Why Jensen Huang’s downfall favours Chinese AI

Jensen Huang’s downfall has exposed deep fractures in US chip policy and the fragile financing behind America’s AI boom. Professor Tan Kong Yam weighs in on why this could ironically hand China a decisive edge.

16 Nov 2026

Technology

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang speaks during a doorstep after attending the AI Ecosystem Reception in Tokyo, Japan, on 16 July 2026.
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang speaks during a doorstep after attending the AI Ecosystem Reception in Tokyo, Japan, on 16 July 2026. (Manami Yamada/Reuters)

(Edited and refined by Bai Kelei, with the assistance of AI translation.)

The downfall of Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang is far more than a sensational scandal involving an intimate relationship with a suspected Chinese intelligence operative. It also exposed three fundamental tensions in the US political and economic system: the conflict between business globalisation and national security, the growing politicisation of technological leadership, and the financial fragility beneath the unprecedented US artificial intelligence (AI) boom.

It also raised a thought-provoking question of whether China could ultimately be the biggest beneficiary of Jensen Huang’s downfall?

Commercial profit or espionage?

At the centre of the controversy is Alice Huang, a businesswoman of Chinese ethnicity with ties to Singapore-based Megaspeed. The company reportedly purchased servers equipped with Nvidia chips for its data centres in Malaysia.

US export controls restrict Chinese companies’ access to Nvidia’s advanced processors, creating lucrative opportunities for intermediaries operating outside China. Companies such as Megaspeed can buy servers, install them in Malaysian data centres and rent computing capacity remotely to Chinese AI developers, potentially including Alibaba. Purchases by Megaspeed’s Malaysian affiliates reportedly totalled at least US$4.8 billion between June 2024 and February 2026.

This business model offers an alternative explanation for Alice Huang’s activities: her motive may have been commercial profit rather than espionage.

Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs issued an important clarification on 12 November. Investigations found insufficient evidence to substantiate allegations that Alice Huang had committed offences relating to server declarations. The Singapore government also clarified that she was not being investigated for suspected espionage.

Washington’s clash over chip controls

There is an increasingly sharp conflict between Jensen Huang’s business philosophy and Washington’s national security priorities. He has long argued that restricting US semiconductor sales to China could be counterproductive because it would accelerate China’s technological self-reliance. By his logic, keeping China dependent on Nvidia’s hardware and software ecosystem would instead help preserve US technological influence.

Nvidia GeForce RTX series GPU products on display at a computer shop in the Akihabara district in Tokyo, Japan, on 13 November 2026.
Nvidia GeForce RTX series GPU products on display at a computer shop in the Akihabara district in Tokyo, Japan, on 13 November 2026. (Issei Kato/Reuters)

However, US national security hawks take the opposite view. They argue that providing China with advanced computing capacity could strengthen its military, intelligence and frontier AI research and development capabilities.

These are, in effect, two competing theories of technological power: one advocates maintaining strategic influence through technological dependence; the other seeks to secure strategic advantage through technological restrictions.

Jensen Huang’s close relationship with US President Donald Trump gives this disagreement considerable political significance. Trump has generally tended to view semiconductor restrictions as bargaining chips in negotiations with Beijing, while more hardline officials see China’s technological progress as a structural national security threat.

Jensen Huang’s support for open-source AI models may also conflict with the commercial interests of US proprietary AI developers, as cheaper Chinese alternatives could undermine their profitability.

Against this backdrop, the flurry of media reports, some relying on anonymous intelligence sources, gives legitimate grounds to question the origins of these disclosures and the motives behind them.

Were elements within the US national security establishment deliberately seeking to weaken Jensen Huang’s influence over semiconductor policy?

Whatever the motives, Jensen Huang’s departure could strengthen those advocating tighter semiconductor restrictions and accelerate the separation of the US and Chinese technology ecosystems.

Nvidia’s circular AI financing

A potentially more consequential issue is Nvidia’s central role in financing the US AI expansion. Under Jensen Huang, Nvidia has evolved beyond being merely a semiconductor supplier to become an investor, financier and guarantor supporting an interconnected business network of AI developers, cloud service providers and data centre operators.

