Bilahari Kausikan: Understanding and dealing with volatility

Discussing Ukraine, US-China relations and the wars in the Middle East, former Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan shares his views on how to think about foreign policy in a keynote address at the 2026 Petroleum and Energy Institute of Thailand (PEIT) Annual Dinner in Bangkok on 9 November. He also gives his reading of how the US midterm election results, which many see as weakening President Donald Trump, might — or might not — change the political landscape. This is an edited version of the transcript.

17 Nov 2026

Politics

This combination of pictures shows (left to right) Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 30 October 2026, US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on 28 September 2026 and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 11 November 2026.
This combination of pictures shows (left to right) Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 30 October 2026, US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on 28 September 2026 and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 11 November 2026. (Pool/AFP)

Foreign policy was once the Game of Kings or of small elites. But in any 21st century democratic society, foreign policy must rest on a foundation of broad public support. This is not necessarily a bad thing provided politics can stop at water’s edge; that is to say, domestic politics should ideally be kept out of foreign policy. But this is an ideal almost everywhere, more honoured by its breach than its observance. It is only the exceptional politician that can resist the temptation to use foreign policy for advantage. In my own country, the phenomenon is not unknown, particularly in the opposition. 

Public interest in foreign policy and its desire to have its voice heard is not necessarily matched by adequate understanding of foreign policy. You could call this “foreign policy illiteracy” which, to some degree, affects all countries. The consequence is a certain naivete in many public discussions of foreign policy and geopolitics in every country. This can conscribe a government’s freedom to manoeuvre as it deals with an increasingly complex and volatile international environment. It makes us vulnerable to domestic and foreign hucksters peddling snake oil. 

Cold-blooded understanding of world events

I have entitled my talk “Understanding and Dealing with Volatility”. The starting point must be a clear and clinical — indeed cold-blooded — understanding of what we are facing. I am going to talk about Ukraine, US-China relations and the wars in the Middle East. But I am not trying to tell you what to think about any of these issues. You can take my opinions on these issues as you please. I am going to use them only to illustrate what I consider the three most common mistakes in public discussions on foreign policy in every country. My goal is to try to persuade you to adopt a particular mode of thought: how to think, not what to think. 

I thank the Petroleum and Energy Institute of Thailand for giving me the opportunity to do so. I hope you do not conclude after listening to me that it was an act of reckless folly. I must also remind you that although I spent many years in my country’s foreign service, the only official title I now hold is that of a pensioner. 

What I have to say applies to all countries. But let’s begin by telling you what our first, and in my opinion, our greatest foreign minister, Mr S Rajaratnam, one of those who signed the Bangkok Declaration forming ASEAN, had to say about foreign policy. What every subsequent Singapore foreign minister has to say on our foreign policy is often only a commentary on or update to Mr Rajaratnam’s insights. Mr Rajaratnam once pointed out that every country has two foreign policies: a foreign policy of words or theology in which all countries always stand for the highest and most noble of ideals and principles, and a foreign policy of deeds, which is what countries need to do to survive in what he called a “jungle world” in which ideals and principles oftentimes have to bow to contingency. In other words, practical diplomacy. The distinction between words and deeds is not absolute. Mr Rajaratnam acknowledged that we need both types of foreign policy. But he also stressed that to confuse them is suicidal. 

Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam (right) at the historic meeting in Bangkok to sign the founding of ASEAN declaration on 8 August 1967, together with (from left) Foreign Ministers Narciso Ramos of the Philippines, Adam Malik of Indonesia, Thanat Khoman of Thailand and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia.
Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam (right) at the historic meeting in Bangkok to sign the founding of ASEAN declaration on 8 August 1967, together with (from left) Foreign Ministers Narciso Ramos of the Philippines, Adam Malik of Indonesia, Thanat Khoman of Thailand and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia. (ST Library/SPH Media)

Singapore leaders and our government are perhaps franker than most leaders and governments in their statements on foreign policy. But it is in the nature of things that public statements by all politicians and all governments — ours included — tend to approach harsh realities only obliquely and tend towards the theological. Facile diplomats of every country become so accustomed to wearing the mask of theology that they often forget where reality begins.  

Three common mistakes: foreign policy and geopolitics talk

Bearing in mind the crucial distinction between theology and diplomacy, the three most common mistakes in public discussions on foreign policy and geopolitics — the three most serious symptoms of foreign policy illiteracy — are: 

First, confusing our opinions with facts. This is particularly harmful because more often than not, our opinions are shaped by emotion rather than reason. A variant of this is believing that just because something is good for us — in our country’s interest — it is or ought to be good for everyone; in every country’s interest. Modern technologies, in particular social media and AI, accentuate the problem.  

