Are China and Indonesia model Global South partners?

China regards Indonesia as a very important country in its own right and on the international stage. Likewise, Indonesia is keen to strengthen ties with China as part of its “free and active” foreign policy. The potential for bilateral cooperation does seem bright after the two countries convened their first comprehensive strategic dialogue mechanism and second foreign and defence ministers meeting in August 2026. However, their ambitions and interests do not always align.

Reshaping the world with Jakarta

Indonesia is a key country in China’s overall game plan to reshape the international order and lend greater voice and representation to developing countries. This is not a recent development.

In the 1950s, the two countries had championed principles of state-to-state relations for the third world that generally referred to the newly-independent, non-aligned countries. China proposed the five principles of peaceful co-existence (namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) in 1954, which were incorporated into the final communique of the Bandung Conference hosted by Indonesia in 1955.

In Beijing’s eyes, the five principles of peaceful coexistence remain relevant today and underpin its efforts to reshape the world order. Chinese President Xi Jinping has observed that these five principles, which originated from three countries in Asia (i.e. China, India and Myanmar), soon gained traction on the world stage with more countries subscribing to them. He added that China’s vision of a “community of shared future for mankind” carries forward the same spirit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

“Community of shared future for mankind” therefore marks an evolution of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It is Beijing’s way of staying relevant and more importantly, positioning itself to be a key, if not the key, country in advocating ideas or a vision that offers an alternative to Western hegemonism and unilateralism. Likewise, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has highlighted the importance of the Bandung spirit in guiding developing countries to grow and prosper, and realise a more inclusive and balanced international order.

Clearly, both countries would like the existing world order reformed although they may differ on the what and how. Beijing further recognises Indonesia’s weight in the Global South — an update of the “third world” term — as it has the world’s fourth largest population, is the most populous Muslim-majority country, and advocates strategic autonomy that Beijing identifies with.

Unprecedented firsts

Beijing has engineered a number of firsts in its ties with Indonesia, an indication of how important it views the relationship. For one, it has launched key global initiatives with Indonesia. In October 2013, Xi became the first foreign leader to address the Indonesian Parliament where he unveiled the maritime route of China’s signature Silk Road, putting Indonesia at the heart of this key initiative. 

Ten years later, in 2023, China scored another first when it launched its first overseas high-speed rail linking Jakarta and Bandung — fully using Chinese technology and standards in the entire set-up including the railway systems and industry chain. However, despite increasing ridership, the project is running at a loss and details on the debt restructuring have yet to be announced. Nevertheless, Beijing is unlikely to allow the project to fail as it bears Xi’s personal imprint — he has pushed for and inaugurated this project.

Last year, in 2025, China established its first ever foreign and defence ministers’ dialogue mechanism (or 2+2) with Indonesia. It was only in 2024 that senior officials from both sides met jointly for the first time. The fact that this upgrade occurred less than a year after their senior officials met showed that Beijing wants to draw Indonesia (and other Southeast Asian countries) closer amid global uncertainties caused largely by America’s disruptive policies and actions that started with the Liberation Day tariffs in April 2025.

After the inaugural 2+2 ministerial meeting with Jakarta in April 2025, China convened other 2+2 platforms with Cambodia (April 2026) and agreed to set up similar ones with Malaysia (April 2025) and Thailand (July 2026). In addition, it convened the first defence, foreign policy and public security ministerial meeting with Vietnam (March 2026) and agreed to hold a similar one with Laos (June 2026). At their second 2+2 meeting (August 2026), China and Indonesia took the first step of agreeing to jointly build and operate production lines for munitions, rockets and guided missiles, a boost for Beijing’s defence-industrial complex overseas ventures and Jakarta’s efforts to move beyond procurement to develop long-term military capabilities.

In another first, Beijing announced that it conducted a military exercise with an Indonesian frigate in waters east of Taiwan. While China is asserting its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone in waters east of Taiwan, Indonesia has downplayed this episode by calling it a passage exercise after the frigate’s naval exercise with Russia and stop-over in Japan. Notwithstanding Jakarta’s position, Beijing has expanded the range of activities it conducts in waters east of Taiwan to further encircle the latter.

Jakarta’s preoccupations and considerations

Apart from choosing China to be the first country to visit as president, Prabowo was decisive in signing on to China-led initiatives such as joining BRICS in January 2025, which his predecessor had vacillated on. Indonesia further joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Plus meeting as a guest for the first time in September 2025 and was a founding member of the Shanghai-based World AI Cooperation Organisation in July 2026.

The above is less about Jakarta drawing closer to Beijing but more about Indonesia safeguarding its national interests by pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation for domestic growth and development — a pressing domestic priority — while raising the country’s international standing. Although China was his first stop in his maiden trip abroad, Prabowo also visited the US, the UK, the UAE and attended the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (in Peru) and the G20 summit (in Brazil) on the same trip.

So far, Prabowo has visited the US three times, one more than his two trips to China. On his third visit in February 2026, he signed an agreement on reciprocal trade with US President Donald Trump to find a way forward on trade and investment matters. He also attended Trump’s inaugural Board of Peace meeting where Indonesia wants a more lasting solution to the Palestinian issue to burnish its standing in the Muslim world. Prabowo further pledged 8,000 Indonesian troops — the first country to commit a specific figure — to the International Stabilisation Force to Gaza, although this plan has stalled due to the widening conflict in the Middle East and other concerns.

