State of Southeast Asia Survey 2026: A harder balance to keep in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia has traditionally preferred not to take sides in the longstanding Sino-US rivalry. A fall in confidence in the US makes this a harder choice to make.
For years, Southeast Asian countries have preferred to avoid taking sides between China and the US. The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey shows that this approach still holds, but a more contested geostrategic environment is making this position harder to sustain. The region continues to feel uneasy about China’s entrenched influence, is increasingly troubled by US leadership under US President Donald Trump and is more conscious of ASEAN’s institutional constraints. The weakening of confidence in the US is especially striking because it is occurring against a wider backdrop of mounting regional pressures.
Southeast Asia is facing a more contested environment in which pressures are building on multiple fronts simultaneously — from climate change and geoeconomic tensions to domestic political instability. The Survey makes clear that the region’s anxieties are no longer limited to conventional geopolitical flashpoints. Even as major power rivalry remains front and centre, climate change and extreme weather events remain the region’s top challenge at 60%, rising from 55.3% last year. It is telling that climate risks are increasingly seen as a direct threat to livelihoods and economic security across the region, even as recent geopolitical instability in the Middle East has reinforced the imperative of energy security. Intensifying economic tensions between major powers come next at 51.7%, followed by domestic political instability at 46.1% (see Infographic 1).
Challenging environment for ASEAN
The Survey shows that Southeast Asia’s strategic anxieties have broadened. US leadership under President Trump now ranks as the region’s top geopolitical concern at 51.9%, overtaking the South China Sea dispute. This suggests growing unease over the uncertainty and credibility of US leadership. Global scam operations come next at 51.4%. Aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea now ranks third, ahead of the Cambodia-Thai conflict and the crisis in Myanmar (see Infographic 2).
Worry outweighs welcome for the US in both the economic and political-strategic domains, marking a notable reversal from last year.
Growing doubts about Uncle Sam
A significant finding of the 2026 Survey is the softening of confidence in the US across several key questions. Worry outweighs welcome for the US in both the economic and political-strategic domains, marking a notable reversal from last year. Confidence in the US to champion global free trade has fallen to 14.8% (from 19% last year). This puts the US behind ASEAN, China and the EU. On maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law, ASEAN has edged ahead of the US, which was the region’s top choice last year. The US has also continued to lose ground to China on strategic relevance (Infographic 5).
The fall in confidence in the US is also reflected in the widely-followed binary-choice question in which 52.0% of respondents chose China and 48.0% chose the US (see Infographic 4 below). This has reversed the US’s narrow lead in 2025 (the only other time that China pipped the US at this question was in the 2024 Survey). This could point to growing discomfort with the US unpredictability on trade, its increasingly transactional approach to partners and doubts about its commitment to international rules and institutions.
... concerns about China continue to remain central. China’s growing influence does not necessarily bring reassurance.
Despite the losses accruing to the US, Washington remains strategically important. It continues to be perceived as the region’s second most influential economic power (15.3%) and political-strategic power (29.9%). It is also perceived to be second overall in strategic relevance to ASEAN; and 42.7% of respondents still express confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security.
The growing anxiety about US leadership is juxtaposed with a China perceived by regional thought leaders as growing in strength. China remains Southeast Asia’s most influential economic power at 55.9% and its most influential political-strategic power at 40.0%. Among ASEAN Dialogue Partners, it again ranks first in strategic relevance (see Infographic 3), ahead of the US and Japan. It should be noted on this question, the gap in mean score between China and the US has widened to 0.5 in 2026 (against 0.04 in 2025 and 0.19 in 2024).
Widening gap between China and US
However, concerns about China continue to remain central. China’s growing influence does not necessarily bring reassurance. The percentage of respondents with concerns about China’s growing influence in both the economic and political-strategic domains still exceeds those who welcome it. When asked what could worsen positive impressions of China, for example, respondents pointed first to interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN member states (30.3%), followed by strong-arm tactics in the South China Sea and the Mekong (28.0%). The broader message is that Southeast Asia sees China’s power as structural and unavoidable, but still wants it to be tempered by restraint, respect for international law, and reassurance.
China pips the US for the second time
If external pressures on ASEAN are rising, ASEAN’s internal constraints are also becoming harder to ignore. ASEAN’s top concern, 34.7% say the organisation is slow and ineffective and cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments. (See Infographic 5). This concern about ASEAN’s internal limitations runs through several parts of the survey. On the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict, 38.9% say ASEAN has taken active steps to mediate the crisis, but 13.5% believe it has not used all the tools at its disposal, while 11.2% express concern that the involvement of external powers raises questions about ASEAN’s ability to address issues on its own terms.
On intra-regional economic cooperation, the main impediments identified are domestic technocratic implementation capacity (30.2%) and development disparities among member states (30.1%), with geopolitical pressure close behind at 27.5%. The issue is not simply that ASEAN faces external pressure, but that its ability to respond is constrained by uneven internal capacity, differing levels of development and lingering questions over its agency.
Sustained concerns about ASEAN
... respondents continue to look to ASEAN as the primary vehicle for strengthening the region’s collective resilience.
Yet the survey also makes clear that respondents continue to look to ASEAN as the primary vehicle for strengthening the region’s collective resilience. When asked how ASEAN should enhance its resilience and demonstrate its relevance, the top responses were resolving differences over longstanding issues such as Myanmar and the South China Sea (29.9%) and increasing intra-regional trade and investment (28.5%).
Likewise, in response to rising protectionism and nationalism, respondents place the strongest emphasis on accelerating regional integration among ASEAN member states (42.2%), followed by deepening cooperation with like-minded partners (30.0%) and strengthening ASEAN institutions that support the rule of law (24.6%).At its core, the 2026 Survey suggests that Southeast Asians still see ASEAN as the region’s best available platform for preserving resilience, balance and collective agency. To remain relevant, however, ASEAN will need stronger internal cohesion, more effective implementation and a clearer ability to act on the region’s own terms.
This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.