Why Jensen Huang’s ouster could backfire on the US
Jensen Huang’s exit from Nvidia looks like a win for Washington’s China hawks. Yet losing a rare tech visionary while alienating Chinese talent could erode America’s long-term AI edge, says commentator Deng Yuwen.
18 Nov 2026
Technology
Jensen Huang has resigned as Nvidia’s CEO and from its board. On the surface, Washington’s China hawks have emerged victorious. They had long resented Huang’s ability to use his close relationship with US President Donald Trump to influence US restrictions on advanced chip exports to China. Now, amid revelations of extramarital affairs and allegations involving a suspected Chinese spy, Huang has left the company he founded and led for 33 years. His opponents may believe they can now tighten restrictions, accelerate technological decoupling, and slow China’s progress in artificial intelligence (AI).
No other Jensen Huang
But I believe that while Huang’s ouster may help the US restrict China’s access to advanced technology in the short or even medium term, the long-term damage to America could be greater — and China may ultimately benefit.
First, America has lost not simply an accomplished executive but an exceptionally rare technology leader. It is as though the stronger side in a military confrontation had suddenly lost a commander of extraordinary strategic vision.
Leadership matters more here than management. Silicon Valley has no shortage of brilliant engineers, skilled executives or wealthy investors. Far rarer are people who can anticipate a technological shift and mobilise capital, talent and industrial resources to turn an immature technology into the foundation of an entire industry.
Huang was one of them. Nvidia began as a maker of graphics chips, but long before AI became the centre of global technological competition, Huang invested in general-purpose GPU computing and the CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture) software ecosystem. That sustained bet helped make Nvidia central to the AI revolution. Through investments, partnerships, supply chains and market development, he also helped create an industrial ecosystem in which countless companies and research institutions depend on Nvidia’s technology.
What distinguishes Huang is his combination of technical foresight, commercial judgment, and the ability to persuade customers and investors to commit enormous resources to an uncertain future. Those qualities cannot simply be replaced by appointing another Silicon Valley professional manager. Nvidia will not collapse overnight, but its future innovative capacity may suffer. So may America’s broader AI industry. China hawks have focused on Huang’s advocacy of chip sales to Beijing while overlooking what his leadership has contributed to American technological power. Is removing someone capable of shaping the next technological era really worth the satisfaction of restricting China’s access to today’s chips?
Limits of export control
Second, Washington may be overestimating the ability of export controls to contain China while underestimating China’s own capacity for innovation.
The US still leads in the most advanced AI chips, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and some foundational software. Stricter controls can raise costs for Chinese firms and impede frontier research. But slowing technological progress does not mean preventing it.
Successive US restrictions have not stopped China’s AI industry from advancing. The development of models such as DeepSeek, progress in domestic chips like Huawei’s Ascend series, and the growing adoption of AI in manufacturing show that China is building an indigenous technology ecosystem. Serious bottlenecks remain, but Chinese innovation cannot be reduced to dependence on American technology, let alone to stealing it.
Consider the reported stockpile of some 600,000 Nvidia H200 chips in Hong Kong awaiting permission to enter mainland China. Beijing’s reluctance to authorise large-scale imports does not mean Chinese companies have no need for them. Rather, its government appears unwilling to deepen the industry’s dependence on Nvidia’s technology. That choice imposes costs, but it also suggests a deliberate effort to change the direction of development.
When Chinese companies could readily buy Nvidia chips, they had little incentive to absorb the costs of domestic alternatives. American restrictions now push them to adapt Chinese chips, develop software tools, and build different computing architectures. Washington’s blockade thus both constrains China and encourages it to construct an independent system. China also possesses an enormous industrial base, extensive manufacturing supply chains, diverse applications and a large technical workforce — advantages export controls cannot erase.
AI competition will not be decided by chip performance alone. Algorithmic improvements, system integration, and industrial applications can partly offset hardware limitations. Over time, the effectiveness of American restrictions may fall short of what their advocates anticipate.
Losing Chinese talent in the US
But the larger long-term danger for America may lie not in semiconductor policy, but in the effect of Huang’s departure on technology professionals of Chinese descent.
The US has sustained its technological leadership in part by attracting talent from around the world. Researchers, engineers and entrepreneurs of Chinese descent are particularly important to its AI sector. They stay not only for better pay, research facilities and capital, but because they believe achievement in America can transcend birthplace and background.

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Huang was a powerful embodiment of that promise. Born in Taiwan and raised in the US, he built a company that became indispensable to the global AI industry. Now his story may convey a different message.
Across the Chinese-language public sphere, his departure has been widely interpreted as a political witch hunt by Washington’s establishment against a Chinese American entrepreneur. Many see a warning that even extraordinary contributions to American technology cannot eliminate suspicions of disloyalty when China enters the picture.
Whether Huang actually lost his position because of his ethnicity is not, in this context, the decisive question. What matters is how people interpret his fate — and whether that interpretation changes their choices. A scientist or entrepreneur of Chinese descent may conclude that American citizenship, professional success, and even founding a world-class company offer no immunity from political suspicion tied to Chinese heritage or connections. If Huang was vulnerable, who is not?
The consequences need not be hypothetical. The US Justice Department’s China Initiative, launched in 2018 to combat economic espionage and technology theft, also subjected some scientists of Chinese descent to questionable investigations and prosecutions. The department later acknowledged that the initiative had fuelled perceptions of bias and mistrust, contributing to a chilling effect in American research. The consequences of that climate did not end with the programme’s termination. More professors and researchers have returned to China in recent years. Not all those departures can be attributed to the initiative, but politics clearly shapes scientists’ sense of professional security.
Dent to America’s innovation advantage
Huang’s case may carry even greater psychological weight. He was not a professor investigated over academic collaboration, but a billionaire founder at the pinnacle of American technology. Yet a private relationship involving China and national-security suspicions helped bring down his leadership of the company he created. That spectacle could lead other talented people to reassess the risks of building their futures in the US.
It is too early to predict a mass return of Chinese American scientists to China, and a mass departure is not necessary for strategic consequences. If even a small number of exceptionally innovative researchers or potential technology leaders choose to build companies in China — or cease to view America as their preferred destination — their impact could far exceed their numbers.
China, moreover, is not the country it was a decade ago. Its technological ecosystem is more developed, its entrepreneurial opportunities broader, and its pool of engineers stronger. In AI, semiconductors and other frontier industries, it increasingly offers an environment in which ambitious researchers can pursue consequential work.
Here lies the paradox. Washington’s China hawks seek to preserve America’s technological edge by denying China advanced American chips. But if the same political climate breeds distrust among people of Chinese descent, drives away future innovators, and helps China attract them, are those policies securing America’s advantage — or eroding its capacity to create the next one?
Chips determine the computing resources available today. Talent, vision and leadership shape tomorrow’s breakthroughs. Focusing only on the first risks a strategic miscalculation.
Losing the long-term battle
The ultimate balance sheet cannot be measured simply by how many export restrictions US Congress passes or how many Nvidia chips Chinese firms fail to obtain. What matters is whether Nvidia and the wider American AI industry can maintain their innovative dynamism without Huang; whether China can use external pressure to develop its own technological ecosystem; and whether America’s increasingly politicised competition with China diminishes its ability to attract exceptional talent.
Washington’s China hawks appear to have won a political battle. But political victory is not the same as strategic success. If denying China today’s chips also undermines America’s capacity to invent tomorrow’s technologies, the long-term consequences of Huang’s ouster may be precisely the opposite of what his opponents intended.
Related: Why Jensen Huang’s downfall favours Chinese AI | Without Jensen Huang, who holds the US-China tech bridge together?
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