Why China’s land routes may fail in a Taiwan crisis

China’s use of alternative inland connections may not ensure the survivability of its supply lines if the US were to blockade key Chinese maritime trade routes in response to an invasion of Taiwan.

A reported US cruise missile attack against the Aq Tekeh Khan railway bridge, a key infrastructure connecting northern Iran with Central Asia, Russia and onward to China, highlighted this potential vulnerability.

Ukraine’s recent drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in the city of Omsk, over 2,500 kilometres from the Ukrainian border, further exposed possible weak points in Chinese land transportation routes to the intermediate- and long-range strike operations conducted by America and its allies.

China’s land routes and infrastructure may be vulnerable

The armed attack on Iran by the US and Israel has made the Islamic Republic aware that it can close the strategic Strait of Hormuz and thus exert some pressure over its opponents. As Tehran has been successful in trapping the Sunni kingdoms allied with America within the Persian Gulf, Washington could lock Chinese air and naval forces inside the China seas and the Taiwan Strait by obstructing chokepoints vital to Beijing’s supply chains in a Taiwan conflict.

Ironically, Iran has demonstrated that the US could execute this strategy relatively cheaply through the massive use of unmanned weapons — provided that its allies and partners help prevent China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and merchant vessels from crossing the maritime passages along the Indonesian archipelago and the first island chain (which comprises Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo).

While it remains unclear whether China can field adequate counter-blockade capabilities to disrupt a US-led containment of its naval forces and shipping assets, Beijing plans to use land routes and infrastructure to bypass vulnerable maritime chokepoints, particularly for energy procurement.

On paper, China can rely on a complex network of inland corridors to mitigate geopolitical and supply-chain risks. The problem for Beijing, however, is that rapid advancements in drone warfare during the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have rendered these overland arteries increasingly vulnerable and less strategic.

Fenced in, with no backup routes

Given their proximity to the potential battlefield, the rail and road transport connections from Guangzhou to Tianjin, which would be used to support Chinese military efforts against Taiwan, would likely be among the first targets of a US missile and drone campaign to degrade China’s logistics resilience.

Outside Chinese territory, the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines represent key strategic assets for Beijing. These conduits are the backbone of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, an integral part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The route links the Chinese province of Yunnan directly to the Indian Ocean via the port of Kyaukphyu, facilitating not only the transport of hydrocarbons but also the economic development of China’s internal regions.

In-depth Eurasian corridors pose different, more complex military challenges. The northern passageway connects China with Russia, with which Beijing has a “no-limits” partnership, but the Ukraine war has reduced its strategic importance.

Drone operations could be a threat

Drone operations replicating Ukraine’s audacious attack with cheap unmanned vehicles deep inside Russian territory in June 2025 would indeed threaten Russian supplies to China during a Taiwan crisis.

The Middle Corridor, which runs across Central Asia and connects China with Turkey and the Middle East (including Iran), can be seen as another land bypass to decrease China’s reliance on maritime trade, but it has the same fragilities as its northern equivalent.

The US attack in April on Iran’s Yahya Abad railway bridge, a key stretch of the Xinjiang-Tehran freight corridor, is a testament to this. Just like the recent raid against the Aq Tekeh Khan rail link, the operation against the Yahya Abad infrastructure showed how the US military can weaken the Belt and Road framework and China’s alternative land procurement system.

Against this backdrop, China’s geographical size may become a weakness — a reality as true for Beijing in the future as it is for Moscow today. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult for the PLA’s defensive countermeasures to protect China’s vast territory against US and allied strikes, especially if Chinese forces must simultaneously defend the overseas infrastructure on which their country relies.

However, geography also poses a challenge for America. To counter this, the US must assemble the largest possible coalition to deny Chinese forces access to the open Pacific and the Indian Ocean while systematically targeting China’s overland corridors and infrastructure. This bloc should include not only regional actors such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, but also traditional allies like France, Britain and Canada.

In this battle for maritime and overland transport routes, winning the drone and robotics race —  in both production and innovation capacity —  is becoming crucial for both Washington and Beijing. Ultimately, the power that can build the most capable autonomous systems to defeat enemy countermoves quickly and cost-effectively will prevail.

Related: The Middle Corridor: Where Turkey’s rise meets China’s ambitions | China’s ‘small’ BRI still thinks big: The return of grand infrastructure