What kind of superpower will China be?

At their summit in Washington on 24 September, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to “constructive strategic stability” in bilateral relations on the basis of respect, fairness and reciprocity. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, this means equal sovereignty: neither country should dominate the other, and both should address their concerns on an equal footing. 

China has long sought this position. This confirms that it can no longer be bullied or humiliated by any other country and is accorded the respect it believes it deserves.

Now that China believes that the US has accepted it as its equal, it has become difficult for China to still avoid the term “superpower”, a status that brings responsibility and risk. What China does matters greatly to the world; what happens elsewhere matters just as much to China. Decisions made in Beijing now have consequences far beyond China’s borders, while wars, trade restrictions and political shifts elsewhere directly affect its own prospects.

Superpower China

So what kind of superpower will China be?

Many observers and practitioners, inside and outside China, believe it differs fundamentally from other great powers, but often reach radically different conclusions.

One view holds that, as the West declines, China in the 21st century has picked up from where the Asian tigers in the 20th century had left off, ushering in an “Asian century” built on “Asian values”. An opposing view instead predicts a “clash of civilisations”, focusing on the threat of China’s socialist and “authoritarian” system to the West. 

Both views date from the last decade of the previous century. Their interpretations differ politically, but have in common that they treat China as the bearer of a coherent civilisational or ideological alternative. They have returned as China’s power has grown, and often continue to rely on stereotypes about China’s political system, ideology, history and civilisation. They say little about what is actually happening in China.

Two path dependencies

A more useful approach follows two connected but complementary path dependencies. The first one is the continuing evolution of China’s socialist system; the second one, the growing demands of geopolitical rivalry. The first makes China a unique great power, the second a superpower like any other. Neither path can be understood on its own: domestic institutions shape China’s response to external pressures, which in turn change the purposes of those institutions.

China is not driven by an absolute antagonism to capitalism or liberalism. Its neo-socialist system has incorporated elements of both as part of the toolbox to build a prosperous, modern society and strengthen China’s global position. Achievements are expressed through modernity, civilisation, unity and the superiority of socialism and party rule. This may challenge other countries, but the challenge is neither an absolute nor an ideological one. Capitalism and liberal practices are used selectively, as instruments that can serve goals defined by the party. Their inclusion therefore does not mean a convergence with Western political systems.

China must also accommodate the world in which it operates, as its reforms since 1978 have repeatedly shown. Its system brings particular advantages and disadvantages, but its superpower role makes it less possible to develop in isolation. The benefits and costs of its choices are now felt by a much wider range of countries and, in return, external reactions increasingly constrain its choices.

Superpowering is only partly visible in new institutions. More often, existing ones receive new goals, wider reach and greater urgency. Examples include strengthening national security and the military, building the Communist Party, renewing ideology, developing a “high-quality” society and favouring self-sufficiency and disruptive technologies, sometimes at the expense of growth. Policies once aimed chiefly at domestic development and political control are being enlisted to sustain China’s position in a more hostile international environment.

Foreign-related rule of law

The growing foreign reach of China’s legal system illustrates the interaction between these two paths.

China’s foreign-related rule of law began with the extraterritorial application of Chinese law, especially the prosecution of corrupt officials and other fugitives abroad. It expanded to countermeasures against foreign sanctions, export controls and entity lists. China also seeks to shape the “international rule of law”, placing its own legal system closer to the centre of global governance. These legal tools protect Chinese interests abroad while giving Beijing more ways to respond to pressure from other states. They also express an ambition to influence the rules under which international exchange takes place.

This signals a new phase in China’s rise, creating geopolitical leverage over countries that depend on its trade, investment, technology or critical minerals.

China is extending its socialist legal system as a semi-permeable membrane for selective globalisation: open in some areas, restrictive and assertive in others. Having participated in an order shaped by others, it increasingly uses law to project power and reshape that order. The membrane allows engagement where it advances Chinese priorities, while limiting exposure to outside demands and protecting room for independent action.

A brave new world

Geopolitical rivalry also changes China’s competitors. The US and other countries are incorporating elements of China’s “model” into their societies and strategies. This reciprocal mimicry makes great powers more alike, even as each draws on the strengths and weaknesses of its own system. Industrial policy, supply-chain security and technology controls are examples of measures that have spread across rival systems.

Internationally, competition and conflict will encourage similar behaviour from China, the US and the EU, as well as Japan and India.

The 21st century will be neither an Asian century nor a clash of civilisations. Nor will China and the US simply dominate a bipolar world. Uncertain alliances and partnerships mean that less powerful countries, too, must learn to navigate superpower rivalry. They will make their own choices about dependence, security and cooperation rather than simply align with either side.

Our century will be marked by shifting alliances, conflicts, deals and agreements among superpowers, other great powers and middle powers. China will be prominent, but superpower status will no longer mean what it once did. Countries across the globe have drawn their own lessons, and neither China nor the US is likely to be trusted as a global hegemon as the latter once was.

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