Second, focusing on events with insufficient attention to the processes and structural factors from which all events necessarily arise. This leads to a loss of perspective. This can accentuate volatility as we over-react or under-react to events and then correct our responses and correct our corrections in a cycle of actions and reactions. A sense of perspective cannot eliminate volatility but can at least limit the range of oscillations. 

Third, reducing dynamic and complex realities into static and simplistic binaries.  Although we often use them as if they are synonyms, the complicated and the complex do not mean exactly the same thing. The difference is that between objective realities, for example the law of gravity, which is complicated, but are usually static or limited in their range of implications — the apple can only fall downwards. But there are also socially constructed realities which consist of complex feedback loops which in principle, open up an infinite and continually evolving kaleidoscope of possibilities. In other words, not all facts have the same status, even if we do not confuse them with opinion. All social systems including the international system are socially constructed realities.  

All this is rather abstract. So, now to illustrations.  

A screen promoting the United Russia party ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election stands in front of residential buildings bearing murals of Soviet military commanders in Simferopol, Crimea, on 15 September 2026.
A screen promoting the United Russia party ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election stands in front of residential buildings bearing murals of Soviet military commanders in Simferopol, Crimea, on 15 September 2026. (Alexey Pavlishak/Reuters)

In 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, then Secretary of State John Kerry famously called this 19th century behaviour in the 21st century. There are many excellent reasons to criticise Russian actions against Ukraine which pose global challenges, but Mr Kerry’s statement was absurd. It was absurd because it assumed that your adversary should share your values or your idea of international order. But if your adversary shared your ideas and values, it would not be your adversary in the first place.  

Mr Kerry’s mistake was to assume that his ideas and values had an objective or autonomous reality that all should recognise regardless of the contingencies of their interests and circumstances. These confusions, which were not confined to Mr Kerry but were widespread throughout the West, played no small role in the ineffectual response to the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas which emboldened Russia and led to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later in 2022. 

Similar confusions underlay Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech in Davos in January this year (2026) when he called on middle powers who shared similar values to work together to uphold an international order that he said had “ruptured” because the US, under Mr Donald Trump, was no longer willing to uphold it. Mr Carney’s speech was widely acclaimed, but in fact his argument was banal. Many countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, ironically, including Canada, had already been doing what he advocated without the melodrama of evoking the world crumbling about their ears. More importantly, Mr Carney’s argument also contained a fundamental internal contradiction.  

International cooperation needs a foundation of stability

Of course, all powers that share interests or values — the distinction is not absolute because some values are interests — ought to work more together. But international cooperation of any sort needs a foundation of stability to operate, and stability depends on strong deterrence and a balance of power. There is no possible combination of middle powers that can by themselves either deter Russia or balance China, the two powers that challenge international order as Mr Carney envisaged it. A week after Mr Carney’s speech, the secretary-general of NATO, a Dutchman, told the European Parliament to “keep on dreaming” if Europe thought it could defend itself without the US.  

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivers remarks during the 20th Francophonie Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 15 November 2026.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivers remarks during the 20th Francophonie Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 15 November 2026. (Chalinee Thirasupa/Reuters)

Carney’s Davos statement ignored this hard fact. It reflected his distaste for Donald Trump as much as objective analysis. Mr Carney is not alone in allowing dislike for Mr Trump to colour analysis. Too much of what passes for analysis of contemporary international relations is colored by emotional responses to Mr Trump. Mr Trump has indeed been highly disruptive, and I am not saying that he is a nice guy. But we pay far too much attention to his personality and not enough attention to the new structural realities he represents. The American policies and ideas about international order whose “rupture” Mr Carney lamented were an artefact of a particular set of historical circumstances that we call the Cold War. Those circumstances have passed, will not return, and cannot be recreated. Mr Trump is much more a symptom or a catalyst of the changes than the cause. 

Not confusing the exception for the norm

Except for a short, exceptional post-Cold War period of about 20 years after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, American ideas were never uncontested even at the height of the Cold War. More than half of the world disagreed with them or accepted them only partially. Significant groups in American allies, and in the US itself, did not accept them in totality. That short period of apparent unchallenged consensus was extremely beneficial to most of us, Singapore and Thailand included. But that does not make it any less exceptional. Confusing the exceptional for the norm is a variant of the confusion between theology and diplomacy that Mr Rajaratnam referred to. The volatility that we are now experiencing is much closer to the historical 20th century norm and in some ways less dangerous, even if more complex, than what we in Southeast Asia experienced in the latter part of the 20th century after the Second World War.  