Among the major powers, Prabowo, as president, has visited Russia the most number of times (in June 2025, December 2025, April 2026 and September 2026). At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, his first international economic debut in June 2025, Prabowo stressed the importance of striking deals with other countries to grow the Indonesian economy and improve people’s livelihood. He returned to the theme of people-centred development at the 11th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2026. At each turn, the Indonesian government makes the point that such engagements are aimed at delivering concrete benefits to ordinary Indonesians, in part to address criticisms of Prabowo’s frequent foreign travels.

While Indonesia-China defence cooperation have moved into new areas, they largely reflect incremental progress and are still far from Jakarta’s more advanced and complex defence ties with other key partners. For example, although China’s first ever 2+2 talks only started with Indonesia in 2025, Jakarta’s has had 2+2 talks much earlier with Australia (started in 2012) and Japan (started in 2015).

Moreover, Indonesia’s passage exercise with China involved just two frigates and rudimentary manoeuvres covering maritime communications, formation manoeuvring and replenishment that were completed in one morning. In contrast, Super Garuda Shield 2026, a bilateral, joint military training exercise between the US and Indonesia in 2007 has since expanded to include 13 partner countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand and the UK, bringing the number of troops involved to almost 5,000 strong. The event lasted 12 days, covering training activities such as a joint staff exercise, cyber exercise, Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Response (HA/DR) exercise, airborne operations, jungle training and helicopter operations.

Beyond Chinese businessmen woes

The Indonesian government’s aggressive effort to centralise state control over natural resources, seen by some as resource nationalism, has affected Chinese businesses especially in the mining sector and puts a dampener on bilateral relations. A letter by the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia (on behalf of Chinese businesses) to Prabowo in May 2026 highlighted issues such as sudden policy shifts, drastic quota cuts, steep royalty and tax hikes, stringent foreign exchange retention rules, alleged corruption and extortion by Indonesian authorities.

The letter, which was leaked to the media, is an unusual way for Chinese businesses to express their concerns given that the two countries are comprehensive strategic partners with established channels to address such issues behind closed doors. Apparently, these concerns were previously conveyed to the Indonesian authorities by a senior Chinese diplomat based in Jakarta. By going public, the objective appears aimed at applying commercial pressure on the Indonesian government to improve the investment climate without according it too high an official signature.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi alluded to these concerns when he met Indonesia’s National Economic Council chair Luhut Pandjaitan in August 2026 and called on Indonesia to provide a safe, stable and favourable business environment for Chinese enterprises. So far, Beijing regards this matter as just one dimension of the otherwise positive and multi-faceted relationship with Indonesia. However, it is uncertain to what extent the grievances of Chinese businesses will be addressed given the Prabowo administration’s overriding preoccupation with extensive oversight and control over the entire value chain of the resource industry.

A related question is whether the Chinese government will take a tougher stand should the situation worsen? While the current situation is nowhere near a worst-case scenario, it bears recalling that in the past, Chinese businesses — either run by overseas Chinese (i.e. Chinese nationals in Indonesia with Chinese citizenship) or ethnic Chinese (i.e. Indonesians of Chinese descent) — had borne the brunt of anti-Chinese sentiments that strained bilateral ties as had happened in the 1998 riots.

Then, China had pressed Indonesia to take immediate action to ensure the safety and legal rights of both ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese, and to punish those who commit criminal acts against these Chinese. Its actions were largely confined to diplomatic pressure and rendering of consular support including arranging for commercial flights to evacuate overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese to safety. There was no large-scale evacuation of Chinese nationals, which happened subsequently in Libya (in 2011) and Yemen (in 2015).

There is a quasi-official view that should a situation arise in the future that threatens the lives of overseas Chinese or even ethnic Chinese, the Chinese government can be expected to do more given its current global influence and military capabilities. Such an expectation may also be partly driven by official assurances that its citizens can rest assured while overseas as they have a strong motherland to count on. 

Apart from mounting large-scale evacuation operations, Beijing could, depending on specific circumstances, resort to other means such as imposing travel restrictions, restricting trade and/or investment flows (as it is Indonesia’s largest trading partner, a major source of investment, and a key partner in Indonesia’s industrial transformation), and even step up grey zone operations in areas of overlapping claims with Indonesia.

Good potential but caution called for

At the moment, China sees great potential in working with Indonesia to not only strengthen bilateral ties but, more importantly, to reshape the world order as key Global South members. In this endeavour, it has kept existing differences with Jakarta in check and not allow them to be blown out of proportion. In maritime cooperation, Beijing also did not kick up a fuss over Jakarta’s apparent back-paddling on joint development in areas of overlapping claims (as deemed by China) and seems content to revisit the issue when the occasion arises. The prospects for the two countries to collaborate further looks bright although this should not be overstated.

Related: Why Indonesian President Prabowo is drawn to Xi Jinping’s China | Beyond trade: The human ties reshaping Indonesia-China relations