Ten years after the South China Sea ruling: Is China’s position better or worse?

12 July marked the tenth anniversary of the South China Sea arbitration ruling. When the Philippines initiated the case, its aim was to use international law to narrow China’s maritime claims, mobilise international opinion and American power to force Beijing to accept the ruling, thus bringing about a de facto redrawing of maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. Ten years later, has Manila achieved that goal? Has China’s position become worse or better?

My view is that the Philippines has not achieved its aims. China’s position has deteriorated in some respects and improved in others, but overall it is more favourable than it was a decade ago.

Some losses for China

The first deterioration is greater Western pressure. On 12 July, 14 countries, including the US, the Philippines, the UK, Australia, Japan, Germany and Italy, issued a joint statement reaffirming that the ruling was legally binding and urging China to comply. The EU issued a separate statement on behalf of its 27 members.

Ten years ago, governments mainly issued separate statements, and relatively few stood clearly and unreservedly behind the Philippines. This time, support came in a joint declaration, including Germany, Italy and five Central and Eastern European states. Western backing for the ruling has become more bloc-based and institutionalised. This reflects the worsening international climate, especially sharper China-US rivalry and Europe’s increased distrust of China after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A second deterioration is the worsening of China’s relations with both the Philippines and Japan. This has strengthened the US-Philippine and US-Japan alliances, deepened Japan-Philippine ties and reinforced trilateral cooperation among Washington, Tokyo and Manila. A degree of linkage is emerging among the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

China-Philippine relations deteriorated because of the arbitration, improved temporarily under Rodrigo Duterte, and worsened again under Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Maritime confrontations have become more frequent, giving the US greater scope to intervene in South China Sea affairs. US-Philippine exercises directed at China have increased, while Japan has expanded its own role. The deepening of Japan-Philippine ties was not driven solely by the South China Sea, but the dispute has been a significant factor. The three countries now cooperate to counter China’s efforts to defend its maritime claims.

Still, no joint push by ASEAN  

Yet while Western support has become more institutionalised, ASEAN has not followed the West’s lead. For Beijing, this is a significant advantage.

Of ASEAN’s ten members other than the Philippines, only Vietnam issued a restrained statement that did not explicitly endorse the ruling. The other nine members, and ASEAN as an organisation, remained silent. Ten years ago, ASEAN also failed to reach a common position, but Vietnam, Singapore and others at least voiced support for international law and legal procedures. There was more regional dissent then than there is today.

ASEAN’s silence matters more than Western statements. The US, Europe, Japan and Australia have long supported the Philippines, but they are not South China Sea claimants and do not bear the direct cost of confronting China. Several ASEAN members are claimants. If they turned the ruling into a common ASEAN position, they could impose substantial pressure on Beijing. But they have not. The Philippines has secured Western support without winning collective ASEAN backing.

China now better at shaping the narrative 

Another favourable development is China’s improved capacity for lawfare and narrative warfare.

In 2016, faced with a ruling almost entirely against it, China could defend itself but had little ability to counterattack. Beijing issued statements and a white paper, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and that Manila had circumvented China’s jurisdictional exclusions by disguising questions of sovereignty and maritime delimitation as disputes over the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But China’s position was largely drowned out by the Western campaign. The prevailing impression was that the Philippines had won through international law while China, as a major power, simply refused to comply.

The situation today is different. China is no longer merely defending itself; it has begun turning legal and narrative pressure back on its opponents. Ahead of the anniversary, Chinese scholars and research institutions published lengthy studies and held seminars on the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the composition of the panel, the use of evidence, the legal status of maritime features and the question of historic rights. Together, they sought to build a comprehensive counter-narrative.

Its response to Japan illustrates this shift. The Chinese foreign ministry raised the issue of Okinotorishima. If Japan supports the tribunal’s conclusion that Taiping Island, or Itu Aba, cannot generate an exclusive economic zone, Beijing asked, then how can Okinotorishima generate hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf?

Taiping Island covers about 0.51 square kilometres, has fresh water and vegetation, and has long supported human activity. The naturally exposed parts of Okinotorishima consist of only two tiny rocks. If Taiping does not qualify as an island, Okinotorishima certainly cannot. Beijing therefore asked whether Japan’s support for the ruling amounted to voluntarily abandoning the maritime entitlements it claims from Okinotorishima.

This will not immediately strip Japan of its legal claims, but it exposes an internal contradiction: Tokyo cannot support an extremely restrictive standard for Taiping while applying a permissive one to Okinotorishima. China’s campaign will not persuade the West to accept Beijing’s legal position, but it shows that China is no longer merely absorbing blows.

China staking its claim

More important than improved legal and narrative capabilities is China’s stronger effective control over South China Sea features.

Despite the ruling, China did not withdraw from any feature it controlled or reduce the activities of its coast guard, navy or maritime militia. After a decade of construction, its network of island bases, airfields, radar systems, ports, missile facilities and logistical infrastructure is largely complete. The China Coast Guard now conducts regular patrols around Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Sabina Shoal and other disputed areas. These are no longer temporary deployments but stable, sustained presences.

The Philippines won the legal document; China gained more initiative at sea.

International tribunals have no police forces or navies. Turning a ruling into reality still depends on state power. Over the past decade, the US has not retaken Scarborough Shoal for the Philippines, and Manila has not used the ruling to alter the basic situation at Second Thomas Shoal or elsewhere. In this respect, China is clearly in a stronger position than ten years ago.

Loss of faith in the US

Changes within the US have also weakened the moral force of Western pressure. In 2016, Washington could still criticise Beijing in the name of international law, the protection of smaller states and opposition to major powers changing the status quo. Today, America’s position on Greenland has stripped some moral credibility from its criticism of China. This will not cause US allies to abandon the Philippines, but it makes it harder for Washington to present its stance as a universal defence of rules free from double standards. The decline in America’s moral standing is one reason ASEAN states have been reluctant to follow the US and the West on the arbitration issue.

Ten years ago, China publicly dismissed the ruling as “a piece of waste paper”, but privately it could not avoid worrying that it might alter the South China Sea balance. That has not happened.

The region has become more complicated, largely because of the US Indo-Pacific strategy and the desire of regional powers to bring in outside forces to balance China. Yet China’s effective control, capacity for sustained action, and ability to counter legal and narrative pressure are all stronger than they were a decade ago.

The reality of the South China Sea is increasingly being shaped by Chinese power. That is the central fact the outside world must recognise when looking back at the arbitration ten years later.

Related: A decade on, 14 nations reaffirm a South China Sea ruling China rejects | Law alone won’t save the South China Sea