Taiwan in the shadow of a Trump-China deal

Donald Trump’s return to the American presidency in 2025 has profoundly deepened global uncertainties at a time when the world order was already upended by US-China rivalry and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

Trump’s “America first” stance, aversion to multilateral collaboration, and transactional views of diplomacy threaten many democratic allies that grew prosperous through international trade and continue to rely on the Americans for security. Conversely, his hawkish posture toward Beijing — which catalysed a strategic pivot against the authoritarian superpower during his first term — offers a degree of reassurance to nations bearing the brunt of China’s expanding coercive influence. Nowhere is this paradox more evident than in Taiwan, a frontline democracy caught directly in the crosshairs of these conflicting geopolitical currents.

Whereas Joe Biden repeatedly affirmed US willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese assault, marking a significant departure from the longstanding doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Donald Trump has refrained from such explicit guarantees. Instead, Trump has consistently sidestepped the question, merely asserting that Beijing would not attempt an invasion during his presidency. This reluctance is unsurprising given his well-known disinterest in promoting international norms of democracy and human rights. Rather than viewing Taiwan as an ideological ally to be protected at all costs, his administration is more likely to assess the island’s value through business calculation.

This same transactional approach was evident when Trump imposed sweeping global tariffs in April 2025. Due to its outsized trade surplus with the US, Taiwan was hit with a whopping 32% rate. This was noticeably higher than the rates announced for neighbouring Asian democracies like Japan (24%) and South Korea (25%), although not as punishingly high as the 145% rate once slapped on China. The sudden announcement caught Taiwan off guard and sent shockwaves through its business community. Through tireless behind-the-scenes negotiations, Taiwan succeeded in reducing the rate to 15% in early 2026. The final package appeared to lend Taiwan an advantage over its Asian competitors, securing the same lowered rate but requiring a smaller amount of promised investment in the US. Nevertheless, Taiwan enjoyed only a brief spell of relief before the US Supreme Court revoked the tariff measures, bringing about a new round of uncertainty — an unsurprising scenario in Trump’s America.

Whether driven by a businessman’s instinct or a personal aspiration for a Nobel Peace Prize, Trump’s propensity for deal-making with authoritarian leaders is profoundly disconcerting for Taiwan. His repeated overtures to Vladimir Putin to end the war have already unsettled Ukraine and its European allies. For Taipei, there is a looming, unstated fear that a “grand bargain” between Trump and Beijing would inevitably compromise Taiwan’s de facto autonomy.

This anxiety is not unfounded: in the summer of 2025, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te allegedly cancelled a planned transit through New York en route to Latin America following US opposition. Furthermore, in early 2026, the Trump administration delayed a major, congressionally approved arms package to Taiwan, presumably to avoid antagonising Xi Jinping ahead of a scheduled summit.

Unsurprisingly, Trump’s unorthodox and highly personalised governing style has deepened preexisting currents of so-called “US scepticism”, the view that the US may ultimately prove to be an unreliable security guarantor and could one day abandon Taiwan in pursuit of its own interests. Pro-Beijing commentators and media outlets in Taiwan have long promoted this narrative, suggesting that the island’s democracy should eventually concede to China’s territorial claims in one way or another. 

According to Taiwan’s American Portrait research team, the share of respondents who regarded the US as “very unreliable” increased from 17.3% in 2024 to 22.4% in 2025. In 2025, 54.5% of respondents expressed distrust in the American security guarantee, while 41.1% reported a trusting attitude. Clearly, if Beijing’s ultimate objective is to erode Taiwanese morale in defending their democracy, the current US administration has unwittingly aided that effort.

On the other hand, Trump’s blunt approach has hastened the democratic camp’s economic weaning off China, and Taiwan’s IT industries are expected to gain a larger foothold in the emerging non-red supply chain. Swerving from his campaign pledge not to start new wars, the Trump administration has decisively opted for military solutions, specifically targeting China’s strategic allies such as Venezuela and Iran.

The stunning success in the capture of Nicolás Maduro, as well as the decapitation strike against Ali Khamenei — both of whose regimes were armed with China’s state-of-the-art defence systems — has definitively proven the superiority of American military might. Consequently, Taiwan’s pro-Beijing talking heads, who had previously heaped praise on Chinese-made weaponry while belittling American resolve, were forced to eat their words in humiliation.

It is also notable that the daily incursions of Chinese warplanes into Taiwan’s air defence zone ceased for an unusual hiatus of roughly ten days following the outbreak of the war in Iran. It appears that a more bellicose America effectively helps deter China’s military ambitions.

Taiwan’s political actors appear to be treading cautiously in an effort to accommodate Trump’s unpredictability. In August 2025, former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Taiwan and offered his personal advice on managing relations with the Trump administration. Noting Trump’s penchant for deal-making, Johnson suggested that Taiwan’s best strategy is to continuously engage him in negotiations and to “give him a success.” 

Apparently, Taiwan’s political leadership has heeded this advice. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party has refrained from public criticism, instead dispatching high-level delegations to iron out bilateral trade frictions. Meanwhile, the opposition Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party — which had previously captured headlines by boycotting budgetary reviews — now appear ready to greenlight the multiyear special military procurement budgets. In short, Trump’s second term has undeniably heightened geopolitical uncertainties; with so many moving pieces at present, it remains too early to draw a definitive balance sheet.

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