[Big read] China’s multidimensional squeeze: ‘Governing’ Taiwan before reunification

(Edited and refined by Grace Chong, with the assistance of AI translation.)

Over the past month, Beijing has stepped up its Taiwan policy on several fronts — diplomacy, maritime enforcement, law and cross-strait development.

The moves may appear separate, but they point to a more coordinated strategy. Beijing is reinforcing the “one China” principle internationally, tightening administrative law enforcement in waters around Taiwan, expanding its legal and institutional toolkit for Taiwan-related affairs, and accelerating the Fujian cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone.

Taken together, these efforts suggest that Beijing is working across multiple policy agencies to reshape the environment around Taiwan — building more favourable conditions at home and abroad for its long-term goal of reunification.

Broadening the pressure campaign 

On the diplomatic front, Beijing has continued to encourage other countries to reaffirm the “one China” principle and adopt more explicit political positions on Taiwan.

During Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s visit to China from 16 to 20 July, the two countries issued a joint statement. In addition to reaffirming its unwavering commitment to the “one China” policy, Thailand recognised Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, expressed support for China’s peaceful reunification, said it would not support any call for Taiwan independence, and endorsed China’s “one country, two systems” policy.

Meanwhile, Tomio Okamura, Speaker of the Czech Republic’s Chamber of Deputies, visited China with a delegation for the first time in seven years. In addition to meeting Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, he told Phoenix TV in an interview that the Czech Republic’s new government would adhere to the “one China” policy and that there would be no future official Czech visits to Taiwan. According to Beijing’s official readout, he also said the Czech Republic adheres to the “one China” policy, which he regards as a key pillar of bilateral relations.

On 16 July, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko unilaterally announced the closure of Taiwan’s representative office in the South Pacific nation. Taiwan rejected the decision, however, and the office remains in operation.

Meanwhile, Morocco recently suspended applications from Taiwanese residents seeking visa confirmation letters. In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 30 July that it would suspend visa applications from Moroccan nationals travelling to Taiwan, signalling that Taipei has begun responding to certain diplomatic restrictions on a reciprocal basis.

In the maritime domain, Beijing has recently coordinated the efforts of maritime authorities, government agencies, research institutions and the coast guard to extend its jurisdictional claims over waters surrounding Taiwan further into the eastern maritime area.

Cross-strait integration has also continued to advance. Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport, expected to begin operations by the end of this year, is positioned as a new aviation hub to deepen economic and social integration across the Taiwan Strait.

‘Reunification without immediate reunification’

In June, Zhu Weidong, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, introduced the concept of “reunification without immediate reunification” (不统而统). He argued that Beijing’s Taiwan policy should neither seek quick results nor passively wait, but instead advance its initiatives gradually and systematically while remaining committed to the goal of reunification.

The concept reflects a series of recent Taiwan-related measures by Beijing and has prompted discussion over whether its approach towards Taiwan is undergoing a strategic shift.

Bao Chengke, a researcher at the Shanghai Cross-Strait Research Association, argues that “reunification without immediate reunification” does not mean abandoning reunification, nor does it advocate rapid reunification. Rather, it represents a pragmatic adjustment in the pace of policy implementation while maintaining the existing strategic direction.

In an interview with Lianhe Zaobao (LHZB), he said, “It is neither about abandoning reunification nor rushing towards it. It is about steadily finding the path forward through a stable, step-by-step approach.”

Bao believes Beijing is continuing to create the conditions necessary for peaceful reunification. The policy of “promoting reunification through integration” remains unchanged. Whether through strengthening maritime governance, expanding cross-strait exchanges or deepening integration in recent years, Beijing has continued to build conditions for peaceful reunification.

An increasingly multidimensional toolkit

Jhang Hong Yuan, a professor in the Department of International Trade at Chihlee University of Technology and a former deputy director of the Kuomintang’s Mainland Affairs Department, said in an interview that “reunification without immediate reunification” is better understood as an academic description of recent developments rather than an official policy slogan adopted by Beijing.

Based on recent official rhetoric and policy implementation, he assessed that opposing Taiwan independence remains Beijing’s core priority. The change in Beijing’s approach to Taiwan, he said, lies not in its goal of reunification but in the steadily expanding range of tools it uses to pursue that goal.

Jhang said that whereas Beijing previously relied primarily on military deterrence, diplomatic pressure, and cross-strait integration and exchanges, it has gradually added legal instruments, grey zone operations and measures aimed at further restricting Taiwan’s international space.

