Why Xi purges his hand-picked officials

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held in Beijing from 26 to 29 October 2026. The Central Committee members adopted a resolution on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance and released a communique on the last day. The fifth plenum focused on “comprehensive and strict governance of the party” as its main agenda, rather than the economic issues discussed at previous fifth plenary sessions. In addition, the meeting also made some important decisions regarding personnel appointments. 

The outcome of this meeting confirmed the speculation of many observers that a large number of officials would be purged. A total of 33 high-ranking officials were expelled from the party, including former Politburo members Ma Xingrui and Zhang Youxia, former Central Military Commission (CMC) member Liu Zhenli, and numerous provincial and ministerial-level officials. At the fourth plenum in 2025, as many as 14 members of the Central Committee were also expelled from the party. If we compare Xi Jinping’s second term (2017-2022) with his third term (2022-present), we can see that 35 Central Committee members were purged in the second term, while the number has already reached 51 in the third term which is not yet over. 

Purging officials installed by Xi

However, the nature of these two groups of cadres is very different. Most of the cadres purged during Xi Jinping’s second term were promoted to Central Committee members during Hu Jintao’s era, but almost all of the cadres expelled from the party during the third term were promoted during Xi’s tenure. Some observers believe this symbolises a challenge to Xi’s power, but this view may warrant further consideration.

Xi Jinping’s purge of his own promoted officials during his third term may not be seen as a sign of his power being unstable. Indeed, Xi dealt with the Central Committee members purged during his second term from a power-struggle perspective, to ensure his own people took over the positions of new Central Committee members. Xi Jinping’s purge of his promoted officials during his third term reflects another authoritarian regime’s governing logic. Xi hopes to continue finding new “enemies” within the party and mobilise cadres to criticise officials who have committed “political errors”. 

Reaffirming firm grip on military power

Only by constantly seeking enemies can Xi instill fear and obedience in more cadres. This is a model of terror, perhaps best described as “governing by fear”. Among all the officials promoted by Xi Jinping, the investigations of military cadres have been the most severe. Given the vast and secretive nature of the military budget, the possibility of massive corruption cases cannot be ruled out. However, another factor may be that Xi Jinping is using this opportunity to personally consolidate his control over the military and purge influential and capable generals like Zhang Youxia.

In other words, the personnel reshuffle results of the fifth plenary session demonstrate Xi Jinping’s firm grip on military power. The election of Zhang Shengmin, vice-chairman of the CMC, as a member of the Politburo was one of the biggest “highlights”. Zhang Shengmin primarily works in the military’s disciplinary inspection system. This suggests that the anti-corruption campaign within the military may continue, and several generals may face further investigation. Furthermore, no other generals were elected as new members of the CMC, particularly those from the combat system, who have been marginalised by high-level politics. 

Fewer Politburo and CMC members possible

Two vacancies remain in the Politburo, which Xi Jinping has not yet filled. The 20th Party Congress in 2022 elected 24 Politburo members, but three were purged. Following the addition of Zhang Shengmin at the fifth plenum, two vacancies remain. Xi Jinping may fill all the positions of Politburo and CMC members at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. However, relevant Party constitutions or regulations do not specify the exact number of Politburo and CMC members. Therefore, at the 21st Party Congress, the CMC may not elect seven members as it did at the 19th or 20th Party Congresses, but may instead do with fewer. This would help Xi Jinping centralise power in military decision-making. The number of Politburo members may also decrease at the 21st National Congress. At the 8th National Congress in 1956 and the 13th National Congress in 1987, there were 17 members (but alternate members were also selected). Therefore, if Xi Jinping wants to further centralise power at the Politburo meetings, he may reduce the number of members. 

Beyond personnel appointments and replacements, this communique also highly praises the “great achievements our Party has made in exercising full and rigorous self-governance in the new era”. Much of the content describes the severe and deeply entrenched problems within the party in the past, such as lax ideology and discipline, and shocking corruption. It claims that Xi Jinping, with his “tremendous political courage”, turned the tide and reversed the fate of the party and the country. This is tantamount to an implicit criticism of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s reforms and partial liberalisation, which effectively weakened the party’s ruling foundation. 

From Mao to Xi

Furthermore, the communique mentioned that the “people’s oversight over government and the Party’s self-reform” are the foundations for the CCP to break free from the historical cycle of rise and fall and for the party to maintain its long-term rule. “People’s oversight over government” is a quote from Mao Zedong’s speech in Yan’an in 1945, while “Party’s self-reform” is a concept Xi Jinping “invented” after taking power. This once again compares Xi Jinping’s historical achievements to Mao Zedong’s, thereby enhancing Xi’s legitimacy and preparing for his continued rule at the 21st Party Congress.  

Overall, this plenary session is being held only about a year before the 21st National Party Congress in 2027. This session can be seen as a “prelude” to Xi Jinping’s preparations for re-election at the 21st National Congress and his pursuit of a fourth term. The CCP attributes all the achievements of its comprehensive and strict governance of the party to Xi Jinping, attributing its great contributions to strengthening the party and the country. 

The CCP intentionally downplays or even erases the political and economic developments during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, portraying Xi Jinping as a historical figure who turned the tide. In fact, much of Xi Jinping’s current governing capital is based on the development and reforms of the Jiang and Hu eras. The result of this approach is an involutional political system, aiming to create a mechanism devoid of any other “dissenting voices” and completely losing oversight and checks and balances.

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