Purged generals, flying missiles: China’s military paradox

(Edited and refined by Candice Chan and Grace Chong, with the assistance of AI translation.)

As a growing number of senior Chinese military officers have been brought down in Beijing’s relentless anti-corruption campaign, with corruption scandals repeatedly surfacing in the Equipment Development Department and the defence industry, questions have inevitably arisen over whether the combat effectiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been weakened. Rather than offering detailed explanations, Beijing has responded by pressing ahead with a series of high-profile missile tests.

In September 2024, the PLA Rocket Force publicly launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into designated high seas areas of the Pacific Ocean, marking China’s first publicly acknowledged long-range ICBM test in more than 40 years. Less than two years later, the PLA Navy’s strategic nuclear submarine force publicly conducted a test launch of a submarine-launched strategic missile into designated high seas areas of the Pacific. Both missile tests, showcasing China's land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear capabilities, took place against the backdrop of an ongoing military anti-corruption campaign.

Corruption affecting combat readiness?

Over the past three years, the PLA has undergone successive waves of high-intensity anti-corruption investigations. The campaign has expanded from the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department to the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, and has reached senior officers with naval backgrounds, as well as two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission. The downfall of Li Shangfu, the reshuffle of the Rocket Force leadership, the investigation into Miao Hua, and the removals of He Weidong and Zhang Youxia have triggered a succession of personnel upheavals, prompting renewed scrutiny of the PLA’s actual combat capability.

In January 2024, Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter, reported that US intelligence indicated that long-standing corruption within the Rocket Force had resulted in serious operational deficiencies, including missiles filled with water instead of fuel and missile silos with lids that did not function. The report also said these problems were a key factor behind the Chinese leadership’s sweeping purge of the Rocket Force and the defence industrial sector.

If international attention at the time was on whether “Chinese missiles could still fly”, then following the public ICBM test in September that year and the public submarine-launched strategic missile test in July this year, the focus has gradually shifted to how far China’s strategic missiles can reach.

Business as usual

Rather than responding to each allegation individually, Beijing has continued testing its weapons at its own pace. From land-based to sea-based systems, the two missile tests have sent a clear message: the ongoing anti-corruption campaign has not disrupted the development of China’s missile capabilities. In Beijing’s view, corruption — not anti-corruption — is what undermines military combat effectiveness. The campaign is not a burden on war preparedness, but an integral part of building a stronger military.

Even so, the two successful missile tests are unlikely to dispel all doubts. While they demonstrate that the relevant weapons systems are functioning as intended, they do not fully answer broader questions over whether the prolonged anti-corruption drive has affected the command structure, joint operational capability, troop morale, or the decision-making efficiency of senior officers.

The two missile tests also carry a clear deterrent message for external audiences. At a time of intensifying US-China strategic competition, strengthened US and allied military deployments across the Indo-Pacific, and the staging of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, Beijing is signalling to the US and its allies that, despite the PLA’s continuing internal purge, China’s strategic nuclear deterrent and long-range strike capabilities remain undiminished.

While China did not disclose the missile’s exact launch site or impact point, it announced two exclusion zones in the Bohai Sea and the northern South China Sea ahead of the test, later stating that the missile had “landed precisely within the designated waters”. The US State Department, meanwhile, said the missile landed in the southern Pacific Ocean.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense insisted the launch was “not directed at any specific country or target”. Both ministries also said relevant countries had been notified in advance and that the test was conducted in accordance with international law and customary international practice.

A show of power

Even so, the timing and manner of the launch have fuelled widespread speculation. It took place on 6 July, just two days after the US celebrated the 250th anniversary of its independence, while the US-led RIMPAC exercise was under way and just before the 89th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July. Some analysts believe Beijing deliberately chose the timing to send multiple signals to Washington and countries across the region.

If external speculation is correct and the missile tested was indeed the JL-3 submarine-launched ICBM, with a range exceeding 10,000 kilometres, the test not only further demonstrated China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent and second-strike nuclear capability. It also suggested that the PLA’s strategic nuclear submarines could hold Guam and even parts of the US mainland at risk by launching from waters relatively close to China’s coast, without having to break through the first island chain.

Other analysts believe the missile flew over the Philippine Sea towards Guam. If so, the flight itself would have been a show of force, demonstrating China’s ability to threaten key US military bases and reinforcement routes in the Western Pacific while also sending a deterrent message to Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and other locations along the first island chain.

Beijing’s logic of deterrence

Beijing has offered its own explanation for such displays of strategic capability. Editorials in the Global Times and the English-language China Daily argued that the stronger China’s strategic nuclear forces become, the more secure regional peace will be.

The Global Times argued that China is the only one of the five recognised nuclear-weapon states to have pledged never to use nuclear weapons first. The stronger its second-strike capability, it said, the greater its ability in “deterring the use of nuclear weapons through nuclear weapons” — a key pillar in preventing nuclear war.

The logic closely resembles the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction: if nuclear-armed states possess a credible second-strike capability, the cost of launching a nuclear attack becomes so high that strategic stability is more likely to be maintained.

From Beijing’s perspective, a stronger nuclear deterrent creates a more stable strategic balance. To some extent, this also aligns with the recent consensus reached by China and the US on building a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”.

For the US and countries along the missile’s flight path, however, China’s growing strategic capabilities may instead necessitate greater investment in countermeasures, thereby fuelling an intensifying arms race.

Completing the nuclear triad?

As the centenary of the PLA’s founding approaches in 2027, attention is likely to focus on whether the military will publicly demonstrate its air-based strategic missile capability, completing the public unveiling of China’s nuclear triad.

From land-based ICBMs and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles to the possibility of publicly showcasing air-based strategic missiles in the future, Beijing is steadily bringing what was once a relatively low-profile strategic nuclear force into public view.

It is also seeking to signal that its anti-corruption campaign has not weakened the PLA’s military capabilities. The missile test was a demonstration of China’s nuclear deterrent. Whether it ultimately reshapes the regional security landscape, however, will depend on how other parties interpret that capability and the strategic responses they choose to make.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “解放军反腐暴风中导弹升空”.

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