“What was once a fairly flat approach has now become multidimensional,” he said.

He noted that Beijing has, in recent years, steadily developed legal and institutional mechanisms targeting “Taiwan independence” and Taiwan-related affairs, creating a system of “legal regulation” over Taiwan.

Diplomatically, Beijing is no longer focused solely on reducing Taiwan’s number of diplomatic allies. Instead, it is reinforcing other countries’ political commitment to the “one China” position through high-level exchanges, bilateral joint statements and international organisations.

On 27 July, the Association for Asian Political Economy and Peace, a think tank that maintains close ties with Taiwan’s green camp, held a seminar bringing together experts and academics to examine the mainland’s evolving use of hybrid pressure against Taiwan.

At the seminar, Hung Yao-nan, an assistant professor at Tamkang University, argued: “Rather than achieving ‘reunification without immediate reunification’, a more accurate description would be ‘governing in preparation for reunification’.”

In his view, Beijing has not abandoned the goal of reunification. Instead, before reunification has taken place, it is already applying to Taiwan and its people forms of governance that would only exist after reunification, while simultaneously weakening Taiwan’s own jurisdiction.

Hung said the ultimate objective of Beijing’s hybrid pressure campaign is not merely to persuade Taiwan’s government to change its policies, but to compel both Taiwanese society and the international community to gradually accept the premise that “China has jurisdiction over Taiwan, while Taiwan does not possess full jurisdiction over itself.”

Recent developments suggest that what Beijing describes as the practical implementation of peaceful reunification is steadily extending into a broader range of policy areas. Internationally, Beijing is using diplomatic statements and high-level exchanges to press other countries to make more explicit commitments on their positions regarding Taiwan. Around Taiwan, it is combining administrative, legal and maritime instruments to expand both its practical presence and its jurisdictional claims. Across the Taiwan Strait, it is promoting integration and infrastructure development to sustain exchanges and connectivity.

Bao argues that these measures are part of creating the conditions for peaceful reunification. Jhang, by contrast, believes Beijing is shifting from relying on individual policy instruments to a more coordinated, multi-agency strategy.

Although their interpretations differ, both point to the same broader trend: Beijing’s focus is shifting away from whether reunification should be achieved immediately and towards how to steadily shape conditions more conducive to reunification.

‘Quasi-quarantine’ grey zone tactics?

While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)‘s military exercises around Taiwan in recent years have largely focused on the island’s southwestern, western and northern approaches, Beijing has recently stepped up activities in waters east of Taiwan. From deploying maritime, government and research vessels to the eastern waters to expanding China Coast Guard “routine law enforcement patrols”, these developments suggest the eastern waters are becoming another key focus of Beijing’s Taiwan strategy.

These activities have continued beyond the conclusion of individual enforcement operations.

In mid-June, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources dispatched the research vessel Xiangyanghong 22 to conduct marine ecological surveys in what it described as the “waters under China’s jurisdiction east of Taiwan island”. In late July, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs sent the research vessel Lanhai 201 to the same area to conduct a fishery resources survey. In both official statements, authorities used the phrase “waters under China’s jurisdiction east of Taiwan island” and stressed that the surveys would provide a basis for marine resource management in the area.

The deployment of government and research vessels by agencies overseeing transport, natural resources and agriculture suggests that Beijing is seeking to build a governance narrative over waters surrounding Taiwan through administrative management, scientific surveys and marine resource governance, rather than relying solely on military deterrence.

At the Association for Asian Political Economy and Peace seminar on 27 July, Chung Chih-tung, an assistant research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said the waters east of Taiwan are crucial in wartime for preserving Taiwan’s military capabilities and maintaining external links. If Beijing were to further intensify pressure on Taiwan or move towards more comprehensive quarantine measures, the eastern waters would inevitably become a critical focal point.

From 6 to 10 June, China’s Ministry of Transport organised maritime authorities in Fujian and Guangdong to conduct a maritime traffic enforcement and hydrographic survey operation in waters east of Taiwan. According to the official notice, authorities inspected 198 passing vessels and ordered three ships to rectify violations. They stressed that the operation was intended to exercise China’s maritime administrative jurisdiction while responding to the launch of maritime delimitation negotiations between Japan and the Philippines in the relevant waters.

Chung argued that such operations already display the characteristics of a “quasi-quarantine” approach.