Competition between major powers and thus at least the possibility of conflict, are inherent qualities of international relations and never absent. “Order” has more often than not been defined not by consensus, but by contention and efforts to make contention as stable as possible and less dangerous. That is why deterrence and a balance of power is the sine qua non of any sort of regional or global cooperation. The US is an irreplaceable component of every calculus of deterrence and equilibrium almost everywhere in the world. Whether we like or dislike a particular president of the United States is irrelevant because our preferences do not change this reality. Nor do our likes and dislikes change the structural shifts in American politics and international relations that brought Mr Trump to power. 

After the end of the US-Soviet Cold War, the US faced no existential threat anywhere in the world. There is therefore no longer any compelling reason for the US to — in the words of President John F. Kennedy at the height of the Cold War — to bear any burden, pay any price, or fight any foe, to uphold its ideas. This marked a sea-change in how the US defined its interests. For the Americans who twice voted for Mr Trump, it was time to “Put America First”. Mr Trump’s more transactional definition of American national interests represents a reversion to the historical norm of how all states conceive of their interests. Which state does not put itself first? We should not expect anything more than changes in form and presentation from Mr Trump’s successor. 

Should not exaggerate the impact of US midterms

I do not think the capture of both House and Senate by the Democrats in the recent midterm elections is going to substantively change post-Cold War American foreign policy. An election is a typical “event” that invites over-reaction if seen out of perspective. I am not arguing that we should ignore the results. There is certainly going to be more noise and confusion, particularly over the budget. There will be attempts at impeachments of Trump’s cabinet members. But looking through the immediate noise, what real difference is this all going to make to American foreign policy? 

Congressional freshmen of the 120th Congress pose for a group photograph on the steps of the House of Representatives of the US Capitol Building on 12 November 2026 in Washington, DC.
Congressional freshmen of the 120th Congress pose for a group photograph on the steps of the House of Representatives of the US Capitol Building on 12 November 2026 in Washington, DC. (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images via AFP)

While not ignoring the midterms, we should not exaggerate their impact either. Mr Trump is not renowned for his respect for the legislative branch of government. The president has considerable ability to act without congressional approval on foreign policy issues and Mr Trump has already stretched the boundaries of presidential authority. He will certainly veto legislation he finds inconvenient, and the Democrats do not have the two-thirds majority to over-ride presidential vetoes. The mid-term results will soon become yesterday’s headlines, while the structural imperatives that are reshaping US foreign policy — the implications of the end of the Cold War — will prove more compelling and enduring. 

US, China locked in strategic competition for long haul

That is certainly going to be true of US-China relations which will be locked in strategic competition for the foreseeable future. The US and China came together in 1972 after more than 20 years of hostility after 1949 for a very straightforward reason: a mutual enemy in the Soviet Union. When that mutual enemy disappeared, it was inevitable that the natural dynamic of competition between major powers would reassert itself.  

This does not mean that the US and China will entirely abandon engagement. But although there will be periods of high intensity competition and periods of low intensity competition, competition is a structural reality that will not be wished away and will for the foreseeable future, be the dominant dynamic of US-China  relations. We will all just have to learn how to cope with it. This requires clinical clarity of thought about our interests and the strategic environment as well as agility of policy. The foreign policy illiteracy of the general public can dangerously compromise both thought and action.  

While its precise trajectory cannot be predicted, the broad parameters of US-China competition can be outlined. First, it is highly improbable that competition will lead to conflict through a war by design — war as an instrument of policy — whether over Taiwan or because of the so-called “Thucydides Trap”. The key factor here is nuclear deterrence. The fear of mutually assured destruction kept what one scholar called “the long peace” between the US and the Soviet Union, and it will keep the peace between the US and China. The risk is not to resort to war as a policy tool, but of accidents. Even then, both sides will do their best to contain accidents because of the grave risks of nuclear escalation. For third countries, the main risk is becoming proxies for one side or another. 

US-China competition: complex, non-binary

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Second, we should understand US-China competition as a multi-dimensional process across many domains and not let our understanding be overly influenced by any specific development in any particular domain at any point of time. I want to emphasise two concepts: that US-China competition is a process and the multi-dimensional nature of that process. This is particularly important because there is a strong tendency to see US-China competition in stark binary terms and to expect a clear outcome to the competition. This is profoundly misleading.

