How Trump’s new Greenland deal locks China out

When US President Donald Trump announced the new agreement on Greenland, he did not undersell it.

The US, he said, had secured “permanent control over security, and all other needs” in Greenland. Washington would be able to do what was necessary there “forever”, while American adversaries would be prevented from establishing a military presence or making sensitive investments without US approval.

Now that the agreement has been published, the picture is more nuanced.

The US has gained clearer and more permanent rights. But sovereignty remains with the Kingdom of Denmark; Greenland retains a formal role in decisions concerning its territory, and much of the military access highlighted by Trump was already possible.

The more consequential changes lie elsewhere. The agreement turns what had increasingly become an informal practice — treating certain foreign investments, particularly Chinese ones, as potential security problems — into a formal part of Greenland’s security framework.

Military access is not new

The US has had extensive military rights in Greenland for decades. During the Cold War, Washington operated 17 military installations there, with more than 10,000 US personnel at the height of its presence. Today, only Pituffik Space Base remains, with approximately 150 US personnel stationed there.

Those rights were rooted in the 1951 agreement, which already allowed for the establishment of new defence areas and gave American military aircraft extensive access. The new agreement builds on that framework by allowing the US to modernise and expand Pituffik and establish additional defence areas in Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig in southern and eastern Greenland respectively. Further defence areas can be established if the parties agree.

One new element is explicit underwater access for US public vessels. In practical terms, American submarines can move submerged through Greenlandic territorial waters unless the parties agree otherwise. Given Greenland’s importance for monitoring the North Atlantic and Russian naval activity, this is a noteworthy expansion.

It is not, however, equivalent to American sovereignty. The agreement preserves the red lines Denmark and Greenland brought to the negotiating table — sovereignty, territorial integrity and Greenlandic self-determination.

Permanent — but closely tied to NATO

Another change concerns duration.

While the 1951 defence agreement was formally tied to the continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty, the new agreement has no end date and can be amended only by mutual consent. Trump therefore has some basis for describing it as a “forever agreement”. However, Denmark’s prime minister is probably more accurate in saying that it can last forever.

Yet NATO runs through the document. It calls for stronger NATO engagement in the Arctic through greater presence, exercises, planning and intelligence cooperation. Denmark also commits itself to strengthening its own military posture in the region.

The agreement even looks beyond Greenland’s present constitutional relationship with Denmark. If Greenland becomes independent, Denmark and Greenland are to ensure that the new state remains within NATO, applying for membership if necessary, and assumes the obligations contained in the defence agreement.

For Greenland, the agreement thus explicitly recognises the right to independence while placing that possible future firmly within a Western security framework.

The agreement’s most notable new element concerns Greenland’s relations with third countries. Neither China nor Russia is named, but both are clearly implicit in provisions intended to prevent unwanted military and economic footholds.

Neither country has shown concrete interest in establishing a military base in Greenland, so the restrictions on non-NATO military installations are largely preventive. More consequential are the rules on foreign investment. Investors from countries outside NATO, NATO partner states and the EU can be prevented from obtaining control, significant influence or access to sensitive information in sectors including critical infrastructure and resource extraction.

Greenland remains responsible for applying its investment-screening rules in close cooperation with Danish authorities, while Denmark must consult closely with the US and other partners. This is not a straightforward American veto, but it makes the strategic boundaries around Greenland’s foreign economic relations much clearer.

Previous Chinese interest in Greenland provides the obvious context.

In 2016, the Chinese company General Nice Group expressed interest in purchasing the former naval station at Kangilinnguit. Denmark intervened and kept the facility out of Chinese hands. Two years later, the state-owned China Communications Construction Company participated in the tender process for Greenland’s major airport projects. Following American security concerns, Denmark offered financing and co-ownership, effectively displacing Chinese involvement.

In both cases, an economic transaction became a security issue.

While Greenlandic governments have regarded foreign investment as a way to diversify the economy and reduce dependence on Denmark, Washington and Copenhagen have increasingly viewed some of the same opportunities through a security lens.

The new agreement institutionalises that shift. What was previously handled case by case is now built into the framework governing Greenland’s foreign economic relations.

One deal, several narratives

The deal leaves each side with a different kind of gain — and a different story to tell.

For Greenland, the immediate gain is that the threat of US control has receded. The agreement also gives unusually explicit recognition to Greenland’s autonomous status, affirming Greenlanders as a people with a right to self-determination and acknowledging the path to independence. At the same time, it envisages any future independent Greenland remaining within NATO.

For Denmark, the agreement defuses an extraordinary crisis with its closest ally without conceding sovereignty or territorial integrity. Copenhagen can again present itself as a close US ally willing to accommodate American security concerns in the Arctic, while the pressure of the past two years has also brought Copenhagen and Nuuk closer together.

For the US, the gains are more limited than Trump’s rhetoric suggests, but they are real: a permanent framework, somewhat broader military rights and stronger safeguards against unwanted third-country military and economic involvement. Trump can therefore present the agreement as a victory even though it falls far short of his earlier ambitions to acquire or control Greenland.

Those narratives will now have to coexist with the harder task of rebuilding trust between Nuuk, Copenhagen and Washington after two years of pressure and uncertainty. The agreement may have ended the immediate crisis, but Trump’s unpredictability means renewed pressure cannot be ruled out. Rebuilding trust will depend above all on whether Washington can convince Greenland and Denmark that the new framework will be respected.

Related: Wanting Greenland: When the strong stop pretending | Cold reality: China’s Arctic push stalls in Finland