Unlike a blockade, which is more likely to be viewed by the international community as an act of war, this form of quarantine-like pressure relies primarily on grey zone instruments — including the coastguard, government vessels, research ships and administrative law enforcement — to conduct inspections, checks and traffic controls in designated waters or on specific vessels. The aim is to gradually constrain Taiwan’s external transport links and maritime activities while avoiding the immediate outbreak of full-scale military conflict.

Shaping the strategic space

Chung argued that the defining feature of such operations is their ability to transition seamlessly between peacetime and wartime. During peacetime, administrative management and law enforcement duties can be carried out by non-military forces such as the coastguard. Should tensions escalate, the PLA can swiftly take over, allowing peacetime deployments to transition naturally into wartime operations.

In an interview with LHZB, Jhang interpreted Beijing’s recent actions through the lens of the regional security environment.

He noted that Japan and the Philippines have recently advanced negotiations on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. While these talks appear to concern bilateral maritime rights and interests, they are closely linked to the security architecture of the first island chain.

If a military conflict were to erupt across the Taiwan Strait, any operations launched by Beijing from the eastern side of Taiwan would inevitably come close to waters claimed by Japan and the Philippines. This would also increase the likelihood that security cooperation among the US, Japan and the Philippines would become directly involved.

Jhang believes Beijing’s continued deployment of research vessels, government ships and coastguard patrols in the eastern waters serves two purposes: reinforcing China’s maritime claims and assertions of jurisdiction, while responding to changes in the regional security environment, in an attempt to establish strategic space favourable to its own operations before any crisis emerges.

Under a “quasi-quarantine” scenario, Beijing could use the coastguard, maritime militia and fishing vessels to block foreign resupply ships, forcing Washington to choose between breaking through the blockade at the risk of direct confrontation with Beijing or abandoning efforts to resupply Taiwan.

One option Beijing could adopt would be to have the coastguard enforce controls on the frontline while the PLA provides support from the rear.

Mounting pressure on multiple fronts

As Beijing continues to narrow Taiwan’s international space, Taiwan’s challenge is no longer simply about maintaining diplomatic allies. It is also about building more resilient external relationships amid China-US competition and the restructuring of global supply chains.

At the Association for Asian Political Economy and Peace seminar, Lin Tzu-Li, a professor in the Department of Political Science at Tunghai University, said Beijing’s diplomatic strategy towards Taiwan has shifted from seeking to win over Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to “internationalising” pressure on Taiwan and promoting its “denationalisation”. This includes pressuring Taiwan’s representative offices to relocate, change their names or cease operations, as well as restricting Taiwan’s participation in international activities.

He said Beijing has also deliberately blurred the distinction between its own “one China” principle and the “one China” policies adopted by various countries, encouraging more nations to accept mainland China’s interpretation of Taiwan’s status.

Shen Yu-chung, a deputy minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, pointed out that Beijing has in recent years leveraged its influence among Global South and African countries to further restrict Taiwan’s international participation. Since Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization, this year marked the first time it was forced to miss a ministerial meeting, held in Cameroon. At the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya, Taiwan representatives and scholars were also hindered from participating because of issues involving documentation and status.

In response to diplomatic pressure, Lin argued that Taiwan should not rely solely on values-based diplomacy, nor should it expect countries to choose sides between China and the US. Instead, Taiwan should integrate its interests more deeply into the energy, technology and supply chain strategies of its key partners.

After the South African government requested that Taiwan rename and relocate its representative office from the administrative capital, Pretoria, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs last year planned to classify 47 semiconductor-related products as items requiring approval for export to South Africa. The move was later suspended after South Africa proposed negotiations.

Meanwhile, after Papua New Guinea’s foreign minister recently announced the closure of Taiwan’s representative office, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it would continue discussions with Papua New Guinea and formulate responses on cooperation in areas such as trade and energy. On 28 July, the ministry announced that Taiwan would suspend spot purchases of liquefied natural gas from Papua New Guinea.

Lin cautioned that semiconductors and energy should not be handled in the same way. Restricting semiconductor exports could undermine international confidence in Taiwan’s reliability as a supplier. By comparison, as an energy buyer, Taiwan has greater room to use procurement arrangements to exert market influence.

He believes Taiwan’s future challenges will not be limited to diplomatic competition, but will also involve integrating its economy, security and international cooperation to build more resilient external relationships.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “北京对台工作四环相扣 和平统一工具趋向多元”.

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