US President Donald Trump looks at Chinese President Xi Jinping as Xi arrives ahead of a state visit at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, US, on 23 September 2026.
US President Donald Trump looks at Chinese President Xi Jinping as Xi arrives ahead of a state visit at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, US, on 23 September 2026. (Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)

US-China competition is obviously a competition between two powers. Still, it does not follow that their competition is binary. The multi-dimensional nature of the relationship and the deep interdependence between the US and China make it a complex and not binary competition: it is a competition between two essential components of a single system and not a competition between two separate systems, as was the case with US-Soviet competition. Trying to shoehorn the complexity of US-China relations into simplistic binaries such as a “new Cold War”, which is an inappropriate and intellectually lazy metaphor or defining it as a competition between “democracy” and “authoritarianism”, as some in the West are wont to do, focuses on the epiphenomenal rather than the essential. A complex competition of this nature is unlikely to end in a clear dénouement for one side or another.  

In complexity, there is greater opportunity for third countries like Singapore and Thailand to exercise agency. I do not claim that it is going to be easy, but the ever-evolving kaleidoscope of potentialities that I referred to earlier as characteristic of complex systems creates opportunities to exercise agency. Whether we have the wit to recognise the opportunities and the courage to seize them are different matters. But in principle, there is always agency and the opportunity to use it. 

I think both the US and China have understood the long-term and complex nature of their competition, and while not relenting in their efforts to gain advantage over the other, are now increasingly seeking to manage the risks of their competition. That is the meaning of the two summit meetings held earlier this year and the forthcoming meetings at APEC and the G20 in the remaining months of 2026. We should not expect definitive outcomes from any of these meetings or future meetings; they are tools to manage an on-going process of competition — not efforts to end the competition. Advantages for one side or another will vary over time and in different domains. It is not particularly useful for third parties like Singapore or Thailand to characterise a process that has no clear endpoint in stark win-lose terms at any particular stage of the unfolding process. Doing so only risks prematurely foreclosing options and flexibility of manoeuvre.  

For Gulf states, primary strategic challenge is Iran

Now to the Middle East. This is a region which arouses strong passions. It is only human to respond emotionally to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. But that does not justify abandoning reasoned analysis. With the exceptions of the Gulf monarchies, Turkey and Israel, the Middle East is rife with failed, failing and fragile states where violence and human suffering is endemic. We are always selective in what we choose to consider shocking. Why should the perhaps 70,000 dead and two million displaced in Gaza be more horrifying than, say, Syria, where war has caused perhaps 700,000 deaths and six million refugees? And why is violence in the Middle East more horrific than in Africa, where conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan have resulted in perhaps seven million dead collectively?  

A drone view shows residents of Jobar and nearby neighbourhoods gather on a war-damaged street at the Jobar bazaar, which was devastated by years of Syria's conflict, in Damascus, Syria, on 13 November 2026.
A drone view shows residents of Jobar and nearby neighbourhoods gather on a war-damaged street at the Jobar bazaar, which was devastated by years of Syria's conflict, in Damascus, Syria, on 13 November 2026. (Khalil Ashawi/Reuters)

Not every humanitarian crisis is of geopolitical significance. It has been a long time since most Middle Eastern governments, particularly in the Gulf, placed the Palestinian issue high on their strategic priorities. Please note I said governments and referred to their strategic priorities. The peoples of the Gulf states no doubt are as moved by the plight of the Palestinians as anyone. To many Gulf governments, the passions of their peoples make the Palestinian question a domestic issue to be managed. But their primary strategic challenge is Iran and has been for a long time. 

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Gulf monarchies have come to regard Iran as an existential threat for two main reasons. First, the Islamic Revolution was a republican revolution that overthrew an absolute monarchy and posed a direct challenge to the political systems of all Gulf monarchies. Second, the new regime in Tehran claimed leadership of all Muslims and not just the Shia. Given that 85% to 90% Muslims are Sunni, this is a remarkably audacious and essentially revanchist claim that in effect seeks to reverse the Battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali in the 7th century that led to the Sunni-Shia split. This was of particular concern to Saudi Arabia which as the Custodian of the Two Holy Places, enjoyed a special status in the Muslim world.  

