry but not released by its Indonesian counterpart. The most striking passage stated: “The two sides reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims…”

However, the Indonesian foreign ministry did not directly accuse the Chinese foreign ministry of issuing an erroneous statement. Instead, it merely pointed out that the joint statement did not specify the locations of the purported overlapping claims. The Indonesian foreign ministry subsequently stated that Indonesia and China had not undertaken any “joint development” in the so-called “areas of overlapping claims”.

What the joint statement signals

Observers have offered two main interpretations of the Indonesia-China joint statement.

The first holds that Prabowo proposed this “compromise” at the time to make concessions to China and improve bilateral relations. However, because the statement did not identify any specific locations or contain detailed implementation provisions, the arrangement would be difficult to put into practice. According to this interpretation, Indonesia had ostensibly agreed to cooperate with China, but in reality, no joint development projects could ever materialise. It was merely a play on words that raised China’s hopes for nothing. The implication is that this represented a diplomatic victory for Indonesia.

Yet this interpretation does not change one fact: the Indonesian foreign ministry neither denied the existence of the joint statement nor repudiated its reference to joint development. Indonesia and China did indeed formally express their intention to pursue joint development in the so-called “areas of overlapping claims”. In other words, the statement signed by Prabowo has already created an important diplomatic record that lends support to China’s nine-dash line claim.

Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law at the University of Indonesia, has pointed out that the Indonesia-China reference to “areas of overlapping claims” could undermine the interests of ASEAN countries involved in maritime disputes with China, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. It could also affect Indonesia’s claims to sovereignty and maritime rights in the North Natuna Sea.

The second interpretation is that the episode was a diplomatic blunder rather than a reflection of Indonesia’s original policy intentions. Proponents of this view argue that the problem lay with the foreign minister, who was not a career diplomat and was unfamiliar with both Indonesia’s diplomatic history and its longstanding refusal to recognise China’s nine-dash line. Had a career diplomat been serving as foreign minister at the time, the wording concerning “joint development in areas of overlapping claims” would never have been accepted. With a career diplomat now heading the foreign ministry, similar diplomatic mistakes could be avoided, and Indonesian foreign policy could return to its traditional course. Hikmahanto subscribes to this view.

However, I disagree with the interpretation that places the blame on the foreign minister. While Sugiono is a young member of Prabowo’s political party and not a career diplomat, that does not mean the November 2024 joint statement was merely a mistake on the foreign minister’s part. The foreign minister was not the ultimate decision-maker; Prabowo was. I suspect that Prabowo personally approved the statement. The crux of the matter is not whether his foreign minister was familiar with Indonesia’s diplomatic history, but how Prabowo himself understood the statement and why he believed there was nothing wrong with its wording.

Prabowo is neither a lawyer nor a career diplomat. He may have assumed that as long as the joint development arrangement could not be implemented in practice, Indonesia could simply choose not to act on it in future, as though nothing had happened, and revert to its original position. This thinking bears some resemblance to US President Donald Trump’s approach to certain policy issues: make a decision first, and leave questions about whether it can be implemented or subsequently changed for another day.

Diplomacy can be tricky

However, diplomacy is not that simple. A formally signed joint statement does not automatically lose its historical significance simply because the arrangements it sets out are never implemented. It is plain to see that Prabowo made a diplomatic mistake in this instance. To date, he has not publicly acknowledged that the statement was wrong and needed to be corrected. We therefore cannot pretend that the statement never existed simply because the Indonesian foreign ministry subsequently issued clarifications, much less shift all responsibility onto his foreign minister.

In my view, the November 2024 Indonesia-China joint statement has already become part of the formal diplomatic record between the two countries. The reference to “joint development in areas of overlapping claims” means that Prabowo accepted a framework closely associated with China’s nine-dash line claim. In diplomatic terms, this amounts to recognising China’s nine-dash line. Even if Indonesia never proceeds with any joint development projects, that decision will not simply disappear from diplomatic history. The historical record documents not only what two countries ultimately did, but also what their leaders formally agreed to.

Prabowo remains highly active in foreign affairs. Whether Indonesia’s regional diplomacy can return to its traditional course is not something a career diplomat can determine alone, as the president continues to wield the greatest decision-making authority. Whether the new foreign minister can influence Prabowo’s diplomatic judgement will depend on the president’s willingness to listen to his advice. For now, it is probably too early to conclude that Indonesian foreign policy is set to return to its traditional course.

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