Chillers that cool water are connected to a data centre building during a tour of the OpenAI data centre in Abilene, Texas, US, on 23 September 2025.
Chillers that cool water are connected to a data centre building during a tour of the OpenAI data centre in Abilene, Texas, US, on 23 September 2025. (Shelby Tauber/Pool/Reuters)

According to the Financial Times, Nvidia’s equity investments and related commitments reached US$124 billion as of July this year. It has made more than 120 investments this year, taken on US$36 billion in cloud computing purchase commitments and reportedly provided guarantees of up to US$105 billion for an OpenAI project in Ohio. Nvidia’s broader financing plans are also said to involve mobilising more than US$500 billion in external capital for AI infrastructure.

These arrangements raise a fundamental question: how much of the extraordinary growth in US AI investment reflects genuine demand from independent paying customers, and how much depends on companies financing one another and supporting each other’s purchases?

Huang is not only Nvidia’s technological visionary but also a key architect of its network of financial partnerships. His departure could therefore have two repercussions.

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First, investors may begin to question whether Nvidia can maintain its technological lead and sustain its extraordinary growth trajectory.

Second, a more financially conservative successor could reassess Nvidia’s investments, guarantees and infrastructure commitments.

Any reduction in Nvidia’s financial support could trigger a chain reaction. AI developers and specialist cloud computing operators could face higher financing costs, be forced to delay infrastructure projects and cut purchases of graphics processing units. Falling equipment prices and computing capacity rental rates could also erode collateral values, putting further pressure on lenders.

China’s low-cost open-weight challenge

The capital-intensive US model of AI development also faces a challenge from China’s increasingly competitive, low-cost open-weight models.

Frontier AI development in the US relies primarily on vast computing clusters, advanced semiconductors and expensive proprietary systems. By contrast, Chinese developers including DeepSeek, Alibaba and Moonshot AI have demonstrated the potential of cost-effective models through offerings such as DeepSeek, Qwen and Kimi. These models can be adapted to different needs and deployed more widely.

If AI with comparable performance becomes available at substantially lower prices, US proprietary model developers may struggle to achieve profit margins high enough to justify their enormous investments.

Jensen Huang’s downfall could produce a deeply ironic geopolitical outcome: measures intended to preserve US technological supremacy could instead accelerate China’s rise as a self-reliant AI power.

Why Beijing may ultimately win

Four mechanisms are particularly important.

First, technological restrictions could further strengthen China’s resolve to innovate independently. Tighter restrictions could spur China to accelerate the development of its semiconductor industry, alternative computing architectures and highly efficient AI models, reinforcing its strategy of technological self-reliance established after the 2018 ZTE crisis.

Second, China’s model of affordable, widely accessible AI could challenge the economic foundations of expensive US proprietary AI systems.

Qwen and Alibaba logos are seen in this illustration taken on 29 January 2025.
Qwen and Alibaba logos are seen in this illustration taken on 29 January 2025. (Dado Ruvic/Reuters)

Third, a sharp correction in US AI infrastructure investment could narrow the US advantage in access to financing, creating more opportunities for Chinese competitors.

Fourth, low-cost Chinese AI technology could gain greater influence in developing countries. For these economies, affordability, customisability and accessibility may matter more than marginal improvements in frontier model performance.

China may be able to replicate some of its success in solar panels, electric vehicle batteries and electric vehicles, bringing advanced technology to international markets at affordable prices.

Tighter restrictions could therefore inflict significant short-term losses on China while further strengthening its long-term drive for technological independence.

The Jensen Huang affair exposed deeper contradictions in US technology strategy. Washington is seeking to restrict China’s access to advanced AI chips, but excessive restrictions could instead accelerate China’s technological self-reliance.

At the same time, the highly complex financial ties between Nvidia and the AI industry raise questions about the sustainability of the capital-intensive US AI boom.

The ultimate outcome of the US-China AI rivalry may depend not on who invests the most money in AI infrastructure, but on who can provide smart services affordably and at scale, and translate technological innovation into sustained productivity growth.

If financial overexpansion in the US AI industry coincides with advances in China’s affordable, widely accessible AI technology, history may ultimately view Jensen Huang’s downfall as a pivotal moment in an unexpected shift in the global balance of technological power.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “从黄仁勋的陨落看美国AI繁荣的脆弱性”.

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