Moreover, by 1979, having fought and lost four wars against Israel, most Arab governments had, however reluctantly, reached the conclusion that Israel was irrevocably part of the Middle East. Even though none would have said so in public, prospects for a Palestinian state were fading into a distant and indeterminate future. In 1979, Egypt formally recognised Israel. In 1994, Jordan followed suit. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, support for the Palestinian cause became increasingly pro forma. Some Arab states provided financial and other material support, but for most it was a matter of passing performative resolutions in the UN, Arab League and OIC (Organization for Islamic Cooperation). They provided much more material support to Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s eight-year war against Iran from 1980 to 1988.  

In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein. Iraq descended into instability from which it is unlikely to ever completely recover. This removed the only effective regional check on Iran and fundamentally shifted strategic calculations. The 2011 “Arab Spring” added a new layer of concern to the Gulf monarchies and spurred their efforts to reform themselves to ensure their long-term survival. In this effort, Palestine was useless, whereas Israel’s technology, expertise and links to the West were potentially of great value. Many Gulf monarchies began to develop unofficial links with Israel. The 2020 Abraham Accords only formalised what was already a reality; an American-sponsored anti-Iran alliance in which Israel provided the military weight in return for recognition, de facto or de jure. 

One central question in the Iran war 

This is the background to the current war against Iran. The war did not suddenly appear out of nowhere; nor is it likely to end in any neat or conclusive manner.  Although almost all day-to-day attention focuses on disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, these are actually second order issues. Whether or not you think this war is justified depends on one central question that defines the core issue: should Iran be allowed to have a nuclear weapon?  

Houthi forces take over from Dhubab to Bab el-Mandeb after Saudi-backed forces withdraw from the area, in Taiz Governorate, Yemen, in this still image taken from a handout video released 15 November 2026.
Houthi forces take over from Dhubab to Bab el-Mandeb after Saudi-backed forces withdraw from the area, in Taiz Governorate, Yemen, in this still image taken from a handout video released 15 November 2026. (Houthi Military Media/via Reuters)

The answer of Israel and every US administration of both parties to this question have been a resounding “No”. There was debate only over the best way of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Gulf monarchies and most other Middle Eastern states shared this view, even though they tried to stay out of the limelight and avoid direct involvement. Still, by 2018 Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was publicly saying on American TV that if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would too. I have heard senior Saudi leaders privately express similar sentiments since the early 2000s. 

Framing the issue in terms of the nuclear question changes perspective. Rather than seeing the current war as a discrete event, it is part of a decades-long process that began circa 2002 when credible evidence emerged that the Islamic Republic had a secret nuclear weapons programme. The first phase of the war against Iran began around this time. It was a shadow war fought by assassinations and sabotage that occasionally burst into open conflict against Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Gaza.  

This phase ended on 8 October 2023 when Hezbollah foolishly decided to join Hamas’s 7 October terrorist attack on Israel. It then became well-nigh inevitable that Israel and the US would get into direct conflict with Hezbollah’s sponsor, Iran. The second phase of direct conflict was fought between 13 and 24 June 2025  when Israel and the US attacked Iran. This short second phase ended with an informal ceasefire that Oman tried, unsuccessfully, to turn into a more lasting end to conflict. The third phase started on 28 February 2026 when the US abruptly abandoned Omani-mediated talks and resumed large scale attacks on Iran. The Gulf monarchies could no longer avoid involvement. All Gulf monarchies (as well as Egypt) were attacked by Iran; Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait retaliated by striking back at Iran, while Qatar shot down two Iranian warplanes. 

We are now (9 November 2026) still in the third phase of fighting while talking and talking by fighting, the use of force by both sides being a form of communication. I do not know how or when this phase will end. But we can be reasonably sure of four things: 

First, regardless of how and when the third phase ends, it will almost certainly be followed by subsequent phases of conflict. The only unknowns are when subsequent phases will begin; their duration; whether it will be shadow war or open conflict or some mixture of both; and the nature and extent of the involvement of the US, Israel and the Gulf states. Conflict will continue because once any country decides that it needs nuclear weapons, there is no way to erase the knowledge of how to enrich uranium and build a weapon. You can only delay those ambitions by destroying the physical infrastructure of enrichment and weapons development. Force must be periodically reapplied because Tehran will try to rebuild.  

A surface-to-air missile system displayed at an exhibition of missiles and drones at the National Aerospace Park outside Tehran on 12 November 2026.
A surface-to-air missile system displayed at an exhibition of missiles and drones at the National Aerospace Park outside Tehran on 12 November 2026. (AFP)

Diplomacy has already been proved ineffective. Even if some kind of diplomatic mechanism is put in place, Tehran’s incentive to cheat will be very high because its conventional defences and proxies having proven ineffective, the Islamic Republic’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons for survival has probably been enhanced. Since Tehran probably regards nuclear weapons as an existential necessity, it would be prudent to see any diplomatic agreement in terms of the Shia doctrine of Taqiyya which justifies dissimulation for survival. 

Gulf states cannot count on China or Russia

Second, the Gulf states may not be entirely happy with the US or Israel, but this does not erase their existential concerns about Iran. They will certainly hedge by developing their relationships with, among others, Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan and even Iran itself. But they cannot ignore the fact that Iran’s close relations with Russia and China not only singularly failed to deter the US, but when war broke out, Moscow and Beijing made only token efforts to help Iran and that those efforts had little impact. China clearly prioritised its relationship with the US over helping Tehran by receiving Mr Trump in Beijing even as he was waging war against Iran. The US is clearly the only external power willing and able to use force against Iran and is the only power that can balance Iran. This has underscored the importance of their security relationships with the US and entrenched the American role in Gulf security. It was telling that when Iran’s proxies in Yemen attacked Saudi Arabia, Riyadh did not invoke the Mecca Accord with Pakistan and Turkey or its bilateral defence agreement with Pakistan but appealed to the US. This is a critical vulnerability for Tehran because, as argued above, the war will, in one way or another, continue for the foreseeable future.  

An assumption that the regime in Tehran has probably held since the early 1980s — that its enemies did not have the stomach to directly attack Iran — has been disproven. That assumption may have become Tehran’s operating principle after 1983 when Hezbollah, on Iran’s instructions, carried out a suicide terrorist attack against US Marines in Beirut, killing more than 200 Americans. After token retaliation, the US withdrew from Lebanon. But the Islamic Republic can no longer assume that it is immune from direct attack. American willingness to use force is a lesson that cannot be ignored by any region, and no doubt China has taken note. 

US-Israel war with Iran could intensify

Third, closing the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting traffic in the Bab al-Mandab were tactical successes for Iran and its Houthi proxy. But these were desperate moves — Tehran had no effective counter to the US blockade — and were strategic failures. It deepened and entrenched the Gulf’s mistrust and antagonised the world, including its ally, China. This is a card that can be played at maximum effectivity only once. The Gulf states will rush to build infrastructure to bypass Hormuz and the Red Sea. Other countries, including China, will invest in this too. As subsequent phases of the war unfold over time, this card will be less and less effective. But Tehran will not easily give up its claim of sovereignty over Hormuz, which is another reason for regarding any kind of agreement to end conflict as precarious and at best temporary. 

Workers warm themselves at a construction building, amid a gas shortage, in Tehran, Iran, 14 November 2026.
Workers warm themselves at a construction building, amid a gas shortage, in Tehran, Iran, 14 November 2026. (Majid Asgaripour/West Asia News Agency/via Reuters)

Fourth, the US clearly underestimated the regime’s resilience. But while the Islamic Republic still rules in Tehran, it is a seriously weakened regime. Its defence-industrial capabilities, including its nuclear infrastructure, have been severely degraded, as has its civilian economy. Iran’s economy was failing even before the war. Its leadership has also been degraded, and uncertainty over who in Iran has the authority to conclude a settlement and the clout to enforce it has added to the intrinsic difficulty of concluding any sort of even temporary agreement.

To survive, the regime must preserve a minimally viable economy when the fighting stops. But different groups in Iran probably have different ideas about what constitutes a “minimally viable economy”. The longer the conflict, the weaker the regime becomes. This is another reason for believing that Tehran regards talk primarily as a means to buy a pause in fighting to rebuild. But the Trump administration is not known for its patience. The midterm election results have complicated matters and may cause some delays. But in my view, the probability is still that US-Israeli attacks at some level of intensity will eventually start again because the Iranians will over-read the midterm results and miscalculate, forcing the US's hand or giving the US and Israel a pretext to do so. The Israeli elections will not make much substantive difference regardless of who forms the next Israeli government. 

Ladies & Gentlemen, I will end here and take your questions. Thank you for listening to me so patiently.  I trust I have said enough to illustrate what I mean by adopting a different mode of thought on foreign policy and geopolitics. This mode of thought does not require you to agree with any of my conclusions — different conclusions can well be reached from the same set of facts. But it does require you to regard facts with cold logic free of illusion and emotion; in short, to adopt Mr Rajaratnam’s terminology, not to confuse theology with the realities of practical diplomacy. We all should aspire to noble ideals and dare to dream of them, but analysis and policy should be made during our waking hours.  

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